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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ARBITRATION
COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA""
By MATTHEW C. R. CRAVEN:f:
1. INTRODUCTION
At a meeting in Brussels on 27 August 1991, the European Community
and its Member States agreed to convene an International Conference
for Peace in Yugoslavia with a view to finding a permanent and pacific
solution to the crisis within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) which had resulted in conflict.' Those to attend the opening
session in The Hague were the Federal Presidency and Federal Govern-
ment of Yugoslavia, the Presidents of the six Republics, the President of
the EC Council and representatives of the EC Commission and EC
Member States." With a view to finding 'a peaceful accommodation of
the conflicting aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples', it was decided that
an Arbitration Commission should be created 'in the framework of the
Conference'> to which 'the relevant authorities will submit their differ-
ences' .4
The Arbitration Commission so created delivered ten 'opinions'
between December 1991 and July 1992.5 Opinions 1-3 and 8-10 were
delivered in response to questions formulated by the Chairman of the EC
peace conference, and Opinions 4-7 on the initiative of the Council of
Ministers of the EC. It also rendered an 'interlocutory decision' prior to
its eighth opinion following Serbia and Montenegro's challenge to its
• © Dr Matthew C. R. Craven, 1996.
:t: Lecturer in Law, University of Leicester.
, Joint Statement, 28 August 1991, Bulletin of the EC, 24 (1991), no. 7/8, p. 115, s. 1.4.25. It was
stated (p. 116): 'The Community and its member States cannot stand idly by as the bloodshed in
Croatia increases day by day. An agreement on the monitoring of the cease-fire and its maintenance
should allow the Community and its :\1ember States to convene a peace conference and establish an
arbitration procedure.'
~ Ibid.
.1 Joint Statement, 3 September 1991, Bulletin of the EC, 24 (1991), no. 9, p. 63, s. 1.4. I. The idea
of creating a European Court of Conciliation and Arbitration had been advanced earlier by Robert
Badinter, President of the French Constitutional Court: see note, La Monde, 21 June 1991.
of Joint Statement, loc. cit. above (n. I).
S In total, the Commission issued fifteen opinions: Opinion No. I, International Legal Materials,
31 (1992), p. 1494; Opinion No. 2, ibid., p. 1497; Opinion No. 3, ibid., p. 1499; Opinion No, 4, ibid.,
p. 1501; Opinion No. 5, ibid., p. 1503; Opinion No. 6, ibid., p. 1507; Opinion No. 7, ibid., p. 1512;
Opinion No, 8, ibid., p. 1521; Opinion No, 9, ibid., p. 1523; Opinion No, 10, ibid., p. 1525.
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334 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
competence." In January 1993 the Arbitration Commission was 'recon-
stituted', its composition and terms of reference being revised and
clarified." In that form, the Arbitration Commission delivered a further
five opinions (Opinions I 1-15).8 Since 1993, although the Conference of
Yugoslavia has still been operating," the Commission has not been asked
to deliver any further opinions on matters arising.
The fifteen opinions delivered by the Arbitration Commission repre-
sent an important and unusual range of opinions on a variety of questions
of international law relating to statehood and succession. Rarely has it
been the case that a body of legal experts has been asked to deliver a series
of apparently abstract opinions on the international legal dimensions of
the dismemberment of a single State. In a formal sense, the opinions of
the Arbitration Commission are not binding on any of the States
concerned. The Commission was not created in virtue of an international
arbitration agreement between disputing parties, and had no treaty base.
Rather, it was an executive creation on the part of the EC and its Member
States acting through the medium of the Conference on Yugoslavia. Its
opinions were directed not to the parties concerned but to the Con-
ference itself, and were delivered in a consultative capacity. 10 N ever-
theless, as has been made clear with respect to the International Court of
Justice (lCJ), advisory opinions delivered by independent judicial bodies
have considerable moral and political authority, and while not having the
effect of res judicata may be declaratory of general international law. II
Even if the Arbitration Commission cannot strictly be seen as an
'independent judicial body', it was certainly independent of the disputing
parties, it attempted to conduct its activities in a broadly judicial manner,
and it sought to found its opinions in general international law. As such,
its opinions may be treated as non-binding but authoritative statements
of the relevant law.
Ultimately, the significance of the Arbitration Commission's opinions
may be appreciated in two ways. First, the opinions served to provide a
I> Interlocutory Decision, ibid., p. 1518.
7 International Legal Materials, 32 (1993), p. 1572.
Ii Opinion No. II, ibid., p. 1586; Opinion No. 12, ibid., p. 1589; Opinion :"1/0.13, ibid., p. 1591;
Opinion No. 14, ibid., p. 1593; Opinion No. 15, ibid., p. 1595.
Q See Reports of Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia, S/1994/1074, 19 September 1994; S/1994/1124, 3 October 1994; S/1994/1246,
3 November 1994; S/1994/1372, I December 1994; S/1994/1454 29 December 1994; S/1994/811,
8 July 1994; S/1994/83, 26 January 1994; S/1995/175, 2 March 1995; S/1995/30 2; 5/1995/6, 5
January 1995. Reports of the Secretary-General on the International Conference on Yugoslavia:
5/24795, II November 1992; 5/25°15, 24 December 1992; 5/25050, 6 january 1993; 5/25100,
Annex, 14 january 1993; S/25221, 2 February 1993; 5/25708, 30 April 1993; 5/257°9, 3 :\lay
1993·
10 Below, nn. 78-85.
\I See separate opinion of judgc Azevedo in the Peace Treaties case, ICY Report, 1950, p. 79, at
p. 80. In the same case judge Zoricic noted that 'in practice, an advisory opinion given by the Court
in regard to a dispute between States is nothing else than an unenforceable judgment': ibid., p. 101.
cr. Article 38( I )(d), Statute of the ICj.
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ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 335
legal rationalization for elements of State practice that were otherwise
contradictory or incoherent. For example, its view that in the dis-
memberment of the SFRY the principle of uti possidetis juris should be
applied to 'internationalize' former administrative boundaries 12 essen-
tially followed earlier statements of the EC Member States to the effect
that they would 'never recognize changes of [former internal] frontiers
which have not be brought about by peaceful means and by agree-
merits'."? Secondly, the Commission's opinions also had a proactive
dimension, in that they provided a legal framework for the development
of subsequent State practice. For example, the EC and its Member
States, in refusing to accept the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) as the sole successor to the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY), expressly referred to the Arbitration Commission's
conclusions in Opinion No. 10. 14 The view that the SFRY underwent a
process of disrnemberment" was also undoubtedly influential as regards
the United Nations' determination that the FRY should not continue
automatically the membership of the former SFRY in the UN.16 In fact
the influence exerted by the opinions of the Arbitration Commission
became a point of issue as far as the FRY was concerned, which
complained that in practice the advisory opinions 'were taken as judg-
ments and served as a basis for making concrete decisions on relevant
issues concerning the Yugoslav crisis'. 17
It should be noted, however, that the opinions of the Arbitration
Commission were not entirely determinative of State practice. Despite
its findings to the contrary, EC Member States proceeded to recognize
Croatia as an independent State and at the same time refused to give
diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Macedonia. IX As will be seen,
however, this was largely due to the fact that on the issue of recognition,
the Arbitration Commission was acting as a fact-finding body and its
opinions were treated merely as a matter of information. In any case, it
is apparent that the main elements of the Commission's opinions broadly
corresponded with State practice and provided a legal framework for the
precarious territorial and political settlement that was ultimately
imposed upon the former Yugoslavia.
'2 Below, n, 307.
'.' Joint Statement, loco cit. above (n. I). While the principle outlined by the EC might have been
acceptable as regards existing international frontiers, it was highly unusual in so far as it referred to
a situation which was at the time prima facie internal. See Weller, 'The International Response to
the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', American Journal of International
Law, 86 (1992), p. 569, at pp. 575-6.
'4 Statement of EC Member States, 22 September 1992, this Year Book, 63 (1992), p. 658.
'; Opinion No. 8, loco cit. above (n. 5), p. 1523 .
• 1> SC Resn. 777, 19 September 1992.
'7 Letter from the Deputy Prime Minister and :Ylinister for Foreign Affairs of the FRY addressed
to the ICFY Co-Chairmen, 2 July 1993. International Legal Materials, 32 (1993), p. 1584.
,>I Below, nn. 257-8.
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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
2. THE ARBITRATION COMMISSION 1 9
2.1. Membership
Under its initial mandate, the Arbitration Commission was to consist
of five members, three of whom were to be appointed by the EC and its
Member States, and the other two by the Yugoslav Federal Preaidency.?'
The EC and its Member States accordingly designated the President of
the French Conseil Constitutionnel (Robert Badinter), the President of the
German Federal Constitutional Court (Roman Herzog) and the Presi-
dent of the Italian Constitutional Court (AIdo Corasaniti). The Yugoslav
Federal Presidency, however, was unable to come to a unanimous
agreement on the proposed candidates. This possibility had been specifi-
cally foreseen in the Commission's terms of reference, which had
provided that where no agreement was possible on the appointment of
the Yugoslav members, they would be chosen by the other three
mernbers.:" Accordingly the final two members were appointed, and
were the President of the Spanish Constitutional Court (Francisco
Tomas y Valiente) and the President of the Belgian Cour d'A rbitrage
(Irene Petry). At its first session, M. Badinter was appointed as the
President of the Commission, and it was decided that the Commission
would continue to sit in Paris. It also adopted a set of rules of procedure
which were not made public.:"
When the EC Arbitration Commission was reconstituted in January
1993 its composition was similarly changed. As previously, it was
determined that the Arbitration Commission should be composed of five
permanent members: three to be designated by the Council of Ministers
of the EC from among incumbent Presidents of Constitutional Courts of
the existing Member States or from members of the highest courts of
19 See generally Pellet, "Note Sur la Commission d'Arbitrage de la Conference Europeenne Pour
la Paix en Yugoslavie', Annuaire francais de droit international, 37 (1991), p. 329; id., "L'Activite de
la Commission d'Arbitrage de la Conference Europeenne Pour la Paix en Yugoslavie', ibid., 38
(1992), p. 220; id., "L'Activitie de la Commission d'Arbitrage de la Conference Europeenne Pour la
Paix en Yugoslavie', ibid., 39 (1993), p. 286; Regazzi, 'Introductory Note', International Legal
Materials, 31 (1992), p. 1488.
20 Joint Statement, loc. cit. above (n. I).
2' Ibid.
22 Pellet describes the working methods as follows:
'cette procedure est derneuree extrerncment souple, inforrnelle et discrete. Sur chaque problerne,
un rapporteur a etc assure par I'envoi ... it chacune des parties interessees des documents ernanant
des autres parties. En revanche, la Commission a refuse de donner suite aux demands d'audience qui
lui ont etc transmises, et, bien qu'elle ait envisage la possibilite de designer des delegues mandates
collectivement pour se rendre sur place a fin d'information ct d'jnstruction. elle n'a jamais utilise
cette procedure.
De merne, bien qu'elle efit prevu que ses recommandations seraient adoptees it la majorite simple
des voix sans possibilite d'abstention ni indication sur Ie sens du vote des members qui, cependant,
pourraient publier, le cas echeant, des opinions dissidentcs, eIle a arrete ses positions par
consensus. '
(Loc, cit. above (n, 19) (1991), p. 332.)
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ARBITRATION COl.VlMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 337
those States;'? the fourth member was to be designated by the President
of the ICj from among the former members of that Court or persons
possessing the qualifications required by Article 2 of the Statute of the
Court; the final member was to be a member of the European Court of
Human Rights, designated by the President of that Court. It was further
stipulated that no two members were to have the same nationality and
that each member 'is to serve as long as he or she holds the office on the
basis of which the designation is made'. 2+ In addition to the permanent
members of the Arbitration Commission, it was provided that in
contentious proceedings, the contending parties would each be entitled
to appoint an ad hoc member to the Commission. The ad hoc members
should either be incumbent members of Constitutional Courts or highest
courts in existing Member States of the CSCE or qualify in the same
manner as the fourth and fifth permanent members of the Commis-
sion.
Pursuant to the terms of reference of the Commission, and in light of
the responses provided by the Presidents of the ICj and European Court
of Human Rights, the initial composition of the Commission was as
follows: Robert Badinter (President of the Constitutional Court of
France), Francisco Paolo Casavola (President of the Constitutional Court
of Italy), Roman Herzog (President of the Constitutional Court of
Germany), Elizabeth Palm (Judge of the European Court of Human
Rights), jose Maria Ruda (former President of the ICj). The Arbitration
Commission's competence with respect to contentious proceedings was
never invoked and therefore no ad hoc members were ever appointed to
sit upon the Commission.
2.2. The Constitution of the A rbitration Commission
The legal basis of the Arbitration Commission is to be found initially
in the EC Declaration of 27 August 1991. In that Declaration the EC and
its Member States, together with the various parties to the Yugoslav
crisis, resolved to create an arbitral procedure 'in the framework of the
peace Conference' with a view to considering 'differences' submitted by
'[tjhe relevant authorities'. 25 It was further resolved that '[t]he relevant
authorities will submit their differences to an arbitration Commission of
five members'. 26
These initial terms of reference fall considerably short of what one
would usually expect of an arbitral procedure. As the International Law
Commission's Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure suggest, the terms of
z'\ It was understood that initially those members were to be those from France, Germany and
Italy.
2~ Ibid.
2~ Joint Statement, loc. cit. above (n. J), p. 116.
", Ibid.
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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
a compromis should indicate as a minimum '(a) the undertaking to
arbitrate according to which the dispute is to be submitted to the
arbitrators; (b) the subject-matter of the dispute and, if possible, the
points on which the parties are or are not agreed; (c) the method of
constituting the tribunal and the number of arbitrators'. 27 In addition, it
suggested that a number of other provisions deemed desirable by the
parties might be indicated, such as the rules of law to be adopted by the
tribunal, the procedure to be followed, the majority required for
the award, the time limit within which the award should be made and the
languages to be employed in the proceedings.t" As far as the Arbitration
Commission was concerned, all that was made utterly clear was the
composition of the Commission. In terms of the undertaking to arbitrate,
the identity of the parties to the dispute, and the subject-matter(s)
covered by the procedure, there remained a number of questions to be
resolved. Before addressing such questions, it is worth considering what
might have been intended by the parties concerned in specifically
creating what they termed to be an 'Arbitration Commission'. 29
Arbitration is traditionally understood as meaning 'the settlement of
disputes between States by judges of their own choice and on the basis of
respect for law'. 3° The two dimensions of arbitration highlighted by this
definition, which set it apart from other forms of international dispute
settlement, are, on the one hand, the need for the consent of States at
every stage of the arbitration process (including the right to choose their
own judges>') and, on the other hand, the legal nature of the award.>"
Arbitration may thus be distinguished from other forms of diplomatic
settlement such as conciliation.v' mediation>' or negotiation.e! in virtue
~7 General Assembly Official Records, 13th Session, Supplement No, 9, Doc. A/38S9, pp. 5-8
( 1958).
~!1 Ibid., Article 2.
~9 It should be noted, nevertheless, that denomination alone cannot be determinative. That a body
is specifically referred to as an 'Arbitration Commission' does not necessitate that it is to engage in
arbitration in the proper sense.
3° Article IS, Hague Convention 1899; Article 37, Hague Convention 1907. The International
Law Commission similarly defined arbitration as 'a procedure for the settlement of disputes between
States by a binding award on the basis of law and as a result of an undertaking voluntarily accepted';
Yearbook of the ILC, 1953, vol. 2, p. 202.
31 Johnson, 'The Constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal', this Year Book, 30 (1953), p. 152.
3~ See Fox, 'Arbitration', in International Disputes: The Legal Aspects (1972), p. 101, at
pp. 101-2.
H Merrills describes conciliation as: 'a method for the settlement of international disputes of any
nature according to which a commission set up by the parties, either on a permanent basis or an ad
hoc basis to deal with a dispute, proceeds to the impartial examination of the dispute and attempts
to define the terms of a settlement susceptible of being accepted by them or affording the Parties,
with a view to its settlement, such aid as they may have requested': International Dispute Settlement
(and edn., 1991), p. 59. It is clearly open for judicial tribunals, such as the ICJ, to undertake a
conciliatory function: see North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICY Reports, 1969, p. 3. See also Fox,
'Conciliation', in International Disputes: The Legal Aspects (1972), p. 93.
H Darwin, "Mediation and Good Offices', in International Disputes: The Legal Aspects (1972),
p.83·
3S Darwin, 'Negotiation', in International Disputes: The Legal Aspects (1972), p. 77.
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ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 339
of the fact that in cases of arbitration, the parties are obliged to accept the
award as binding.>" That arbitration is essentially a legal task has certain
consequences for the composition and functioning of the arbitral body.
The arbitral body must proceed strictly within its terms of reference and
must respect the rules of natural justice. The judicial character of the
body was stressed, for example, by the PCI] in the Interpretation of
Article ], Paragraph 2, of the Treaty ofLausanne case, where it found that
because of its political composition it was 'impossible, properly speaking,
to regard the Council, acting in its capacity of an organ of the League of
Nations ... as a tribunal of arbitrators'. 37 Despite the similarities in
function, arbitration is also usually distinguished from judicial settle-
ment. As has frequently been noted, however, no clear-cut distinction
can be made, the differences lying more in terms of typological character-
istics>" such as the relative permanence of the tribunal>" and the degree
of control exercised by the disputing parties over its composition and
procedure.4°
Given that the Arbitration Commission was to be composed of jurists
appointed by the EC and its Member States on the one hand, and the
Yugoslav Federal Presidency on the other, one might assume that the
Commission was created to arbitrate on disputes arising between those
parties. That of course was never the intention, it being clear from the
fact that the Arbitration Commission was created within the framework
of the Conference on Yugoslavia that the disputes to which it would
address itself were those arising from the conflict within the SFRY
following the attempted secession of Croatia and Slovenia. This raises a
number of significant problems as regards both the characterization of
the procedure and the application of legal principle.
The first, and most obvious, problem relates to the legal status of the
disputing parties. Even on the most optimistic analysis.v' the statehood
of Croatia and Slovenia can only clearly be established once the three-
month suspension of their declarations of independence came to an end
J" Article 37 of the 1907 Hague Convention adds to the defiinition: 'Recourse to arbitration
implies an engagement to submit in good faith to the award'.
J7 Advisory opinion, PCIY, Series B, No. 12, at p. 26 (1925).
.1H Brownlie cites the following factors as being influential in designating a tribunal as an 'arbitral
tribunal': (i) if the compromis is likely to allow settlement on extra-legal principles; (ii) if the agency
of decision is designated as an 'arbitral tribunal'; (iii) if the tribunal consists of an odd number and
includes representatives from the disputing States; (iv) if the tribunal is merely created to deal with
a particular dispute, or class of disputes; (v) if there is flexibility in the procedures: Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law (4th edn., 1990), p. 710.
JQ Merrills, op. cit. above (n. 33), p. 80.
40 Schwarzenberger notes that 'the only difference between arbitration and judicial settlement lies
in the method of selecting the members of these judicial organs. While, in arbitration proceedings,
this is done by agreement between the parties, judicial settlement presupposes the existence of a
standing tribunal with its own bench of judges and its own rules of procedure which parties to a
dispute must accept': Manual of International Law (6th edn., 1976), p. 195.
4' Below, nn. 252-61.
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34° THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
on 8 October 1991.4 z As regards the other Republics, their acquisition of
statehood occurred somewhat later (up to nine months later in the case of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviaj.e> Accordingly, it appears that the
Arbitration Commission was not intended to arbitrate on differences
between 'States' as such, but rather, non-State actors ..~4 This much, at
least, was implicitly recognized in the terms of its mandate, which
referred opaquely to the 'relevant authorities' between which the Com-
mission was to arbitrate.t" Having said that, it cannot have been far from
the minds of those involved in the creation of the Commission that at
least some of the Republics were likely to acquire independent statehood
in the foreseeable future and that questions of public international law
were therefore likely to arise.
The very real difficulty facing the Conference was therefore providing
a legal basis for the jurisdiction of the Commission. Arbitration, as a
procedure for settling disputes in national or international law, is always
constructed on the basis of a compromis-a binding agreement between
two parties (either on an ad hoc or a general basis-") to submit a dispute
to the jurisdiction of an arbitrator or an arbitration tribunal. If the
agreement were solely founded in Yugoslav law, it would not sufficiently
deal with matters relating to the acquisition of statehood and subsequent
issues of statehood. Similarly, if the agreement were founded in inter-
national law, it could only bind the Republics themselves in so far as they
were deemed to have international personality as States in statu nas-
cendir? and only to the extent that they were deemed to have consented
to the procedure.
In the event, the agreement on arbitration was essentially contained in
the Declaration adopted by the Conference on Yugoslavia. Although it
was approved by all the participants of the Conference, it cannot readily
be seen as a treaty or other form of binding commitment. Rather, it
42 See Opinion No. II, loc. cit. above (n. 8), p. 1588.
43 This assumes, of course, that the FRY is not the continuation ofthe SFRY: below, nn. 224-32.
H That, at the time of the creation of the arbitration procedure, the situation was essentially
internal to the SFRY, was in some respects reflected in the composition of the Arbitration
Commission. The Arbitration Commission in the first instance contained judges from constitutional
COurts across Europe, suggesting that the lex arbitri was intended to be Yugoslav law and that the
Commission was to enquire inter alia into the legitimacy and effects of the secession of Slovenia and
Croatia under the Yugoslav Constitution.
45 It was open to question whether the leaders of the Serbian enclave within Croatia (which had
constituted itself as the Serbian Autonomous Republic of Krajina) could have been considered
'relevant authorities' for the purposes of the dispute settlement procedure.
41> The difference between ad hoc and general compronns is that in the latter case, States agree to
submit all or definite classes of disputes to a tribunal (usually an arbitral institution). In the latter
case, there is usually the need for a further 'special agreement' or 'implementing compromis' to
outline the details of the procedure to be adopted and the issues that the tribunal is to deal with. See
Oellers-Frahm, 'Cornpromis', in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. I (1991), p. 712.
47 See Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (1979), pp. 391-6; Brownlie, op, cit.
above (n. 38), p, 79.
 at School of O
riental and A
frican Studies on February 21, 2014
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 341
appears to be in the form of a 'gentleman's agreement' incorporating a
declaration of intention or preliminary agreement to submit disputes to
arbitration. As Pellet suggests of the Declaration creating the Commis-
sion, '[ill s'agit ... d'un acte concerte non conventionne1 sans valeur
juridique obligatoire'. 4 H Thus, although there was nothing to prevent the
EC creating an Arbitration Commission pursuant to the Declaration, the
'relevant parties' were in no sense obliged to submit their differences to
it.?? Indeed, it is likely that were they to do so, a further 'implementing
compromis' would be necessary in order to lay down the details of the
procedure to be followed, or at least the expression of ad hoc consent.
The initial terms of reference of the Arbitration Commission were
supplemented in a joint statement of 3 September 199 I, which specified
that the Chairman of the EC Peace Conference would transmit to the
Arbitration Commission the issues submitted for arbitration, and that
the results of the Commission's deliberations would then be returned to
the Peace Conference through its chairman.r" The intercession of the
Chairman of the Peace Conference in the arbitration procedure would
not be significant if he merely represented a channel of communication.
It would, however, significantly alter the nature of the procedure if the
Chairman were to involve himself, as he later did, in determining the
questions that were ultimately to be addressed by the Commission.t ' In
the latter case, the Commission would find itself in the position not of
arbitrating between two parties, but rather of delivering a legal opinion
to the Conference as an advisory organ.
In fact, of its first ten opinions, six resulted from references to the
Commission by the Chairman of the Peace Conference (Lord Carring-
ton), two of which had been initiated by Serbia but were redrafted by the
Chairman. The other four (relating to the conditions for recognition)
were referred to the Commission by the Council of Ministers of the EC.
That the Commission considered itself obliged to respond to the request
of the Council to deliver opinions on the diplomatic recognition of the
Republics lends some ambiguity as to the States or institutions to which
it was responsible. Indeed, what serves to confuse matters is that the
creation of the Commission was in effect initiated under the auspices of
the EC in an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Council of
4
H Pellet, loco cit. above (n. 19) (1991), p. 331.
4<> This is the case irrespective of the fact that the Declaration provides that the relevant
authorities 'will submit their differences' to the Arbitration Commission (emphasis added): Joint
Statement, loco cit. above (n. I).
se Interlocutory Decision, loco cit. above (n. 6), p. 1520.
S' Cf. Schwebel, 'Was the Capacity to Request an Advisory Opinion Wider in the Permanent
Court of International Justice than it is in the International Court of Justice?', this Year Book, 62
(199 1), p. 77·
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342 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Ministers'? and that it was funded primarily from the EC budget. 53 It
would appear nevertheless that the Commission was not intended to be
an organ of the Community, but rather one of the Peace Conference as a
separate entity. Its response to the request of the EC for opinions may
presumably be explained by the fact that the EC and its Member States
were members of the Conference. As will be seen below, however, many
of the confusions that attached to the Arbitration Commission's initial
terms of reference were subsequently remedied when its constitution was
revised and clarified on 27 January 1993.54 That initiative was undoubt-
edly prompted by the first of two challenges that were raised by the FRY
against the jurisdiction of the Commission.
2.3. The First Challenge to Jurisdiction5 5
The competence of the Commission to render 'opinions' on issues put
before it by the Chairman of the Commission and the Council of
Ministers of the EC went unchallenged for the first seven of its fifteen
opinions. When it came to deal in detail with issues relating to the terms
of succession in June 1992, however, its competence was challenged by
Serbia and Montenegro. The Chairman of the Arbitration Commission
was informed by the Presidents of Montenegro (Momir Bulatovic) and
Serbia (Slobodan Milosevic) that they challenged the Commission's
competence to give an opinion on the latest three questions (which were
to form Opinions 8-10) submitted to it by the Chairman of the
Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia. 56 They contended that: (i) the
questions did not fall within the mandate given to the European
Community under the terms of the Brioni agreement; (ii) that out-
standing matters between the various Republics should be resolved by
S2 The Community and its :\1ember States convened the Conference 'under their aegis'. They
agreed to 'ensure the Chairmanship of the Conference' and stipulated that the proceedings would be
'conducted on their behalf by a Chairman on the basis of a mandate from them': joint Statement,
loc. cit. above (n. 3).
S3 Pellet notes that '[djes sa premiere reunion, la Commission decida d'ailleurs que "Ie reieve des
frais engages (voyages, traductions, fais de telephone et de telecopie) serait centralise a Paris et
transmis ulterieurernent a fins de remboursement a l'organe competent de la Comrnunaute", en
I'espece la Presidence'; Pellet, loc. cit. above (n. 19) (1991), p. 332.
S4 Note on Composition and Terms of Reference, International Legal Materials, 32 (1993),
P·1573·
H The terms 'jurisdiction' and 'competence' have been used loosely in the practice of the ICj.
Here, the approach advocated by Fitzmaurice will be used, namely, to use 'jurisdiction' as a term
associated with the tribunal's entire jurisdictional field ratione materiae, personae or termporis; and
'competence' as the tribunal's capacity to determine a particular case: see Fitzmaurice, 'The Law
and Procedure of the International Court of justice', this Year Book, 34 (1958), p. 5, at pp. 8-<). Cf.
Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court (and edn., 1985), pp. 296-304; Pratap, The
Advisory jurisdiction of the International Court (1972 ) , pp. 113-15.
sf> Interlocutory Decision, loc. cit. above (n. 6), p. 1518.
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ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 343
means of an overall agreement; and (iii) that those questions that could
not be resolved by agreement should be submitted to the IC] ,57
These points were addressed by the Commission in what was termed
an 'interlocutory decision' before going on to consider the questions that
became the subject of Opinions 8 to 10. The first issue to be dealt with
by the Commission in its interlocutory decision was whether it was in
fact able to pronounce upon its own competence in the case at hand (the
competence de La competence). This matter had been specifically contested
by Serbia and Montenegro-" which apparently considered that the
jurisdiction of the Commission had to be determined by the parties to the
arbitration proceedings rather than by the Commission itself. 59 The
Commission initially pointed out that it had been established, not as
Serbia and Montenegro had suggested under the Brioni Agreement of
7 july 199 1, 6 0 but by the joint statement on Yugoslavia adopted on 27
August 1991.6 1 It also noted that the arrangements set out in that
document, although summary in nature, had been accepted by the six
Yugoslav Republics. Moreover, it was clear 'from the terminology used
and even the composition of the Commission that the intention was to
create a body capable of resolving on the basis of law the differences
which were to be submitted to it by the parties' .62 This, as the
Commission argued, 'precisely constitutes the definition of arbitration'
as defined by the Iej in the Arbitral Award of yi July I989 case (1991).63
I t followed that since the Commission was an arbitral tribunal properly
so-called, it was therefore competent to determine its own jurisdiction.
Recalling the dicta of the IC] in the N ottebohm case (Preliminary
57 Ibid., p. 15 1 9 .
.<M Ibid .
.<" There is some evidence in the Commission's decision that Serbia's objection on this point was
itself the subject of objections by other Republics, the Commission considering it necessary to
ascertain its competence 'independent of any dispute on this point' and without considering the
'admissibility of [the] preliminary objections': ibid. See also Pellet, loc. cit. above (n. 19) (1992),
p.223·
too The Brioni Agreement, brokered by the EC, provided inter alia for the withdrawal of j:'-JA
forces from Slovenia in return for the suspension of the implementation of Croatia's and Slovenia's
declarations of independence for a period of three months: Keesing's Record of World Ecents
(hereinafter Keesing's), vol. 37, p. 38374 (1991).
I" The source of Serbia and :\'lontenegro's confusion on the point is unclear: the Brioni
Agreement itself made no mention of the Conference on Yugoslavia, let alone the Arbitration
Commission that was later to be set up.
to. Interlocutory Decision, loc. cit. above (n. 6), p. 1519.
I.", ICY Reports, 1991, p. 50. In that case the ICj made the following point:
, ... when states sign an arbitration agreement, they are concluding an agreement with a very
specific object and purpose: to entrust an arbitration with the task of settling a dispute in
accordance with the terms agreed by the parties, who define in the agreement the jurisdiction of
the tribunal and determine its limits. In the performance of the task entrusted to it, the tribunal
"must conform to the terms by which the Parties have defined this task".'
(Ibid., p. 70.) It may be noted that this definition is not 'precisely' that advanced by the Arbitration
Commission, in that it makes no mention of the legal nature of the issues to be decided.
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344 THE EUROPEAN COl\1MUNITY
Objectiony/" the Commission noted that this was a principle of inter-
national law that had been generally accepted in the field of arbitration
'since the Alabama case'.6s
On this initial point the reasoning of the Commission is largely opaque
and even confused. Although it is generally accepted that international
tribunals have an inherent power to determine their own jurisdiction.t" it
is doubted whether the reasoning pursued by the Commission to
establish this point is sound. The Commission suggested that this
competence derived from its position as an arbitral tribunal. I t is clear, as
the ICJ suggested, that in cases where parties to a dispute refer the
matter to arbitration by means of a compromis, the tribunal must be
deemed to possess, de minimis, the competence to interpret the terms of
the compromis unless specifically excluded from doing SO.67 If it were
otherwise, the very object of arbitration would be defeated.P" However,
as suggested above, the Commission's initial mandate was not so much a
compromis agreed between disputing States, with binding force under
international law, as a declaration of intention on the part of the
participating entities. In the absence of a further agreement between the
disputing parties to submit the matter to the Commission for arbitration,
it cannot be said that the Commission based its jurisdiction on the
consent of the parties concerned. In fact, as the Commission later came
to recognize, its role was rather one of delivering advisory opinions to the
Conference from its position as a consultative organ.f"
The Arbitration Commission, having established its power to deter-
mine jurisdictional issues, turned to examine its competence as regards
the three questions submitted to it by the Chairman of the Peace
Conference. In doing so, the Commission advanced two arguments in
h .. ICY Reports, 1953. p. 4.
I>s Ibid., p. 119.
hI> See Fitzmaurice, loco cit. above (n. 55), pp. 25-8. The competence of the ICJ in this regard is
founded in Article 36(6) of the Statute of the ICJ, which provides that a dispute as to whether the
Court has jurisdiction shall be settled by the Court. This is applicable to advisory cases by virtue of
Article 68 of the Statute. See Pratap, op. cit. above (n. 55), p. 117.
h7 In doing so, an arbitral tribunal may consider both the intentions of the parties and the rules
of law to be applied: Rio Grande Irrigation and Land Co. case (1923), Reports of International Arbitral
Awards, vol. 6, p. 131. The competence of an arbitration tribunal to determine jurisdictional
questions is, however, generally limited by the principle extra compromissum arbiter nil [acere potest,
See Schlochauer, 'Arbitration', in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. I (1991), p. 215,
at p. 224.
M See Johnson, loco cit. above (n. 3 I), p. 160.
hq This point was alluded to by the Arbitration Commission in its interlocutory decision in so far
as it referred to the full passage in the Nottebohm judgment which included the following passage:
'[the principle that an international tribunal has the right to decide as to its own jurisdiction]
assumes particular force when the international tribunal is no longer an arbitral tribunal constituted
by virtue of a special agreement between the parties for the purpose of adjudicating on a particular
dispute, but is an institution which has been pre-established by an international instrument defining
its jurisdiction and regulating its operation': Nottebohm (Preliminary Objection), lC] Reports, 1953,
p. 119. There are, however, difficulties with viewing the position of the Arbitration Commission as
being analogous to that of the ICJ in this respect: see below, nn. 113-15.
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favour of it performing the functions requested. First, it asserted that its
competence derived from the consent of the parties as expressed in their
participation in the work of the Comrnission.?" Secondly, and implicitly
recalling the opinion of the I CJ in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties
case.?' it argued that its competence derived from its position as an organ
of the Conference, in which guise it was under an obligation to deliver an
opinion when so requested by the Chairman.?" As to the first point, the
Commission relied upon the 'practice followed by the Conference ...
and by the responsible authorities in the various Yugoslav Republics'. 73
In that respect it noted that the Republic of Serbia had earlier taken the
initiative of submitting three questions to the Conference (two of which
had been considered by the Commission and formed Opinions 2 and 3),
and that none of the Republics had challenged the Commission's
competence in that respect. It thereby concluded that the Republics had
recognized the Commission's competence 'in consultative issues as
well' .74
In relying upon the imputed consent of the Republics as expressed by
their participation in its procedures to ground its competence in the case
before it, the Commission apparently comes close to invoking the
doctrine of forum prorogatumt> as operated in the context of the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the ICj .76 It would seem unlikely, however, that this
doctrine could be invoked in the circumstances as the sole basis for the
competence of the Commission. First, it is clear that although the
Republic of Serbia had actively sought the opinions of the Commission
in earlier cases, it had in no way signalled its willingness or desire for the
Commission to exercise its competence with respect to the particular
issues in hand.?? Secondly, given that the Republic of Montenegro did
not participate to the same extent in the early proceedings of the
Commission, it may be questioned whether the FRY could be deemed to
be bound by any commitments undertaken by Serbia in that regard. In
reality, however, it would appear that the Arbitration Commission was
not actually attempting to establish consent to its competence in the case
before it, but rather more generally in relation to its role and activity as
70 Interlocutory Decision, loc, cit. above (n. 6), p. 1520.
7' Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, IL'] Reports, 1950, p. 65,
at p. 71.
72 Interlocutory Decision, loc. cit. above (n. 6), p. 1521.
7.l Ibid., p. 1520.
74 Ibid.
75 See Corfu Channel case (UK v. Albania), ICY Reports, 1948, p. 15; H. Lauterpachr. The
Deuelopment of International Law by the International Court (1958), pp. 103-4; Rosennc, op. cit.
above (n. 55), pp. 344-63·
7" See Pellet, loc. cit. above (n. (9) (1992), p. 224.
77 Cf. case concerning Application of the Comiention on the Preuention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Hersegocina v. Yugoslaoia (Serbia and Afonte1legro)), IC-'J Reports, 1993,
p. 3, at pp. 17-18.
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a consultative body. In that respect, it is the Commission's second
argument that is crucial.
In its second argument, the Arbitration Commission noted that 'it was
established in the framework of the Conference for Peace as a body of
this Conference' and that '[r]eplying to the questions put by the
Chairman of the Conference constitutes Commission participation' in the
work of the Conference, of which it is a body, and it would require
conclusive reasons to bring it to refuse such a request' .7 H It accordingly
considered that in the case at hand, it could see 'no reason to refuse to
perform its functions' .79 With respect to this point, it is very clear that
the Arbitration Commission had in mind'" the dicta of the IC] in the
Peace Treaties case.": In that case, the IC] had stated that:
[tjhe consent of States, parties to a dispute, is the basis of the Court's
jurisdiction in contentious cases. The situation is different in regard to advisory
proceedings even where the Request for an Opinion relates to a legal question
actually pending between States. The Court's reply is only of an advisory
character: as such, it has no binding force. It follows that no State, whether a
Member of the United Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an Advisory
Opinion which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to obtain
enlightenment as to the course of action it should take.i'"
With this passage in mind, it can be assumed that the Commission
considered that the apparent lack of consent on the part of the FRY was
essentially irrelevant to the exercise of its competence in the case before
it."> At the same time, it is clear that the Arbitration Commission
considered itself to have a certain discretion as to whether or not it should
exercise its competence: it suggested, in particular, that it might refuse to
offer an opinion if there were 'conclusive reasons' for it not to do SO.X4
This, however, appears to be primarily a question of propriety rather
than one of jurisdiction. Xs
7
H Interlocutory Decision, loco cit. above (n. 6), p. 1521.
7<> Ibid.
xo This point was later made explicit by the Commission: sec Reactions of the Members of the
Arbitration Commission of the ICFY to the Statement made by the FRY Government on its
Competence, International Legal Materials, 32 (1993), p. 1582, at p. 1583.
HI In the Interpretation of Peace Treaties zcith Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, ICJ Reports, 1950,
p.65·
H. Ibid., p. 71; Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 15, at pp.
19-20.
H.l Peace Treaties case, ibid, p. 70. See also Westem Sahara case, ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 12. The
Arbitration Commission accordingly appears to have adopted the position of the ICJ with respect to
jurisdiction, rather than that of the PCIj: sec Eastern Carelia case, PCIJ, Series B, No. 5 (1923). See
generally Rosenne, op. cit. above (n. 55), pp. 698-716; Pomerance, The Advisory Function of the
International Court in the League and UN Eras (1973), pp. 27cr95; Pratap, op. cit. above (n. 55),
pp. 150 ff. On the position with respect to the Inter-American Court, see Buergenthal, 'The
Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court', American Joumal of International
LaU', 79 (1985), p. I.
H.. Interlocutory Decision, loc. cit. above (n. 6), p. 1521.
Hs Prarap, op. cit. above (n. 55), p. 142. He notes later, however, that in the Peace Treaties case,
questions of propriety and jurisdiction were somewhat confused: ibid., p. q8.
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As far as the ICJ is concerned, the exercise of its discretion under
Article 65 of the Statute is determined by a number of interrelated
desiderata relating to its role as the principal judicial body of the United
Nations. Broadly speaking, the main considerations are: (i) that the court
should confine its opinions to questions of an essentially legal nature.?"
(ii) that it should not offer an opinion if to do so would circumvent the
principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted
to judicial settlement without its consent:"? and (iii) that it should only
respond to a request if it relates to matters that fall properly within the
field of competence of the requesting organ. xx In that the Arbitration
Commission clearly considered its advisory jurisdiction to be analogous
to that of the ICJ, it is not surprising to find that it addressed some of
these points.
As regards the first point, the Commission confirmed that the ques-
tions that had been put to it were essentially legal questions and that as
such, 'far from constituting an obstacle to the Arbitration Commission's
exercising its competence, [it] is, on the contrary, a justification: as the
arbitral body of the Conference, the Commission can give a judgement
only in law, in the absence of any express authorization to the contrary
from the parties, it being specified that in this case it is called upon to
express opinions on the legal rules applying'. Xl) There is little doubt that
the Commission was correct on this point. The questions to which it was
asked to respond, while certainly having a political dimension, essentially
related to the issues of statehood (the expiration of the SFRY and the
emergence of the FRY) and to the principles of succession, and were
susceptible to judicial determination. This conclusion is not necessarily
affected by the somewhat abstract nature of the questions asked. The
Commission might have reached a different conclusion, however, had the
point at issue been the substance of Opinions 4-7, in which the
Arbitration Commission had acted primarily as a fact-finding body for
the EC and its Member States (in determining whether the four
Republics had fulfilled the necessary conditions for recognition).
As regards the second point, it was undoubtedly clear to the Arbitra-
tion Commission that the questions it was asked to address related to a
legal dispute between States (even possibly to the merits of that
~h Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the UN,IC] Reports, 1947-8, p. 57, at p. 61;
Certain Expenses case,IC] Reports, 1962, p. 151. Sec generally Greig, 'The Advisory Jurisdiction of
the International Court and the Settlement of Disputes between States', International and
Comparative Laze Quarterly, 15 (1966), p. 325.
~7 Western Sahara case, IC'] Reports, 1975, p. 12. Cf. Eastern Carelia case, PCIj, Series B, :'IJo. 5
(1923), where it was stated that 'no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its
disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific
settlement': p. 27.
1'1' fLO Administrative Tribunal case, fC] Reports, 1956, pp. 83-4; Fitzmaurice, loc. cit. above
(n. 55), p. 139. See also Fitzmaurice, 'The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice:
International Organizations and Tribunals', this Year Book, 29 (1952), p. I, at pp. 45-55.
1'., Interlocutory Decision, loc. cit. above (n. 6), p. 1521.
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348 THE EUROPEAN COMl\-lUNITY
dispute?"), and that the FRY had certainly not explicitly consented to its
competence on the point. As suggested above, however, the Commission
did appear to consider that some form of consent could be imputed to the
FRY in virtue of its participation in the activities of the Commission at
an earlier stage. One may recall in this regard that a significant considera-
tion in the Eastern Carelia case had been the fact that Russia was not a
Member of the League of Nations nor a party to the Statute of the
Permanent Court. As far as the ICJ was concerned, this was a major
point of distinction, such that in the Western Sahara case it noted that
'Spain is a Member of the United Nations and has accepted the
provisions of the Charter and Statute; it has thereby in general given its
consent to the exercise by the Court of its advisory jurisdiction' Y· If
there is sufficient basis for an analogy being drawn between the role of
the I CJ and that of the Arbitration Commission (a point which is
somewhat doubtful), it may be argued that the FRY's participation in the
work of the Commission and the Conference can be assimilated to prior
consent.v"
With respect to the third point, the Commission noted that the
Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia had a mission 'to reestablish peace
for all in Yugoslavia and to achieve lasting solutions which respect all
legitimate concerns and legitimate aspirations'. 93 The Commission con-
sidered that in attempting to enlighten the Conference on the legal
aspects of problems encountered it was acting entirely within the role
entrusted to it by the EC, its Member States, and the six Republics. It
might be questioned, however, whether the Arbitration Commission had
really done enough to establish the institutional interest in the case at
hand. Certainly, Serbia had participated in the Conference on Yugoslavia
and had accepted the creation of the Arbitration Commission, but
whether that participation is sufficient to establish a legitimate interest on
the part of the Conference in the status of the FRY under international
law is open to question. Further, it is doubtful whether a strict analogy
can be drawn with the position of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ
of the UN, in so far as the role of the ICJ is set out in the UN Charter,
which is ratified by Member States, and which defines in concrete terms
the purposes of the organization itself. These matters come into focus in
- The Eastern Carelia case has been distinguished on a number of occasions on the basis that the
question to be addressed did not address the merits of the dispute: see Peace Treaties case, ICY
Reports, 1950, p. 65, at p. 70; Interpretation ofArticle ], Paragraph 2. of the Treaty of Lausanne case,
PCI], Series B, No. J2.
q. Western Sahara case, ICY Reports, 1975, p. 12. That Spain was only said to have given its
consent 'in general' may suggest that in certain circumstances consent may not be imputed from
membership alone.
93 Pomerance, op. cit. above (n. 83), p. 295. The fact that the PClj Statute was not organically
linked to membership of the League of Nations is often cited as one of the reasons for the more
tentative approach that was apparently adopted by the PCIj: see Rosenne, op. cit. above (n. 55),
PP·60-7°.
93 Ibid.
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ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 349
the second challenge directed against the jurisdiction of the Arbitration
Commission.v'
2.4. The Second Challenge to Jurisdiction
The FRY launched a second assault upon the jurisdiction of the
Commission on 30 April 1993. On this occasion the challenge related to
the Commission's competence to deliver opinions relating to the division
of the assets and liabilities of the SFRY, and to deliver advisory opinions
on the principles by which the succession of States to the SFRY would
be effected.?" In doing so, the FRY made a number of inter-related
points. First, it considered 'unacceptable' the idea that the Commission
should discuss the principles upon which succession should be deter-
mined 'prior to any substantial discussion of these principles within the
Succession Group of the Conference on Yugoslavia' .')6 Secondly, recall-
ing its earlier challenge to the Commission, it argued that the Commis-
sion 'was not established or composed for arbitration purposes' and that
its work within the Conference on Yugoslavia 'has been seriously in
breach of both the law and procedure and implementation of material
law'.?? Thirdly, it reiterated that all disputes arising as regards the
division of assets and liabilities 'should be referred by agreement either
to the Permanent Court of Arbitration ... or to an ad hoc arbitration
court'v?" In that regard it pointed out that it considered arbitration
proceedings as being 'proceedings before a court of law in the sense of
general international law and not as proceedings before the Arbitration
Commission presided by Mr Badinter.vv Finally, it was argued that the
opinions of the Commission were 'doctrinary in the sense of article 38(d)
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which do not
constitute a legal ground for any valid decision'. Accordingly, the FRY
determined that it 'shall consider null and void and non-binding any
9-4 The Commission did not comment on the final two points raised by Serbia and Vlontenegro,
namely that the questions should be resolved by the parties concerned, and that outstanding disputes
should be referred to the IC] , It may be presumed that the Commission considered these issues not
to be relevant given its assumption of competence in the matter at hand. It is worth noting,
nevertheless, that the ICj did not consider this statement sufficient to establish a prima facie basis
for its jurisdiction in the Genocide case: case concerning Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICY Reports, 1993, p. 3. It was considered that
the statement did not make clear whether it was intended as an immediate commitment to accept
unconditionally the unilateral submission of a wide range of legal disputes; or as a commitment
solely to submit the three questions raised by the Chairman of the Commission; or as 'no more than
the enunciation of a general policy of favouring juidicial settlement': ibid., p. 18.
<)~ Statement of 30 April 1993 by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
International Legal Materials, 32 (1993), p. 1581.
9" Ibid.
97 Ibid.
"H Ibid.
Ibid., p. 1582.
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opinion of the Commission adopted in the procedure to which it has not
agreed'. 100
These objections were contained in a 'Statement' issued by the FRY
issued to the Steering Committee of the Conference on Yugoslavia.
While they were not directly addressed to the Commission itself (a fact
that might be explained by the FRY's contention that the Commission
did not have the power to determine its own jurisdiction':"), the
Arbitration Commission 'considered it an appropriate opportunity to set
out the scope and limits of its competence'. Nevertheless, the document
containing the Commission's response was not entitled, as in the earlier
case, an 'interlocutory decision', but rather merely 'Reactions of the
members of the Arbitration Commission'. 102 Further, it was made clear
that the document reflected the opinions of 'members of the Arbitration
Commission' rather than of the Commission as a whole, and that it 'in no
way prejudges ... the competence of the Commission in this matter if it
is challenged on grounds which they deem justified'. 103 In other words,
the document was an informal response issued by the individual mem-
bers acting ex officio and in a collective capacity, which did not in any way
prejudice the ability of the Commission to address other matters that
merited an official response. Why the Commission took the unusual step
of issuing only an informal response is unclear. Although it had not been
directly asked to respond to the statement issued by the FRY, it might
have been appropriate for the Commission to have addressed the issues
while acting proprio motu. 104 Equally, the suggestion that it should only
respond officially in cases where the challenge is 'justified' would appear
to entail an unwarranted element of prejudgment.
By this stage, the constitution of the Arbitration Commission had been
placed on a new footing. Its composition and terms of reference had been
re-defined in a document dated 27 January 1993 issued by the Steering
Committee of the Conference on Yugoslavia. lOS Although the document
did not provide any firmer legal foundation for the Arbitration Commis-
sion, it did specifically lay down the terms of the Commission's
contentious and advisory jurisdiction, and altered its terms of member-
100 Ibid.
'0' Above, nn. 56-8.
10;0 Reactions of the members of the Arbitration Commission, International Legal Materials, 32
(1993), p. 1582.
10:\ Ibid.
10.. As judge McNair noted, 'An International tribunal cannot regard a question of jurisdiction
solely as a question inter partes. That aspect does not exhaust the matter. The Court itself, acting
proprio motu, must be satisfied that any State which is brought before it by virtue of such a
Declaration has consented to the jurisdiction': Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, judgment of 22 july 1952,
ICY Reports, 1952, p. 93, at p. 116 (separate opinion). See also judge Cordova, dissenting opinion
in ILO Administrative Tribunal case, ICY Reports, 1956, p. 163.
'os International Legal Materials, 32 (1993), p. 1573.
 at School of O
riental and A
frican Studies on February 21, 2014
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 351
ship.'?" According to paragraph 3 of that document, the Commission IS
competent to:
(a) Decide, with binding force for the parties concerned, any dispute submitted
to it by the parties thereto upon authorization by the Co-Chairmen of the
Steering Committee of the Conference;
(b) Give its advice as to any legal question submitted to it by Co-Chairmen of
the Steering Committee of the Conference. 107
The Commission pointed out that the six questions relating to the
principles of succession had been referred to it for the purpose of
receiving an advisory opinion according to the terms of paragraph 3(b).
The implications of this were twofold. First, the competence of the
Commission as an advisory body stemmed 'not from the consent of the
parties concerned but from the mere fact of referral to it by the
Co-Chairmen of the Conference'. lOX The opinions constituted the Com-
mission's participation in the work of the Conference and therefore were
to be given not to the States concerned but to the Co-Chairman 'in order
to furnish them with the information needed to take decisions'. 10<)
Secondly, the opinions were essentially advisory in nature and possessed,
in the words of the IC], 'no binding force' .110 However, they did
constitute a 'subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law'
according to the terms of Article 38, paragraph I(d), of the Statute of the
ICJ. The Commission noted, in the manner of a parenthesis, that if the
parties were not able to reach an agreement in their negotiations, it was
open for them to refer the matter to the Arbitration Commission under
paragraph 3(a) or to any other adjudicatory or arbitral body of their
choice. I r I
10" Ibid. Pursuant to Article 4 of the terms of reference, the Arbitration Commission adopted a set
of Rules of Procedure, ibid., p. 1575. The Rules stipulate, inter alia, that the members of the
Commission shall be 'completely independent and impartial' (rule 1.1) and that they shall maintain
'absolute secrecy in respect of the proceedings of the Commission' (rule 1.4); that the permanent
members shall elect one of their number to be Chairperson for a three-year term of office (rule 2.1.);
that it should be supported by a Secretariat with the necessary staff (rule 3.1.); that the Commission
should meet in Paris unless otherwise decided (rule 4.1); that 'proceedings shall be as informal as
possible' (rule 5.1.) and should be confidential until the opinion has been disclosed (rule 5.4); that
in advisory proceedings the proceedings should normally be exclusively in writing (rule 7.1) and that
in exceptional circumstances the Commission may decide to hear representatives of the parties
concerned or other persons (rule 7.4); that decisions and opinions shall be adopted by majority vote,
abstentions not being permitted (rule 8.1) but that no record of the number of votes constituting the
majority should be made (rule 8.3.1.); that decisions and opinions shall state the grounds on which
they are given (rule 8.2) and that any member in the minority may attach to the decision a brief
dissenting opinion (rule 8.3.2); that while decisions shall be addressed to the parties concerned (rule
8.4.2.), opinions shall be addressed to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the
Conference and shall not be made public except on authority of the Co-Chairmen (rule 8.4.2.).
'°7 Ibid.
loll Reactions, loco cit. above (n. 102), p. 1583.
10<) Ibid.
110 Interpretation of Peace Treaties case, ICY Reports, 1950, p. 65, at p. 71.
II I Reactions, loco cit. above (n. 102), p. 1583.
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Although considerable problems remained, the reactions of the Com-
mission to these points were considerably clearer and less objectionable
than those produced following the first challenge. Not only was its
mandate much more precise, making clear that it had both a contentious
and an advisory jurisdiction, but it did not confuse matters by character-
izing its activities as essentially those of an arbitral body. A question that
might be raised, however, is whether the FRY could be deemed to have
tacitly accepted the consultative jurisdiction of the Arbitration Commis-
sion as established in }anuary 1993 in virtue of its participation in the
work of the Conference on Yugoslavia. Although the Commission had
been reconstituted, it was still only a creation of the Conference and
lacked any treaty basis. At the same time it is difficult to argue, given the
fact that the Commission was officially reconstituted in 1993 with a new
mandate and a different composition, that the Republic's initial approval
of the work of the Conference and its organs still had any significance.
Indeed, since June 1992, the FRY had consistently opposed the work of
the Arbitration Commission and therefore, as at April 1993, it could be
assimilated to a third party, or a non-consenting member of the
organization. If that is the case, it is arguable that its position was
analogous to that of Russia in the Eastern Carelia case. In that case the
PCI} considered that, owing to the fact that the dispute involved a non-
Member of the League, the exercise its advisory jurisdiction 'could take
place only by virtue of their [Russia's] consent'. II 2
Although the IC} has not followed the practice of the PCIj as regards
the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction, a number of considerations point
towards taking a somewhat stricter line on the question of consent in the
context of the Conference than that adopted by the Ie}. Whereas the UN
exists under a constituent treaty defining its objects and purposes and
enjoys a 'large measure of international personality', 113 the same cannot
be said of the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia. It has no constituent
instrument, possesses only an ill-defined set of 'organs', 114 and does not
prescribe the rights and obligations of the participating States. It is one
thing for States to accept, by treaty, limitations on their sovereignty
through membership in an organization where the purposes and powers
of the organization are clearly set out, 115 and where the rights and
II. Eastern Carelia case, PCI], Series B, No, 5 (1923), p. 27. Cf. Westem Sahara case, ICY
Reports, 1975, p. 12, para. 30.
11.1 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations case, ICY Reports, 1949,
P·174·
' .. The only 'organs' as such that might be associated with the Conference are the Secretariat, the
four Working Groups (Succession Issues; Institutions; Minorities Rights; and Economic Relations),
the Arbitration Commission, and the Steering Committee.
, 's Lauterpacht could see no 'reason why the sovereignty of States should be protected from a
procedure to which they have consented in advance as members of the United Nations, of
ascertaining the law through a pronouncement which, notwithstanding its authority, is not binding
on them': Lauterpacht, op. cit. above (n. 75), pp. 357-8. Fitzmaurice points out, however, that the
consent is in itself only to a permissive jurisdiction, loco cit. above (n. 55), pp. 142-3.
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obligations of the States vis avis the organization are defined in advance.
It is quite another for such limitations to be imputed to a State in virtue
of its 'participation' in an organization with an ill-defined and open-
ended mandate.
This argument is not displaced by the fact that the opinions of the
Arbitration Commission are not binding. As the Commission noted
itself, its opinions can nevertheless be treated as an authoritative state-
ment of the law and would thereby be likely to affect the interests of the
parties concerned when, and if, they came to negotiate on the matter. lit>
This point was not lost on the FRY, which later declared its intention of
discontinuing its participation in the Working Group on Succession
Issues, ostensibly because: '[i]n practice the opinions of the Commission,
as an advisory body of the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia, on the basis of which the Yugoslav participants at the
Conference were to adopt relevant decisions by consensus taking also
into account the Commission's opinion, were taken as judgements and
served as a basis for making concrete decisions on relevant issues
concerning the Yugoslav crisis'. 117 The FRY evidently objected to the
activities of a 'quasi-judicial' organ exercising jurisdiction over matters
subject to dispute without its consent, and on the basis that there was
some organizational interest on the part of the Conference.
3. THE OPINIONS OF THE COMMISSION
The Arbitration Commission issued a total of fifteen 'opinions' in its
consultative capacity dealing with a range of issues including questions of
statehood, recognition, self-determination and succession. It is not
intended to consider in detail the opinions delivered to the EC Council of
Ministers relating to the application of the Community Guidelines on
Recognition (Opinions 4-7). I I~ In those opinions, the Commission did
not attempt to interpret or apply general principles of international law,
but rather acted as a fact-finding body in assessing whether the various
Republics had fulfilled the criteria for recognition laid down in the
Guidelines. As such, they are of less interest than the other opinions in
"I> On the status of advisory opinions of the ICJ, see Pratap, op. cit. above (n. 55), pp. 227-34;
Rosenne, op. cit. above (n. 55), pp. 744-7; Greig, loc. cit. above (n. 86), pp. 360-5; Hambro, 'The
Authority of the Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice', International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, 3 (1954), p. 2.
"7 Letter of 2 July 1993, International Legal Materials, 3 2 (1993), p. 1584.
"I! See generally Warbrick, 'Recognition of States: Part 2', International and Comparative Law
Quarterly, 42 (1993), p. 433; Rich, 'Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union', European Joumal of International Law, 4 (1993), p. 36; \Veller, 'The International Response
to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', AmericanJoumai of International
Law, 86 (1992), p. 569.
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which the Arbitration Commission offered its own interpretation of
international law in the context ofthe dismemberment ofthe SFRY. Rather
than follow the pattern of the opinions entirely in sequence, it is intended to
address the issues that arise under three general headings: statehood
(secession/dismemberment), self-determination, and succession.
3. I. Statehood (Secession/Dismemberment)
The first question addressed by the Arbitration Commission arose
from a difference in opinion between the Republics as to the legal nature
of the crisis within the SFRY. On the one hand, Serbia contended that
the Republics which had proclaimed, or intended to proclaim, independ-
ence were in fact seeking to secede from the SFRY, whose international
personality would nevertheless continue. 119 The other Republics (Croa-
tia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) considered that there
was 'no question of secession', but rather one of the 'disintegration or
breaking-up of the SFRY as the result of the concurring will of a number
of Republics'. 120 Accordingly the personality of the SFRY would be
extinguished and the six Republics would be considered equal successors
in title.
The position adopted by the Arbitration Commission to this first
question was significant in so far as it formed the basic framework for the
later opinions. Although the question was formulated in terms of the
identity and continuity of the SFRY, its significance essentially lay in the
field of State succession. Traditional doctrine in the law of succession has
tended to differentiate between cases of 'total' and 'partial' succession. 121
If the Republics were to be seen as seceding from the Federation, the
personality of the Federation would remain intact and it would continue
to remain bound by existing international obligations and would retain
its membership in international organizations. 122 If, on the other hand,
the new Republics emerged as a result of the general disintegration, or
dismembermenr'<' of the SFRY, succession would be 'total' in the sense
that each of the Republics would be an equal successor in title. While this
does not necessarily entail that there would be a corresponding total or
partial succession to the legal relations of the previous sovereign;'>' the
II., Opinion No. I, loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. 1494.
IZO Ibid.
131 See O'Connell, State Succession ill Municipal Law and International Law (1967), vol. I,
pp. 3-4; Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, vol. I (oth edn., 1992), pp. 208-<).
IZZ Below, n. 239.
133 The term 'disintegration' was used by the Chairman of the Peace Conference in the first
question addressed to the Arbitration Commission, to describe the breaking-up of the SFRY. By
contrast, the Commission used the term 'dismemberment'. Although the latter term appears to have
more 'active' connotations, it is clear that neither is a legal term of art, and that both describe the
same process.
13" O'Connell, op. cit. above (n. 121), p. 4.
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evidence points towards a greater degree of succession in cases of
dismemberment than in cases of revolutionary secession.v'" Indeed in
cases of dismemberment there would, by necessity, have to be a
reapportionment of the assets and liabilities of the parent State. 126 Thus
issues of succession were inevitably predicated upon an understanding as
to the issue of continuity or otherwise of the State. Before turning to the
question of personality, however, it is worthwhile briefly considering the
interrelationship between principles of continuity and succession.
3. I. I. Succession and identity/continuity
The traditional distinction between the identity or continuity of the
State, and State succession, is both artificial, 127 and marked by confused
terminology. 12M The issue arose historically with the abstraction of the
concept of sovereignty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when
a distinction came to be drawn between the legal consequences that
attach to changes in government on the one hand, and changes in
sovereignty on the other. 129 It has become clear, however, that the notion
of statehood itself is not sufficiently precise as to determine clearly in all
cases where a change in the condition of a State has occurred, whether or
not the personality of the State is affected (i.e. whether or not it
'continues'). Difficulties have arisen, for example, in distinguishing
between cases of lawful annexation or union;'>" and between cases of
"5 With respect to conventional obligations, a number of cases point to the application of the
clean slate doctrine in cases of revolutionary secession: e.g., secession of the Spanish American
Colonies; secession of Texas, 1840; secession of Cuba, 1898; secession of Fin land, 1919. See
generally O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law (1967), vol. 2,
pp.88-loo.
"" This is particularly the case with respect to immovable property located in the territory of
third States: see Article 18(1 )(b), Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State
Property, Archives and Debts 1983, International Legal Materials, 22 (1983), p. 306.
"7 See e.g., Brownlie, op. cit. above, (n. 38). He comments: 'Unfortunately the general categories
of "continuity" and "state succession", and the assumption of a neat distinction between them, only
make a difficult subject more confused by masking the variations of circumstance and the
complexities of the legal problems which arise in practice. "Succession" and "continuity" are levels
of abstraction unfitted to dealing with specific issues': pp. 82-3.
"N 'Continuity' as a term has been used both with respect to the personality of a State and as
regards the rights and obligations assumed by successor States. See, e.g., O'Connell, op. cit. above
(n. 121), pp. 9-25. This assimilation, however, was central to his thesis that the boundary between
change of sovereignty and change of government in terms of their legal consequences should be
reassessed: ibid., p. 6. Similarly, the term 'succession' is not infrequently used in reference to
territorial entities which retain the personality of the parent State in the face of dramatic changes in
its condition, e.g., announcement of Finland in relation to Russia, 30 December 1991, cited in
Broms, 'The Agreement on the Foundations of Relations between the Republic of Finland and the
Russian Federation', Finnish Yearbook of International Law, 3 (1992), p. 615, at p. 620.
..... O'Connell, op. cit. above (n. 121), p. 5. For an early view that admitted no such distinction,
see Grotius, De jure belli et pads (1625), book II, xiv, p. II; Vatrel, Le Droit des gem (1758), book
II, xii, p. 191. For the modern view, see Wright, 'The Status of Germany and the Peace
Proclamation', American JOllmal of International Law, 46 (1952), p. 299, at p. 307; Crawford, op. cit.
above (n. 47), pp. 28-9.
1.1
0 e.g, unification of Italy, 1848-1870.
 at School of O
riental and A
frican Studies on February 21, 2014
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
secession or dismemberment. 13 1 In each category, the factual circum-
stances may well be similar, the conclusion as to continuity being derived
from extraneous elements of procedure or assertion. The view that the
unification of Italy, for example, came about through a process of
annexation by the Kingdom of Sardinia in the period 1848-70, rather
than through a union of independent States, appears to be more a matter
of perception and emphasis than one of fact. 1 3 2 Similarly, on the facts
alone, the break-up of Austria-Hungary can equally plausibly be argued
either as a case of dismemberment involving the extinction of the
personalities of Austria and Hungary, or as a case of the dissolution of the
union and the corresponding secession of several national groups.P>
Ultimately, while the facts upon which statehood is premised are always
relevant, they are not necessarily sufficient as the sole determining
considerations of continuity.
In most cases, questions of personality and succession go hand in hand
and for that reason tend to become entangled. It is undoubtedly the case
that the characterization of a particular situation as one of continuity or
discontinuity will be heavily influenced by the respective claims made by
interested parties. These claims themselves will necessarily reflect the
interests of the States concerned as regards questions of succession. For
example, in the case of Austria in 1919, the difference in opinion arose
primarily in relation to the issue of reparations; Austria denied continuity
in order to avoid liability for reparations; the Allies, by contrast, wanted
to establish continuity for converse reasons.">' Similarly, the contention
advanced by the USSR in 1919 that it did not represent the continuation
of the Russian State may be attributed, in part at least, to the desire to
avoid liability for the debts of its Tsarist predecessor.v'"
Whatever their interrelationship in practice there are, however, several
reasons for clearly maintaining the distinction between identity and
succession. First, on an abstract level, issues of identity and succession
should be distinguished in so far as the former relate to the existence and
identification of the legal subject, and the latter to the rights and duties
that are to be assumed by a legal subject once it comes into existence or
'3' e.g. dismemberment of Austria, 1918; secession of Pakistan, 1947; dismemberment of Mali
Federation, 1959; dismemberment of United Arab Republic, 1961.
'32 Anzilotti argued in favour of Union: Rioista di diritto internazionale, 6 (1912); see also Costa
v . Military Seroice Commission of Genoa (1939), Annual Digest, vol. 9, No. 13. For the view that it
was a case of annexation, see Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law
(1954), pp. 19 1-8.
133 See generally Feilchenfeld, Public Debt and State Succession (1931), pp, 431-'755; Udina,
L 'estineione dell'imperio Austro-Ungarico nel diritto intemazionale (1933); Borchard, 'Sequestered
Private Property and American Claims-The Treaties of Versailles and Berlin', American Journal of
International Law, 19 (1925), pp. 358"'"'9; Anzilotti, loco cit. above (n. 132), p, 86; Marek, op. cit.
above (n. 132), pp. 199-236.
']4 See generally Marek, op. cit. above (n. 132), pp. 199-236.
'35 See, Oppenheim, op. cit. above (n. 121), p. 205.
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ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 357
when it takes over responsibility for a new piece of territory. 136 As such,
the problem of State succession only arises once a conclusion is reached
as to the issue of State personality.v-? Secondly, it can be seen that
problems of succession and personality do not always coincide. For
example, if island State A were to lose permanently the entirety of its
territory as a result of some natural occurrence (such as a rise in the sea
level), the only question involved would be that of personality; the issue
of succession would simply not be relevant.P" Finally, it has to be
admitted that whatever arguments might be put forward for eliminating
the distinction between continuity and succession (or between 'succes-
sion of States' and 'succession of governments'), 139 as long as the law of
succession is premised upon the distinction, it will have to be main-
tained ...~o
3·1.2. The dismemberment of the SFRY
On 8 October 199 I, when the suspension of their declarations of
independence came to an end, Croatia and Slovenia purported to secede
from the Federation. 14 1 The question facing the Arbitration Commis-
sion, however, was whether the various acts of independence had, when
13
b As Marek comments, '[wjhereas the problem of State identity and continuity bears on the
identity of the subject . . . the problem of succession relates to the identity of certain rights and
obligations between different subjects': op. cit. above (n. 132), p. 10 (original emphasis). Article 2 of
the Vienna Conventions on the Succession of States 1978 and 1983 defines succession as 'the
replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory'.
I t notably assumes that the question of personality has already been determined. See Crawford, 'The
Contribution of Professor D.P. O'Connell to the Discipline of International Law', this Year Book,
51 (1980), p. 2, at p. 32.
1)7 Hall, International Law (8th edn., 1924), p. 114; Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), p. 29.
13 K ~o doubt significant legal problems might arise from such an occurrence (e.g. in relation to the
disposal of debts, the rights of former nationals in third States, and any interest in property held on
the territory of third States). But these problems would not be resolved by reference to principles of
succession.
'.1" O'Connell advocated a return to the rSth century position (in which no distinction was made
between succession of States or governments) overtly in order to ensure greater certainty (and
arguably greater continuity) and suggested that the touchstone should be the degree of political,
economic and social disruption: op. cit. above (n. 121), p. 25. Cf. O'Connell, 'Independence and
Problems of State Succession', in O'Brien (ed.), The New Nation in International Law and Diplomacy
(1965), p. 7, at p. II.
'4° See Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), pp. 29-30; Marek, op. cit. above (n. 132), pp. l}-13.
"4' Croatia and Slovenia initially declared their independence on 25 June 1991 (Keesing's, vol. 38,
p. 38274 (1991). In its 'Declaration of Independence' Slovenia declared that '[o]n the basis of the
right of the Slovene nation to self-determination ... the people of the Republic of Slovenia have
decided to establish an independent State, the Republic of Slovenia, which will no longer be part of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia': Blaustein and Flanz (eds.), Constitutions of the
Countries oj the World, Release 9 2-6, p. 55.
Croatia issued both a 'Declaration on the Establishment of the Sovereign and Independent
Republic of Croatia' and a 'Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and Independence of the
Republic of Croatia'. In the latter it was declared that, '[p]roceeding from the inalienable ... right
of the Croatian nation to self-determination, including the right of disassociation', Croatia was to
establish herself as a 'sovereign and independent State'. Further, '[b]y this act Croatia initiates
proceedings for disassociation from the other republics and from the SFRY': Blaustein and Glanz,
ibid, Release 92-3, pp. 119, 123.
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taken in conjunction, affected the continuing sovereignty of the SFRY to
the extent that it could be said to have become extinct as a legal person.
Dismemberment, as a term descriptive of a set of circumstances in which
a State has ceased to exist by virtue of the disassociation of its various
territorial elements, stands alongside other 'categories' of extinction such
as merger, 142 absorptiorr'<' and (formerly) annexation.v" It is not a term
of art, however, and is analytically useful only in so far as the range of
situations it encompasses are analogous so as to form a coherent corpus
of practice. In terms of actual (or posited) cases of dismemberment in the
past century, most may be distinguished from that of the SFRY. A
number of cases of dismemberment involved failed unions of pre-
existing States (such as the United Arab Republic 1960,145 the Union
between Norway and Sweden 19°5, and possibly the Mali Federation
1960146) and for that reason, the problems of disassociation were
considerably less acute. Others were accompanied by an agreement
between the parties concerned (USSR 1991,147 and Czechoslovakia
1993 14H) , and have more in common with cases of devolution or cession
than of dismemberment. The best analogy is that of Austria-Hungary in
1918, but there the divergencies in views and practice as to the
continuation or otherwise of Austria deprive it of much decisive value as
a precedent. 149
The approach adopted by the Arbitration Commission was on the face
of it uncontroversial. As its starting point, it merely stated that 'the
existence or disappearance of the State is a question of fact', 15° and in that
respect the State is 'commonly defined as a community which consists of
a territory and a population subject to an organized political authority'
qz e.g. the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar to create Tanzania in 1964. The union of Syria and
Egypt to form the United Arab Republic was also intended to have extinguished the independent
personalities of the two States (according to Arts. I and 58 of the Provisional Constitution of the
UAR): see Cotran, 'Some Legal Aspects of the Formation of the United Arab Republic and the
United Arab States', International and Comparative Laze Quarterly, 8 (1959), p. 346.
'4~ e.g. absorption of Congo Free State into Belgium in 1908; absorption of Montenegro into the
Serb-Croat-Slovene State in 1919.
'44 Acquisition of territory by conquest is no longer permissible under international law; see
Oppenheim, op. cit. above (n. 121), p. 699. For a more circumspect approach, see O'Connell,
International Law (and edn., 1970), pp. 431-2.
145 See generally Cotran, loc. cit. above (n. 142); Young, 'The State of Syria: Old or New?',
American Journal of International Law, 56 (1962), p, 482.
'41> See generally Cohen, 'Legal Problems Arising from the Dissolution of the :\!tali Federation',
this Year Book, 36 (1960), p. 375; Gandolfi, "Naissance et mort sur le plan international d'un etat
ephernere: la Federation du Mali', Annuaire francais de droit international, 6 (196o), p. 881; Shaw,
Title to Territory in Africa (1986), pp. 213-4.
'47 Agreement establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Alma Ata, 21 December
1991, International Legal Materials, 31 (1992), p. 138. The USSR was technically not a case of
dismemberment in that Russia was deemed to continue the personality of the USSR: see generally
:\!tullerson, 'The Continuity and Succession of States by Reference to the Former USSR and
Yugoslavia', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 42 (1993), p. 473.
1411 See Malenovsky, Anmiaire francais de droit international, 39 (1993), P.305.
1"0 See Marek, op. cit. above (n. 132), p. 205.
'50 Opinion No. I, loco cit. above (n. 5), p. 1495.
 at School of O
riental and A
frican Studies on February 21, 2014
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 359
and which is 'characterized by sovereignty'. lSI While the conditions
outlined by the Arbitration Commission closely reflect the classical
criteria for statehood.v" its approach could be subject to two qualifica-
tions. First, strictly speaking, a State is not a 'fact' in the same way as
other material objects, but is rather a legal construction in which
significance is attached to the existence of a certain state of affairs. 153 The
question is, therefore, a mixture of fact and law'>' and is one which may
be subject to modification in virtue of the existence or emergence of other
fundamental legal principles. 15S Secondly, even if it is accepted that these
factors generally govern the extinction as well as the creation of States,
they assist little in determining the position in cases where the elements
of Statehood are not extinguished in toto, but are rather merely altered or
adjusted. In other words the real question is how far a State can survive
fundamental changes to its condition even when it nominally continues
to possess all the material elements of statehood.
Traditionally, scholars have sought to explain the 'continuity' of the
State in face of changes in its condition, and have tended to ignore the
more fundamental question of when the State itself may cease to exist.
This, in part, has been moved by the perception that the existence of the
State is a meta-legal phenomenon embracing historical and political facts
which the law can only presuppose. I S6 Thus the notion of continuity has
I~I Ibid.
1~2 Ibid. Clear reference is made in this regard to the :\10ntevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States, 1933, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 165, p. 19. Article I stipulates that '[t)he
State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other
States'. Although the Convention refers to 'the capacity to enter into relations with other States', this
has generally been treated as meaning 'independence': see, e.g., Harris, Cases and Materials on
International Late (ath edn., 1991), p. 1°5, Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), pp. 47-8.
"Soveruigrrty' is more convincingly appreciated as a function of statehood and not a precondition:
see Rousseau, Droit international public, vol, 2 (1974), pp. 55-93; Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47),
p. 71; Oppenheim, op. cit. above (n. 121), p. 122. As has been noted: 'sovereignty in the relations
between States signifies independcncc. Indcpendence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right
to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the function of a State': Island of Palmas
arbitration, Reports of International Arbitral Auiards, vol. 2, p. 829, at p. 838 (per Huber). Cf. also
Austro-German Customs Union case, advisory opinion, PCI], Series A/B, :'-10.41 (1931), per Judge
Anzilorri.
'~.1 That is not to say that the State is created by law. As :\'larck notes: 'Intcrnationallaw docs not
"create" States, just as State law docs not "create" individuals. But it is international law and
international law alone which provides the legal evaluation of the process, determines whether an
entity is in fact a State, delimits its competences and decides when it ceases to exist': op. cit. above
(n. 132), p. 2.
,q Waldeck. 'General Course on Public International law', Receuil des cours, 106 (1962-11), p. 5,
at p. 146.
I ~~ Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), p. 4- Onc might note, in that respect, the prohibition of the
usc of force and the principle of self-determination which have been seen as operative principles in
the acquisition of Statehood; below, nn. 183-4.
,~b Sec e.g., Quadri, Diritto Lnternazionale Pubblico (1960). Charles de Visscher conceives of the
factual basis of States as being distinct from the legal order. The historical facts which found the
State are, in his words, 'des donees pre-juridiques'. He continues; 'L'ordre juridique international
ne fond pas l'Erat: il presuppose son existence": Theories et realities en droit international public
(1970), pp. 184-5·
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been expressed in terms of the continuity of socio-political factors (such
as population or territory)!"? or the continuity of the national legal
orderv" (sometimes expressed in the form of sovereignty or its basic legal
norm 1 5 9 ) . While these considerations serve to construct the identity of
States, in the sense of distinguishing between them, none of them
sufficiently addresses the fundamental issue of a State's existence or its
demise.
A good example of what might be termed the 'existence-identity
paradox' is provided by the work of Marek. Marek appears to consider
that in order to evaluate whether State AI is the same as or different from
State A, which existed at an earlier time on the same territory, the central
question is one of 'identity'. Rather than referring to the factual elements
of statehood (which in an abstract sense all States by definition possess
equally), she defines the identity of a State in terms of the identity of its
rights and obligations."?" Continuity, as such, is the 'dynamic predi-
cate'"?' of a State's identity and expresses its extension on the temporal
plane.t"? The answer, therefore, to whether there is continuity between
State AI and State A at different times) is determined by whether or not
its rights and obligations remain relatively constant. There are two clear
problems with this approach. First it introduces an unworkable level of
relativism into the issue of identity'P" in that it allows little scope for
distinguishing between on the one hand, differences in the rights and
duties of a State at two different points in time, and on the other hand,
differences between two separate States. Secondly, as Crawford points
out, it appears to suggest that the possession of rights and duties by an
entity is a condition for statehood, rather than being an attribute of
statehood. 16..
What is interesting about the work of Marek, however, is that when
she comes to determining the criterion by which the 'identity' of a State
might be preserved, she returns to more familiar territory. Marek relies
first upon the notion of independence.t'< which she considers to be
'chiefly, but not exclusively, expressed in the delimination of the legal
order of the State, that is, in its basic norm', 166 and secondly upon the
'57 e.g. Verdross, Volkerrecht (1950), p. 79.
,sM Kelsen, Principles of International Law (znd edn., 1966), p. 382.
'S9 Marek, op. cit. above (n. 132), p. 186 .
•60 Ibid., p. 5.
Ibl Ibid.
16:> Cf. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (and edn., (966), pp. 3°7-84. He remarks that '[a]
State exists ... not only in space but also in time': pp. 381-2.
16;l Marek admits that '[a]ny definition of identity is, to some extent, relative': op. cit. above (n.
(32), p. 5.
1
64 Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), pp. 401-2. It might be added, however, that this criticism
assumes that Marek was actually concerned with the question of acquisition of statehood. It is
arguable, in fact, that her test for identity was concerned with a different set of issues, namely, the
distinguishing criteria of States.
•6s ~Iarek, op. cit. above (n. 132), p. 186.
166 Ibid.
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extent of territorial and political changes.Y'? Ultimately, recognizing
there to be a certain interdependence of principles, Marek argues that the
extinction of a State only occurs when both the legal order and the
territorial and personal delimitation of the State experience substantial
changes. 168
What this brief excursus indicates is two things. First, that far from
being an issue of 'continuity' or 'identity' in the terms expressed, the
issue is essentially one of the 'existence' or 'extinction' of the State. 16<)
The identity of a State may be posited in a number of ways-according
to its social, cultural, political, territorial or legal delimitation-but none
of these expresses the terms by which the State is said to exist as a legal
person. The rules for the existence of a State are external, abstract, rules
and do not stipulate the need for a particular form of government,
possession of a particular piece of territory or control over a particular
section of the population. In other words, the notion of identity thus
constructed is by definition too particularized for it to be determinative
of a State's existence. Secondly, as the specific rules developed in
Marek's work indicate, there is in fact less disagreement as regards the
basic criteria by which the extinction of the State is to be determined
than might at first be imagined: however posited, they appear to be little
more than subtle applications of the basic requirements of statehood
(territory, population, government and independence).
To conclude, it is clear that the factual predicates for a State's
existence only provide broad parameters by which the existence of a
State may be determined. For example, mere loss of territory (even if
quite extensive)"?" will not affect the legal personality of the State,171 nor
will a political transformation in the State. 172 Indeed, it has been
accepted that in the context of belligerent occupation, complete lack of
government does not extinguish the sovereignty of the Srate."?" While
'''7 Marek argues that 'international law provides for the identity and continuity of a State in case
of revolution on condition that the validity of the new revolutionary order corresponds more or less
to the pre-revolutionary territorial and personal delimitation of that State': ibid., p. 63 .
• 1>11 Ibid., p. 186.
'''9 Kunz, 'Identity of States under International Law', American Journal of International Law, 49
(1955), p. 68, at pp. 71-2.
'70 Guggenheim argues that the principle that territorial changes will not affect the identity of a
State is subject to an exception where territorial change is 'quantitatively very considerable': Beitriige
zur Volkerrechtlichen lehue uom Staatemcechsel (1925), p. 19. Hall similarly argues that territorial
change must leave 'a part of the territory which can be recognized as an essential portion of the old
State': A Treatise on International Law (7th edn., 1917), p. 22. Kunz notes, however, that these are
'tautological statements, telling us that territorial changes do not affect the identity of the State,
except when they do': The Changing Law of Nations (1964), p. 289.
171 Turkey, for example, was considered the continuation of the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman Debt
arbitration, Annual Digest, vol. 3, No. 57.
'7Z Protocol of London, 19 February 1831, Martens, Nouveau recueil des traites, vol. 10, p. 197,
at pp. 197-9. With respect to Russia, see Lazard Bros. fS Co. v. Midland Bank Ltd., Annual Digest,
vol. 6, No. 69-
'73 Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), pp. 49,418-19.
 at School of O
riental and A
frican Studies on February 21, 2014
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
362 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
this does not necessarily mean that 'there are no fixed criteria of State
extinction";'>' it does suggest that a more synthetic approach is needed,
taking into account both a combination of factual considerations and the
assertions of all parties concerned, including those of other members of
the international community (as might be expressed, for example,
through the medium of diplomatic recognition).
As far as the Arbitration Commission was concerned, however,
recognition had little formal significance: in its own words, 'the effects of
recognition by other States are purely declaratory'. 175 Without entering
into the extensive and rather sterile debate over whether the function of
diplomatic recognition is either declaratory or constitutive, 17 h it could be
said that such a categorical position appears overstated. To say that
recognition is 'purely' declaratory is to admit rather too easily the idea
that the existence of international law is somehow independent of the
appreciation of individual States. This is not to say that diplomatic
recognition is therefore 'constitutive' in the sense that recognition
becomes a sine qua non for the existence of international rights and duties,
but rather that States have an active role in the construction, application
and appreciation of norms of international law. l 77 For example, where
there is some doubt as to the identity of a State, the position adopted by
other members of the international community is highly significant."?"
The Arbitration Commission subsequently qualified its rather dog-
matic stance in respect of recognition in its later opinions. First, in
17-. Marek op. cit. above (n. 132), p. 9.
17!i Opinion No. I, loc, cit. above (n. 5), p. 1495.
17" See generally, H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947); Dugard, Recognition
and the United Nations (1987); Chen, The International Law of Recognition (1951); Oppenheim, op.
cit. above (n. 121), pp. 126-203; Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), pp. 10-25; O'Connell, op. cit.
above (n. 144), pp. 127-65; Brownlie, op. cit. above (n. 38), pp. 87-106. For support for the
'declaratory' view of recognition, see Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellscha]t v. Polish State (1929),
Annual Digest, vol. 5, :'110. 5; Tinoco arbitration (1923), Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol.
I, p. 369 (as regards recognition of governments). The principal problems with the constitutive
theory of recognition are: (i) that it may lead to 'degrees of legal personality' according to how many
States have recognized an entity; (ii) that unrecognized entities will not be burdened by any duties
under international law; (iii) that it does not conceive of the possibility of illegal recognition. See
Brierly, The Law of Nations (6th edn., 1963), pp. 138-40; Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47),
pp. 18-20.
177 As has been noted, an act of recognition is more than merely one of cognition, or knowledge
that an entity possesses the factual elements of statehood. Recognition indicates, in addition, a
willingness to bring about the legal consequences of that acknowledgement. See O'Connell, op. cit.
above (n. 144), p. 128. Cf. Alexandrowicz, 'The Quasi Judicial Function in Recognition of States
and Governments', American Journal of International Law, 42 (1952), p. 631. Statehood may thus be
said to be opposable as regards the recognizing State: Charpentier, La Reconnaissance internationale
et l'ecolution du droit des gens (1956), pp. 217-25.
178 Brierly comments that the 'primary function of recognition is to acknowledge as a fact
something which has hitherto been uncertain, namely the independence of the body claiming to be
a state, and to declare the recognizing state's readiness to accept the normal consequences of that
fact, namely the usual courtesies of international intercourse': op. cit. above (n. 176), p. 139.
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Opinion No.8, it noted that 'while recognition of a state by other states
has only declaratory value, such recognition, along with membership of
international organizations, bears witness to these states' conviction that
the political entity so recognized is a reality and confers on it certain
rights and obligations under international law'.: 79 Secondly, and more
controversially, in Opinion No. I 0 it asserted that 'while recognition is
not a prerequisite for the foundation of a state and is purely declaratory
in its impact, it is nonetheless a discretionary act that other states may
perform when they choose and in a manner of their own choosing,
subject only to compliance with the imperatives of general international
law, and particularly those prohibiting the use of force in dealings with
other states or guaranteeing the rights of ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities'. r So It is generally accepted that the formal act of 'recognition'
is a discretionary one, and that there is no duty to accord recognition to
a State even if it happens to fulfil the requisite criteria. l x l There is also
some practice to suggest that there is a general duty of non-recognition Ilh
where the emergence of a State is associated with some illegality, such as
the prohibition on the use of force.v'" or a violation of the right of self-
determination. IX.. It is highly unusual, however, for it to be suggested
'7<> Opinion No. 8, loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. 1523.
1110 Opinion No. 10, ibid., p. IS26.
1111 The US Government has taken the position that '[i]nternational law does not require a state
to recognize another entity as a state, it is a matter of judgment of each state whether an entity merits
recognition as a state': US Digest, 1976, p. 19. This statement is to some extent a response to the
position espoused by both Lauterpacht and Chen that there is an international legal obligation on the
part of States to recognize entities as States when they have fulfilled the necessary criteria:
Lautcrpachr, op. cit. above (n. J 76), p. 61; Chen, op. cit. above (n. 176), pp. SO-4.
IH2 In analysing early State practice, 0' Connell was sceptical about the existence of a 'custom of
non-recognition': op. cit. above (n. 144), p. 147. Oppenheim notes, however, that a gradual change
in attitude may be discerned: op. cit. above (n, 121), p. 185. Although in practice duties of non-
recognition have mainly been identified in cases where the Security Council has so ordered (e.g.
Southern Rhodesia, :".Iamibia), it is considered that the duty exists independently of Security
Council action. For the view that an obligation not to recognize a situation created by the unlawful
use of force is 'self-executory', see Skubiszewski (dissenting opinion), case concerning East Timor
(Portugal v. Australia), judgment of 30 June 1995, paras. 125, 129-30.
It should be noted, however, that this duty is arguably an imperfect one: recognition of an illegal
situation is not necessarily forbidden by international law as States may well choose to waive the
interest they have in the observance of the rule in question in order to give recognition to the factual
existence of the entity. Indeed over time, such a choice may become inevitable: ex factis jus oritur,
e.g. recognition of Ethiopia; Australian recognition of Indonesian control of East Timor, case
concerning East Timor, ibid., para. 17. That a State is ultimately recognized, however, does not serve
to remedy the earlier illegality, but rather affirms, in spite of it, the fact of effective government:
Lauterpacht, op. cit. above (n. (76). p. 412; Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), pp. 121-3 .
•11.1 The cases of Northern Cyprus (1974-) and Manchukuo (1932-4S) support the view that States
will not recognize entities created following the illegal use of force. See Laurerpachr, op. cit. above
(n. 176), p. 420.
III,. e.g., Southern Rhodesia in 1965, when the Security Council adopted a resolution calling on all
States 'not to recognize this illegal racist minority regime': SC Resn. 216 (12 November 1965). The
Security Council later repeated this demand and went on to declare the declaration of independence
as having no legal validity: SC Resn. 217 (22 November 196s). See generally Fawcett, 'Security
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that a putative breach of the rights of minorities should also prohibit
recognition. The Commission's approach on this point is undoubtedly
related to its view that the rights of ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities have the status of norms of jus cogens. If so, the Commission
would also appear to suggest that norms of jus cogens apply to the
question of statehood. This matter will be discussed in more detail
below. ISS
These points aside, it is perhaps relevant to point out that recognition
has only an indirect role in the extinction of States. States will not
necessarily withdraw recognition from a State on its demise; 1Mb more
often than not, the withdrawal of recognition will merely be implied by
the recognition of the succeeding Staters). For example, the UK with-
drew recognition from Abyssinia in 1939, not explicitly, but implicitly by
recognizing de jure its annexation by Italy. I H7 Such practice is inevitable
given that States need to be assured that they will not legally put
themselves at risk in the period between the demise of one State and the
emergence of its successor. Even taking into account the broadly
declaratory nature of recognition, what this suggests is that it is unrealis-
tic to assert the demise of one State before its successors have been
clearly identified.
The main element of the Commission's first opinion was the legal
construction it placed upon the facts before it. It noted that although 'the
form of internal political organization and the constitutional provisions
are mere facts', they need to be taken into consideration 'in order to
determine the Government's sway over the population and the terri-
tory'. I HH Accordingly, it argued that in 'a federal-type State, which
embraces communities that possess a degree of autonomy and, moreover,
participate in the exercise of political power within the framework of
Council Resolutions on Rhodesia', this Year Book, 41 (1965-6), p. 102. In 1970, the SecurityCouncil
called upon Member States to 'take appropriate measures, at the national level, to ensure that any
act performed by officials and institutions of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia shall not be
accorded any recognition': SC Resn. 277 (18 March 1970). The Security Council also declared the
independence of Transkei to be 'invalid' and called upon governments to 'deny any form of
recognition to the so-called independent Transkei': GA Resn. 31/6A (1976), endorsed in SC Resn.
402 (1976). These cases have been interpreted in two main ways: either as an affirmation that self-
determination is an additional criterion for statehood (Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), pp. 81,
102-6); or as evidence of self-determination as a norm of jus cogens serving to vitiate an otherwise
established case of statehood, (Dugard, op. cit. above (n. 176), p. 147). For a moderate position, see
Greig, 'Recognition and the United Nations', Australian Yearbook of International Law, 12( 1992),
P·296.
'1l5 Below, nn. 283-Q7 .
• Ilh The Montevideo Convention of 1933 provides that 'Recognition is unconditional and
irrevocable': loc. cit. above (n. 152), p. 19. Practice suggests, however, that recognition may be
withdrawn upon a State's demise: see, e.g., US withdrawal of recognition from Montenegro, US
Foreign Relations, 1921, vol. 2, p. 946.
1117 See Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Ltd. (No.2), [1939] Ch. 182. On the question of
Abyssinia, see Ylarek, op. cit. above (n. 132), pp. 331-7. On current UK practice as regards
recognition of governments, see Talmon, 'Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New
British Policy and Practice', this Year Book, 63 (1992), p. 231, at p. 263 .
• HIl Opinion No. I, loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. 1495.
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institutions common to the Federation, the existence of the State implies
that the federal organs represent the components of the Federation and
wield effective power'. 189 Turning then to the position of Yugoslavia, the
Commission noted that four of the six Republics had indicated their
desire for independence, and that the 'composition and workings of the
essential organs of the Federation' no longer met 'the criteria of
participation and representatives [sic] inherent in a federal state'. 190
Consequently, it came to the conclusion that the SFRY was 'in the
process of dissolution' 1<)1 and that therefore the Republics were to settle
such problems of State succession as may arise in keeping with the
principles and rules of international law, 'with particular regard for
human rights and the rights of peoples and minorities.' 192
As to the factual basis for the Commission's assessment, there is little
with which to disagree. By the time of its decision, Slovenia and Croatia
had both actively asserted their independence from the Federation, 193
Macedonia had held a referendum on independence.vv' and the Parlia-
ment of Bosnia-Herzegovina had adopted a resolution on sovereignty.
The Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia had also withdrawn
their representatives from participation in the Presidency '?" and other
federal organs"?" following a dispute over the nomination of a representa-
tive for Kosovo, un and the Serbian rejection of the incoming Croatian
'N9 Ibid.
Ibid.
It was later made clear in Opinion No, 8 that this did not mean the immediate expiry of the
personality of the SFRY-'the SFRY was at that time still a legal international entity': loc. cit. above
(n. 5), p. 1522.
"" Ibid.
"J.l Slovenia initially made moves towards autonomy in 1989 when it included in its constitution
a provision declaring it to be 'an independent, sovereign and autonomous State': Keesing's, vol, 35,
pp. 36899-36900 (1989). On 2] December 1990 it held a referendum in which 94.6% of votes were
cast in favour of secession: Keesing's, vol. 36, p. 37790 (1990). Croatia held a referendum on
independence on 19 May 1991 in which 92.2'X. of voters favoured secession: Keesing's, vol, 37,
p. 38204 (1991). Both Croatia and Slovenia initially declared their independence on 25 June 1991:
Keesing's, vol. 38, p. 38274 (1991). See above, n. 141. They subsequently agreed, in Brioni, to a three
month moratorium on their independence: Keesing's, vol. 37, p. 38374 (1991). See generally \Vellcr,
loc. cit. above (n. 13); Zametica, 'The Yugoslav Conflict', Adelphi Paper ;.Jo. 270 (1992); Thompson,
A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia (1992); Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (1993); Glenny,
The Rebirth of History (and edn., 1993); Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (1994); Magas, The
Destruction of Yugoslavia (1993); The United Nations and the Situation ill the Fonner Yugoslavia (U;.J
publication, 1995).
",.. Keesing's, vol. 37, p. 38420 (1991).
"'5 The remaining Republics formed a 'Rump Presidency' which assumed the powers of the full
Presidency, but without constitutional authority: Keesing's, vol. 37, p. 385 13 (1991).
",I> Keesing's, vol. 37, pp. 38420,38559 (1991): Magas, op. cit. above (n. 193), p. 295.
"'7 In March 1991 the representative of Kosovo to the Presidency was replaced by an appointee
of the Serbian Assembly (Bajrarnovic). Magas comments: 'Without a functioning assembly, Kosovo
representatives in the Federal Assembly and on the Federal presidency became illegitimate, and with
them also the work of these bodies': op. cit. above (n. 193), pp. 291-2.
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President, Stipe Mesic.'?" At the same time, although the Federal
Presidency had initially sent federal troops into Slovenia;'?" by Sep-
tember 199I it was clear that the federal organs no longer had direct
control over the conflict."?" As the Commission itself noted, the author-
ities of the Federation and the Republics showed themselves to be
'powerless to enforce respect for the succeeding ceasefire agreements
concluded under the auspices of the European Communities or the
United Nations'."?'
Even if the Commission's assessment of the facts is accurate, one may
question the conclusions it draws from them. The first point is the
emphasis it apparently placed upon the internal structure of the Federa-
tion as a basis for asserting the dismemberment of the Federation. As a
general proposition, the criteria governing the legal existence of a State
do not vary according to the type of political or social system that is
operated. As the ICJ noted in the Western Sahara case, 'no rule of
international law, in the view of the Court, requires the structure of the
State to follow any particular pattern, as is evident from the diversity of
the forms of State found in the world today'. 202 Even if it is accepted that
self-determination has become an additional criterion for statebood.v?
requiring accordingly a certain level of representativity, as Crawford
noted, '[t]his principle does not-at this stage of the development of
international law and relations-constitute a principle of law with respect
to existing States'. 204 Nevertheless, it appears that the Commission was
not directly asserting that the criteria for statehood differed according to
the internal structure of the State, but rather that the system
,,)K Keesing's, vol. 37, pp. 38203-4 (1991). The Federal Presidency had eight members, one from
each of the six republics and the two autonomous provinces. Each of the representatives was to be
elected by secret ballot in the appropriate provincial assembly. The President was elected by the
Presidency according to a strict rota each year. In 1989 the post was held by Slovenia (Janez
Drnovsek), in 1990 by Serbia (Borisav jovic), and it was due to go to Croatia (Stipe Mesic) in 1991.
The constitutional deadlock continued until June 30 when :YIesic was eventually proclaimed
President: Keesing's, vol. 37, p. 38275 (1991).
"") Keesing's, vol. 38, p. 38275 (1991).
200 On 12 September, the Defence Minister, Ve1jko Kadijevic, rejected an order to withdraw J='JA
troops to barracks. Mesic, in response, called upon J).1A soldiers to desert: Keesing's, vol. 37, p.
3842 1 (1991).
20. Opinion ).10. I, loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. 1497.
202 ICY Reports, 1975, p. 12, pp. 43-4.
20.1 Fawcett argues, in light of the Southern Rhodesia case, that 'to the traditional criteria for the
recognition of a regime as a new State must now be added the requirement that it shall not be based
upon a systematic denial in its territory of certain civil and political rights, including in particular the
right of every citizen to participate in the government of his country, directly or through
representatives elected by regular, equal and secret suffrage': op. cit. above (n. 184), p. 112. For a
different view see Dugard, op. cit. above (n. 176), pp. 128-31; Devine, 'The Requirements of
Statehood Re-examined', Modem Law Review, 34(1971), p. 410.
204 Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), p. 105. It is considered, however, that no distinction can be
made between new and existing States. The personality of a State, premised by certain conditions
of fact and law, is an enduring phenomenon and must be seen to be a test for the continued existence
of States as much as their creation. Cf. Arbitrator Huber, Island of Palmas case (1928), Reports of
International Arbitral Awards, vol. 2, p. 829. Accordingly, if self-determination is not an operative
criterion as regards existing States, it cannot be so with respect to new States.
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of government had to be taken into account for the purposes of
determining its effectiveness. While this may be presumptively more
consistent, it still suggests that the test of effectiveness may differ
according to the type of government established within a State.
The Arbitration Commission's appreciation that the effectiveness of a
State is conditioned by a degree of participation and representativity may
be considered too strict for normal unitary States. It is certainly true that
the representatives of the organs of the State may well influence the
credibility of a government's claim to wield effective authority over a
portion of its territory in face of an act of secession, but it cannot be
accepted that as a general proposition the personality of a State is
extinguished merely by lack of representativity or participation in
government itself. What needs to be distinguished is the notion of control
on the one hand, which concerns the de facto authority exercised by the
government over the people, and the notion of participation on the other,
which serves as a legitimizing principle, but which traditionally has no
significance with respect to a State's personality. Much as the EC
Member States and other members of the international community
conditioned their recognition policy upon a requirement of a referendum
and the institution of minority guarantees;'?" it has to be accepted from
State practice that so long as a government continues to wield power over
its territory, any lack of representativity will be of little consequence as
far as its continuity is concerned.
Although international law does not formally recognize any distinction
between unitary and federal States in terms of their personality, it may be
argued that the test of effectiveness in the case of federal States is
different. Federations have been thought to be characterized by a
constitutionally guaranteed division of power between central and
regional government in which both forms of government exercise, at the
same time, independent and direct control over the population."?"
Although it is the federal State that will generally have full (although not
necessarily exclusive"?") authority over foreign affairs.e?" and will be
considered the person in which the sovereignty of the State is vested in
terms of international law, 20<) sovereignty, in terms of competence over
functions of the State, is divided between the federal and constituent
governments. Even if the variety of forms of federations and unions
precludes the identification of universal principles, it might be argued
,o~ EC guidelines on recognition, European Journal of International Lou', 4 (1993), p. 72.
,of. Bernier, International Aspects of Federalism (1973), p. 5.
'07 e.g. Byelorussia and Ukraine under thc 1977 Constitution of the USSR. Article 80 provided
that 'a Union Republic shall have the right to enter into relations with foreign States, conclude
treaties with them and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives, and participatc in thc work
of international organizations'. See generally Dobrin, Transactions of the Grotius Society, 30 (1944),
PP·260-g3·
20H See Stoke, The Foreign Relations of the Federal State (1931).
'0,> Montevideo Convention, 1933, Art. 2, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 165, p. 19.
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that in cases such as that of Yugoslavia where the constituent Republics
possessahighdegreeofautonomy, 2 lOtheonlyrealtestofeffectivenessforthe
federal government is the extent to which the constituententities participate
in its organs. It is considered, however, that even in these circumstances the
test appears too rigid and inflexible. Effectiveness should not be calculated in
a mathematical fashion merely by reference to the number of constituent
Republics that continue to participate in the federation. Rather, it should be
determined by effectiveness on the ground, namely by reference to
population and territory overwhich the government continues to hold sway.
This may not rendera radically different conclusion tothecase in hand, butit
avoids the conclusion that federal States, in virtue of their devolved systems
ofgovernment, are necessarily more fragile as legal persons.
Even if it is accepted, considering the matter purely as one of control,
that the federal government could not be said to be effectively 'govern-
ing' the territories in question, whether or not this is sufficient to
conclude that the SFRY was in the process of dismemberment, and one
might presume extinction, appears somewhat doubtful. Prior to these
events, there was much concurrence in the view that a strong presump-
tion existed in favour of the continuity of an established State. 2 1 1
Statehood would not be affected merely by a change in government or
territory."!" Indeed, as Crawford notes, '[e]xtinction is thus, within
broad limits, not affected by more or less prolonged anarchy within
the State'. 21 3 A case in point is that of Austria-Hungary where,
despite the extensive territorial changes and the change in government,
certain States persisted in the view that the personality of Austria
continued intact.v ' Even if this was not a universally accepted view, it
2'0 The Federation of Yugoslavia consisted of six Federal Republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia) and two Autonomous Regions (Kosovo, Vojvo-
dina). Each of the six Republics essentially represented the territorial 'home' of one of the Yugoslav
nations (Serbs, Croats, Solvenes, Muslims, Macedonians and Montcnegrins), although only
Slovenia was ethnically homogenous (<)0% Slovene). The 'nations' of Yugoslavia were considered
sovereign in that they were deemed to have entered into the federation through a process of 'free
association', retaining a right to self-determination and secession: 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, Basic
Principles 1(1). See generally Ramer, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia I963-I983 (1984),
pp. 20-84; Bagwell, 'Yugoslavian Constitutional Questions: Self-Determination and Secession of
:Member Republics', GeorgiaJournal of International and Comparative Law, 21 (1991), p. 489. The
Federation was highly decentralized, the constituent Republics enjoying complete freedom of
economic management and a high degree of political autonomy: Lapenna, ')tain Features of the
Yugoslav Constitution 1946-1971" International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 21 (1972), p. 209.
In virtue of the constitutional amendments of 1969 the Republics were awarded the right to
participate autonomously in the foreign policy of the Federation by directly engaging in contacts
with foreign States: Ramer, op. cit. above, p. 81.
Marek, op. cit. above (n. 132), p. 548; Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), p. 417.
Above, nn, 170-2.
21) Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), p. 417. Cf. Somalia, 1994.
2 ... This was the view taken by the Allies, support for which is found in the Treaty of St Germain,
19 19. Austria lost nearly 75% of its pre-war territory and over 75% of its population: Marek, op. cit.
above (n. 132), pp. 199-236.
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clearly points to the fact that the extinction of a State cannot be lightly
presumed. Turning to the case of Yugoslavia then, even though four of
the Republics had indicated their desire for greater independence, only
Slovenia and Croatia had actually issued a declaration of independence
by December 1991 and had taken steps to assert that independence.
Macedonia had only held a referendum on the question.r '" and Bosnia-
Herzegovina had merely adopted a sovereignty resolution within its
Parliament. In fact, neither of the latter States had entirely dismissed the
possibility of continued participation in Yugoslavia within a loose union
of sovereign States,":" and neither had at that stage secured their borders
or required the removal of federal forces."!" Equally, although some of
the Republics had withdrawn from participation in the organs of the
Federation, the Federation continued to operate in the form of the Rump
Presidency with two of the six Republics still participating in the
Federation. This being the case, one might question whether the opinion
of the Commission was not premature.
I t is apparent that the Arbitration Commission appreciated the
difficulty of merely declaring the dismemberment of the Federation, in
that it attempted to mitigate the force of its statement by remarking that
the Federation was 'in the process of' dismemberment.v'" One might
question, however, whether the idea of a 'process of dismemberment' has
any legal meaning. Dismemberment, as was noted above, is merely
descriptive of a form of extinction following the disassociation of various
territorial units. As such, it can only really be attributed to a situation ex
post facto once the lack of continuity of the State has been finally
determined. If the issue is simply whether or not a State continues to
exist, it makes no sense to speak of dismemberment as a process. Indeed
the Commission later made clear that, at the time of its first opinion
(December 1991), the SFRY was 'still an international entity'. If that
was the case, one can only understand the Commission's finding as a
prediction about events of which it could only guess, and in which case
it should properly have refrained from offering its opinion.
However premature the Commission's first opinion, subsequent evi-
dence suggests that the dismemberment of the SFRY has since been
effected. On 18 May 1992, the Chairman of the Conference for Peace in
Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington, asked the Arbitration Commission inter
alia whether the process of dissolution, to which it had previously
ZIS Above, n. 194 .
.. t> Keesing's, vol, 37, p. 38420 (1991). It would appear, nevertheless, that Macedonia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina were only willing to continue their association within Yugoslavia if both Croatia and
Serbia were also involved. \Vhen it became clear that the international community would recognize
Croatia as an independent State, their departure became inevitable.
>17 An agreement was eventually reached as to the withdrawal of forces from Vlacedoriia by April
1992; Keesing's, vol. 38, pp, 38779,38833 (1992).
21M Opinion No. I, loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. 1496.
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370 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
referred, could be regarded as complete.v'" The Commission began by
noting, rather belatedly it seems, that as 'the dissolution of a state means
that it no longer has legal personality', and that it has 'major repercus-
sions in international law', there was a need for 'the greatest caution'. 220
It went on to state that 'the existence of a federal state, which is made up
of a number of separate entities, is seriously compromised when a
majority of these entities, embracing a greater part of the territory and
population, constitute themselves as sovereign states with the result that
federal authority may no longer be effectively exercised'. 221 Recalling,
inter alia,"?" the fact that 'the former national territory and population of
the SFRY are now entirely under the sovereign authority of new states',
and that 'the common federal bodies on which all the Yugoslav republics
were represented no longer exist', the Commission concluded that 'the
process of dissolution of the SFRY... is now complete and that
the S FRY no longer exists'. 223
In coming to the conclusion that the SFRY was extinct as a State, the
Commission made three important assertions: first, that a majority of
the constituent entities of the Federation had sought independence from
the Federation; secondly, that all the territory occupied by the SFRY was
under the control of new sovereign States (ie. that all the Republics had
acquired statehood); and thirdly that the newly formed FRY (Serbia and
Montenegro) could not be considered the continuation of the SFRY.224
With respect to the first issue, it has already been noted that, according
to general principles, the personality of the SFRY cannot be considered
extinct merely by reference to the level of participation of the constituent
Republics.v" In this later opinion, however, it is significant that the
Commission also takes note of the fact that the Republics attempting to
disassociate themselves constituted 'the greater part of the territory and
population'v'?" This observation is arguably crucial in the context of
Yugoslavia in so far as it provides a partial basis for distinguishing
between it and the case of the USSR, the personality of which was
deemed to continue in the form of Russia. The Russian Republic's
territory constituted 76% of the total territory of the USSR (22.4 million
krn") and 51% of the total population (148 million). The territory of the
FRY, by contrast, comprises 400/0 of the territory of the SFRY, and its
population, 45% (10.5 million). Although it would be wrong to place too
~'" Opinion No. 8, loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. 1519.
a ao Ibid., p. 1522.
UI Opinion No. 8, loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. 1522.
u~ The Arbitration Commission first noted that a referendum held in Bosnia during February
and March 1992 had found a large majority in favour of independence, and that Serbia and
Montenegro had 'constituted a new state, the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", and on 27 April
adopted a new constitution'; ibid., p. 1523.
UJ Ibid., p. 1523.
a a .. Ibid.
~2~ Above, nn. 202-10.
uh Opinion No. 8, loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. 1523.
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ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 371
much emphasis upon such considerations, they are significant when
combined with other factors such as the reactions of other members of
the international community (the concurrence of the other former Soviet
States being highly determinative in the case of Russia).
As to the second question, the Commission noted that Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia had each been recognized by all the
Member States of the EC and 'numerous other states', 2Z7 and had been
admitted to membership of the UN. Lest it be argued that the diplomatic
recognition of the various Republics does not conclusively demonstrate
their statehood, the Commission noted that recognition, whilst being
merely declaratory, 'bears witness to these States' conviction that the
political entity so recognized is a reality and confers on it certain rights
and obligations under international law'. 22X What the Commission did
not mention was the fact that neither the FRY nor the Republic of
Macedonia had attracted diplomatic recognition by the time of its
opinion. It may be excused, however, for considering such matters as
irrelevant.'?" The failure of the international community to recognize
Macedonia was more out of deference to Greek sensibilities than any
material factor that operated to disqualify Macedonia from acquiring
statehood. 23° At that time, Greece and Macedonia were in dispute over
the latter's name which was said to be an appropriation of Greek heritage
and a threat to the territorial integrity of Greece.">' As regards the FRY,
in claiming to be the continuation of the former SFRY, it had not in fact
sought international recognition at all. Indeed, when it came to consider
the position of the FRY in its tenth opinion, the Arbitration Commission
considered that 'within the frontiers constituted by the administrative
boundaries of Montenegro and Serbia in the SFRY, the new entity meets
the criteria of international public law for a State'. 23 2
The third assumption upon which the Commission based its opinion
was that the personality of the SFRY did not continue in the form of the
ZZ7 Ibid.
zzN Ibid.
ZZQ :Ylacedonia was only recognized after its admission into the U:"J in April 1993 under the name
'the former Yugoslav Republic of :Ylacedonia'; SC Resn. 817 (1993); Keesing's, vol. 39, pp. 39428,
39698,39785 (1993). The UK considered its support for the application for U:"J membership by the
Republic as an act of recognition: see HC Debs., vol. 223, WA, col. 241, 22 April 1993.
Z.\O The Arbitration Commission had previously opined that the Republic of Macedonia complied
with the EC guidelines on recognition: Opinion No. 6, loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. lSI 2. See generally
Craven, 'What's in a Name? The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Issues of Statehood',
Australian Yearbook of International Law, IS (199S), p. I.
Z.\ I Keesing's, vol. 38, p. 38734 (1992); vol. 39. p. 39328 (1993). Statement of Greek Government
Spokesperson. 17 April 1992, cited in Ioannou, The Question of Recognition of Skopje (1992), p. 77·
See generally Perry, ':Ylacedonia: From Independence to Recognition', RFEIRL Research Reports,
3 (1994), p. 118.
Z.lZ Opinion No. 10, loc. cit. above (n. S), p. 1526.
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FRY.23 3 It noted, in that respect, that UN Security Council Resolutions
752 and 757 (1992) contained references to 'the former SFRY'.234 More
important, however, was the fact that in Resolution 757 (1992), the
Security Council noted that 'the claim by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically (the
membership) of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in
the United Nations) has not been generally accepted' .23 5 This point was
reinforced in Opinions 9 and 10. In Opinion 9 the Commission, in
outlining the basis upon which the succession of States should be based,
noted that the European Council had demonstrated its conviction that
the FRY should not be considered the sole successor (or what should
properly be regarded as the continuation) of the SFRY. It recalled in
particular the Council's Lisbon declaration, in which it was stated
that:
the community will not recognize the new federal entity comprising Serbia and
Montenegro as the successor State of the former Yugoslavia until the moment
that decision has been taken by the qualified international institutions. They
have decided to demand the suspension of the delegation of Yugoslavia at the
CSCE and other international fora and organizations.w?
I t followed, as was made clear in Opinion 10, that the FRY does not ipso
facto enjoy the recognition enjoyed by the SFRY and that it is therefore
for other States to recognize it as a State under international law. 237 It
added that with respect to EC Member States, recognition would be
conditioned upon its compliance with the requirements laid down in the
Guidelines of 16 December 1991.238
The position adopted by the Arbitration Commission in these later
opinions flowed inexorably from its findings in its first opinion. As soon
as the Commission had declared the SFRY to be 'in the process of
dismemberment', unless some extraordinary reversal of events had
subsequently taken place, it followed that the extinction of the SFRY
would occur, that the FRY could not thereby claim to be its continua-
tion, and that so long as it fulfilled the necessary conditions it would have
to be considered a new State under international law. That it has neither
received nor sought recognition does not affect this conclusion, as the
Arbitration Commission appeared to admit.
The Arbitration Commission's views have since been mirrored in the
2J3 At the time of the proclamation of the FRY on 27 April 1992 a declaration was issued
proclaiming the FRY to be the continuation of the SFRY: see case concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro ) ), ICY Reports. 1993. p. 3. at p. 15.
2).+ Opinion No. 8, loc. cit. above (n. 5). p. 1523.
235 Ibid.
2;1" Opinion No. 9. loc. cit. above (n. 5). p. 1524.
2;17 Opinion No. 10. loc. cit. above (n. 5). p. 1526.
2;18 Ibid.
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practice of the UN. In Resolution 777 (1992) the Security Council noted
that 'the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia has ceased to exist' and that the 'Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the
membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
the United Nations; and therefore recommends to the General Assembly
that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and
that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly'. 239 The
General Assembly responded by adopting Resolution 47/1, in which it
noted that 'the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations', and resolved that
it should not participate in the work of the General Assembly. 24°
The UN Legal Counsel explained the implications of General Assem-
bly Resolution 47/1 in the following terms:
the only practical consequence that the resolution draws is that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the
work of the General Assembly. It is clear, therefore, that representatives of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) can no longer
participate in the work of the General Assembly, its subsidiary organs, nor
conferences and meetings convened by it.
On the other hand, the resolution neither terminates nor suspends Yugosla-
via's membership in the Organization. Consequently, the seat and nameplate
remain as before, but in Assembly bodies representatives of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot sit behind the sign
'Yugoslavia'. Yugoslav missions at United Nations Headquarters and offices
may continue to function and may receive and circulate documents. At
Headquarters, the Secretariat will continue to fly the flag of the old Yugoslavia
as it is the last flag of Yugoslavia used by the Secretariat. The resolution does not
take away the right of Yugoslavia to participate in the work of organs other than
Assembly bodies. The admission to the United Nations of a new Yugoslavia
under Article 4 of the Charter will terminate the situation created by resolution
47/ 1 •2 4 1
As the ICj noted, the solution adopted by the UN 'is not free from legal
difficulties'v'?" Apart from the limited scope of the resolution, a matter
which was later rectified by an additional resolution excluding the FRY
']9 sc. Resn. 777 (1992), 19 September 1992.
24° GA Resn. 47/1, General Assembly Official Records, 47th Session, Agenda Item 8, U:'-1 Doc.
A/47/L.1 and Add. 1 (1992).
24' U~ Doc. A/47/48S.
242 Case concerning, Application of the Convention on the Precention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia-Hersegooino v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro i ) , ICY Reports, 1993, p. 3,
at p. 14. See Gray, 'Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegroj)", International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, 43 (1994), p. 7°4, at pp. 707-10.
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from participation in ECOSOC,24 3 it appears to allow for the continued
existence of an extremely ambiguous situation.v'" I f, as the Legal
Counsel suggests, the membership of Yugoslavia in the UN is retained,
one may question whether that implies that the SFRY continues to exist
as a State in a manner reminiscent of India after the secession of
Pakistan.r-" Certainly for operational purposes that appears to be the
case.v'? but it is otherwise inconsistent with the non-participation of the
FRY. Similarly, although the opinion suggests that the admission of a
'new Yugoslavia' would terminate the situation created by Resolution
47/1, that itself is open to question. If the FRY were to be admitted to the
UN under Article 4, one may wonder why that would affect the
(admittedly fictitious) membership of the SFRY, unless, contrary to
what has been asserted, it was indeed the continuation of the SFRY. If,
on the other hand and against all odds, Yugoslavia were to recreate itself,
one would assume that, as in the case of Syria in 1962,247 it would resume
its membership without having to re-apply. In the final analysis, the
matter would be clarified only if the membership of Yugoslavia in the
UN were to be officially terminated and the participation of the FRY
completely eliminated.
Whatever the residual ambiguities in the position adopted by the UN,
it is difficult to see practice as showing anything other than the extinction
of the legal personality of the SFRY. To some extent, that situation was
determined by the Arbitration Commission, which saw fit to proclaim
243 GA Resn. 47/229 (1993), 29 April 1993, pursuant to SC Resn. 821 (1993), 28 April 1993.
2 .... See Blum, 'U::"l Membership of the "New" Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?', American
Journal of International Law, 86 (1992), p. 830; Lloyd, 'Succession, Secession, and State :\1ember-
ship in the United Nations', New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 26
(1994), p. 761.
245 On that occasion the General Assembly First Committee agreed to the following formulation
to govern the question of admission:
'I. That as a general principle, it is in conformity with legal principles to presume that a State
which is a member of the organization of the United Nations does not cease to be a member simply
because its constitution or its frontier have been subjected to changes, and that the extinction of the
State as a legal personality recognized in the international order must be shown before its rights and
obligations can be considered thereby to have ceased to exist;
2. That when a new State is created, whatever may be the territory and the populations which it
comprises and whether or not they formed part of a State member of the United Nations, it cannot
under the system of the Charter claim the status of a member of the U nited Nations unless it has
been formally admitted as such in conformity with the provisions of the Charter;
3. Beyond that, each case must be judged according to its merits.'
(U::"l Doc. A/C.1/212, II October 1947.) See generally Schachter, 'The Development of Inter-
national Law through the Legal Opinions of the United Nations Secretariat', this Year Book, 25
(1948), p. 91.
241> The Secretariat has resisted the complete expulsion of the FRY from the organization because
of the practical consequences it might have for the peace initiatives and other deliberations within
the Conference on Yugoslavia: see UN Doc. A/48/847 (1993).
247 Syria was able to revive its United Nations membership on seceding from the UAR without
the need for readmission: Young, loc. cit. above (n. 145). Crawford argues, however, that in so far
as the existence of Syria had been expunged by mutual consent on its entry into the UAR, its
subsequent assertion of identity 'takes on decidedly fictional overtones': op. cit. above (n, 47),
P·40 8.
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ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 375
the dissolution of the Federation in December 1991 and which laid the
ground for the subsequent recognition of the emergent Republics by
other members of the international community. The determinants of
dismemberment outlined by the Commission were arguably somewhat
superficial and were applied in an unnecessarily formulaic manner. Little
consideration was given to the formal continuance of the Federation and
its organs (albeit in a mutilated form), or to their claim to sovereignty
over the territory. Similarly, in the early stages, the absence of diplomatic
recognition was effectively overlooked, it being considered to be strictly
declaratory and therefore irrelevant to any determination as to a State's
existence or demise. In the circumstances, this was patently unrealistic.
The facts in question were never sufficiently clear to render any opinion
as to the legal situation beyond doubt. The fact of diplomatic recognition
was undoubtedly highly 'constitutive' as regards Bosnia-Herzegovina
and also perhaps Croatia. Having said that, as a case of dismemberment,
the significant factors in the case of Yugoslavia (that perhaps distinguish
it from the USSR) appear to have been the extent of territory and
population lost in virtue of the disassociation of the various Reptrbl ics,
the fact that the Federation and its organs had to be legally reconstituted
as a result, and the widespread conviction that the FRY could not
automatically assume the membership of the SFRY in international
organizations.
3.1.3. Dismemberment and the statehood of the emergent Republics
As a brief comment before considering the Arbitration Commission's
approach to the acquisition of statehood by the Yugoslav Repub'lics, it is
worth noting that in established doctrine, although a necessary link is
made between the expiry of one State and the rights and obligations that
arise for the emergent entiries, it has rarely been recognized that there
should be any necessary interrelationship between the legal extinction of
one State and the acquisition of personality by another in its place.
Crawford, for example, although briefly considering the question of
extinction, 24M does not directly address the implications of dismember-
ment on the acquisition of personality by the emergent entities. Rather
he refers exclusively to two main processes-devolution and secession-
both of which apparently assume the continued existence of the parent
State.>" Marek, by contrast, considers in depth the question of dis-
memberment, but does not address whether that fact has any impact
upon the acquisition of statehood by an emergent entity. 25°
One does not have to go too far to find an explanation. Generally
speaking, unless an explicit process of devolution is at work, the process
'4!l Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), pp. 417-20.
'4') Ibid., pp. 21 5- 70 .
'SO :\>larck, op. cit. above (n. 132), passim.
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by which an entity acquires or loses statehood is shrouded by doubt, both
as regards the relevant factual circumstances and as to their legal
significance. It is therefore only when nascent entities come to be
recognized as States by other members of the international community
that these issues will be presumptively resolved. Accordingly, the demise
of one State and the emergence of another in its place involve a single set
of events which cannot be conceptually separated. At the same time, as a
matter of policy it is not convenient to admit the possibility of an
'interregnum', or a discontinuity in responsibility for a piece of territory,
as might emerge between the extinction of one entity and the emergence
of another in its place, not least because the rights and duties of third
States might be put at risk during the intervening period. It is therefore
the practice that the extinction of a State will only be signalled once a
view has been taken as to its presumptive successors.f""
The Arbitration Commission, by force of circumstances one might
presume, appeared to reverse this natural sequence of events by identify-
ing the dissolution of the Federation (albeit in the form of a process)
before the acquisition of statehood of the emergent entities could clearly
be established beyond doubt.v" It subsequently attempted to rationalize
the decision by retroactively dating the time of succession (and a fortiori
the date of acquisition of statehood) of most Republics some time before
their recognition by the international community. 253 This is certainly
consistent with the declaratory approach to recognition, which the
Commission itself endorsed, in which the date of commencement of
statehood is to be divined by reference to the existence of factual criteria
and not to the discretionary acts of the recognizing States. On this view,
even if 'retroactivity' has no place in the context of statehood (to the
extent that late recognition of an entity is essentially superfluous'<"), it
may serve to give legal recognition to a factual situation which was only
concretized by subsequent events. As Crawford notes:
[A]n entity whose status is doubtful at a particular time may well, if it becomes
definitively established or generally recognized as a State, be regarded as having
been a State also at that earlier time: in such cases, subsequent events are capable
of giving form to a state of affairs which would otherwise have been equiv-
ocal. 255
251 This is consistent with the view that States tend not to withdraw recognition from States (as
distinct from governments) but rather merely to recognize the successor State: above, n. 25 I.
25
2 It is suggested that the 'doubt' was only removed once Croatia and Slovenia were recognized
by the EC Member States on 15 January J992: Keesing's, vol. 38, p. 38703 (1992).
25.1 Opinion No. I I, loc. cit. above (n. 8), p. 1589. Although it might be considered that the
Arbitration Commission was creating problems for itself by identifying specific dates of succession,
as indeed it recognized itself (ibid., p. J 588), it is nevertheless considered an undertaking that is
suited to judicial determination: see Chen, op. cit. above (n. 176), pp. 176-7. Sec, e.g., decision of
International Commission of Jurists in the Aaland Islands case, League of Nations Official Journal,
J 920, Special Supplement No. 3.
2H Brownlie, op. cit. above (n. 38), p. 95.
255 Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), p. 389.
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As Crawford explains, it is the 'relatively conservative' operation of rules
relating to the acquisition of statehood by secession which have encour-
aged international tribunals to date the commencement of the State from
the 'earliest date at which it could be said to have been effectively in
control of its territory'. 256 What is clear from the Yugoslav situation,
however, is that the 'conservative' rules regarding secession were not
applied, not least because there remained considerable doubt about the
effectiveness of the control exercised by the Croatian and Bosnia-
Herzegovinian Governments even at the time of their recogrrition.""?
Only in the case of Macedonia, which was recognized following its
admittance to the United Nations in April 1993, is there a strong case for
retroactivity.v"
The problems posed by the Commission's chronology are com-
pounded by the fact that when the dates of succession provided by the
Commission are analysed, they are not entirely consistent with the
conclusions posited in its first opinion. According to the Commission,
Croatia and Slovenia acquired statehood on 8 October 199 I, Macedonia
on 17 November 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 March 1992, and
Serbia-Montenegro on 27 April 1992.259 As it also determined that the
process of disintegration started on 29 November 1991,260 it is difficult to
view Croatia's and Slovenia's declarations of independence as anything
other than acts of secession. Indeed, ironically enough, it also appears
that Macedonia's independence is the result of an act of secession. Only
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY can be seen to have emerged once the
process of dismemberment was under way. Such problems underline
the arbitrary and reductive nature of legal chronologies and demonstrate
the difficulties of differentiating between cases of secession and dis-
memberment. That the Commission was apparently indifferent to the
problems of chronology may be understandable, but its insistence on
>,,1> Ibid., p. 39 0 . He cites as an example the practice of mixed arbitral tribunals of holding
that the various States formed after the World War I came into existence prior to the relevant
peace treaties, e.g. Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State (1920), A 11111101 Digest;
vol. 2, No, 5.
,,,7 The EC Member States recognized Croatia on 15 January 1992: Keesing's , vol. 38, no. I,
p. 38703 (1992). At that time, the Serbian Republic of Krajina (formerly the two Autonomous
Regions of Krajina and Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem), which amounted to approximately
one third of Croatian territory, was effectively entirely independent. It was recognized by Serbia on
20 December 1991: Keesing's, vol. 37, p. 38685 (1991). Similarly Bosnia-Herzegovina was
recognized on 6 April J 992, despite the existence of the self-proclaimed Republic of the Serbian
People of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Keesing's, vol. 38, pp. 38704, 38833 (1992).
2"H In Opinion ~o. 6, the Arbitration Commission opined that F'YROyl had fulfilled the
necessary requirements for recognition: loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. 1512. Although it was concerned
primarily with compliance with the EC recognition guidelines, one might suppose that no such
recommendation would be given if the Republic did not fulfil the basic criteria for statehood.
FYRO::\I was admitted to the U="l on 8 April 1993 under a provisional name: Keesing's, vol. 39, p.
39442 (J 993).
'.'" Opinion ~o. I I, loc. cit. above (n. 8), p. J 589.
• 1>0 Ibid., p. 1587 .
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different dates for accession to independence undoubtedly complicates
the issues of succession that arise."?'
Leaving aside the Commission's asserted chronology of events, it may
be argued that the significance of identifying the process as one of
dismemberment was that it enabled the statehood of the Republics to be
established with considerably greater ease. According to traditional
doctrine, the normal requirements for statehood are applied more strictly
in cases of secession, where the emergent entities have to show con-
siderably higher levels of effectiveness, than would be required in a case
of devolution.v? The primary distinguishing feature in cases of devolu-
tion is the consent of the parent State, which serves to confer territorial
sovereignty upon the new entity and provides it with a prima facie right
to govern its territory as a State."? Thus, in 196o, the Congo was
admitted to membership of the UN primarily on the basis of the
agreement of Belgium and despite the fact that its government was
struggling to prevent the Katangese secession and can hardly be said to
have been in effective control of the territory. 264 Where no such
agreement is evident, the seceding entity has to struggle to establish
effective control in face of a presumption in favour of the integrity and
effectiveness of the parent State. 2 6 5 For example, in the cases of Katanga
and Biafra, even though the secessionist units exercised significant
control over the disputed territory, the majority of States refused to
accord them recognition out of deference to the sovereignty of the
respective parent States (the Congo and Nigeriaj.s?" Indeed, as
Lauterpacht noted, in cases of secession, recognition will only be
legitimate once it is clear that the parent State is unlikely to be able to
reassert control. 2 6 7
The emergence of the new States in Yugoslavia cannot be seen as the
result of a process of devolution in that, throughout the operative period,
the Federation consistently opposed the intended secession of the various
2(" Below, n. 369 .
2(,2 Devolution can be either 'partial' or 'universal'. The former involves the 'consensual'
secession of a territorial unit, leaving the State otherwise intact. The latter involves the voluntary
unification of two States or the separation of a whole State (as opposed to merely parts of a State)
to form a new international person, e.g., the merger of Egypt and Syria to form the United Arab
Republic in 1958; the merger of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Arab
Republic to form the Republic of Yemen in 1990; the separation of Czechoslovakia into the Czech
and Slovak Republics on I January 1993.
2(,) Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), pp. 44,218. He identifies a number of exceptions to this rule,
however, particularly as regards grants of independence in violation of the principle of self-
determination: ibid, pp. 21<)-22.
26.. See Shaw, op. cit. above (n. 146), pp. 202-8.
2bS Ibid., pp. 21 4- 16.
2f>6 Biafra was recognized only by Tanzania, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Zambia. Even then,
recognition appears to have been accorded for 'humanitarian' reasons: see Shaw, ibid., pp. 20<)-10.
Similarly, the General Assembly condemned the attempted secession of Mayotte as a violation of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Comoros: GA Resn. 31/4,21 October 1971; GA Resn.
45/11, II November 1990.
2
6
7 Lauterpacht, op. cit. above (n. 176), p. 45.
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Republics."?" Equally, although the Constitution of the SFRY did
explicitly embody a right to secession.v'? that it served to provide
legitimacy for the acts of the various Republics is extremely doubtful.
Strictly speaking the constitutional right to self-determination and
secession belonged to the respective 'nations' rather than to the Repub-
lics themselves. 27° As none of the constituent Republics (with the
possible exception of Slovenia) was nationally homogenous, it was
questionable whether the right devolved upon the Republics themselves.
Moreover, there was never any agreement as to the precise implication of
the right to secession,"?" there being doubt, for example, as to whether or
not it could have been exercised by means of a unilateral act."?"
Given the non-consensual nature of the acts of independence, one
might have expected that a presumption would be operated in favour of
the effectiveness of the federal government, and correspondingly against
that of the seceding Republics. Nevertheless, the international commu-
nity was willing to afford diplomatic recognition to Slovenia, Croatia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina at an early stage and in spite of an obvious lack
of effectiveness in the latter two cases.v" To some extent, the advice of
.MI On 24 June 1991 the Yugoslav Prime :\;Iinister warned that the 'Federal Government will use
all means available to stop the republics' unilateral steps towards independence': cited in Weller, loc.
cit. above (n. 13), p. 570. The FRY did eventually recognize Slovenia in 1992: Keesing's, vol. 38,-
p. 3903 6 (1992) .
•f", The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution provided (Basic Principles I, para. I): 'The nations of
Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to
secession, on the basis of their will freely expressed in the common struggle of all nations and
nationalities. .. have, together with the nationalities with which they live, united in a federal
republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded a socialist federal community of
working people-the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'.
'7° This also excludes a right of secession on behalf of 'nationalities' (i.e. the Albanians in Kosovo
and the Hungarians in Vojvodina): see Rich, loco cit. above (n. 118), pp. 38--<). Serbia adopted the
position that the proper subjects of any political settlement arc not the republics or provinces, but
rather the South Slav nations. Accordingly, it considered the internal borders of Yugoslavia to be
administrative rather than political, and therefore claimed the right to represent Serbs irrespective
of where they lived. Serbia officially committed itself to the annexation of parts of Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia in the event of the federation being replaced by a looser State structure:
Magas, op. cit. above (n. 193), pp. 275-6.
'71 The right to secede was set alongside a duty to ensure the 'unity of the political system' (Art.
244). As Singleton comments: 'The legal theory behind the federal structure is that the separate
South Slav peoples voluntarily acceded to the [SFRY] and have the right of self-determination ...
[However] the possibility that any of them should exercise the right to secession is politically
unthinkable': A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples (1985), p. 210. It is pertinent to note that
Article I of the 1946 Yugoslav Constitution, which is the predecessor of the 1974 Constitution,
described the Federal Republic as 'a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the
right to self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live
together in a federative State'. This apparently reflects the idea that self-determination has already
been exercised in the creation of the Federation.
'7' See generally Bagwell, 'Yugoslavian Constitutional Questions: Self-Determination and Seces-
sion of :\1ember Republics', Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 21 (1991), p.
489; Iglar, 'The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self-Determina-
tion: Slovenia's and Croatia's Right to Secede', Boston College International and Comparative Law
Review, 15 (1992), p. 213, at pp. 218-21.
>7J Above, n. 257.
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the Arbitration Commission was ignored on this point. Despite the
Arbitration Commission's concern that Croatia had not fully incorpo-
rated the provisions on the 'special status' of minorities,"> the EC
Member States proceeded to afford it recognition.v" Similarly, although
the Republic of Macedonia was found to have fulfilled the EC Guidelines
on recognition.V" it was refused recognition by the EC Member States
on the basis that 'more important issues' had to be resolved.t?" That
being said, it is clear that considerable deference was given to the
Commission's view that the federation was in the process of dismember-
ment. Indeed, it may be directly as a result of that finding that the
precipitous recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is to be
explained. If this reasoning is accepted, it could be suggested that once
an entity asserts its independence as against a State which shows itself to
be in the process of dismemberment (in virtue of the effective, simultane-
ous, disassociation of the majority of the constituent territorial units), no
presumption will operate in favour of the sovereignty of the parent State
and the nascent entity will be able to establish its statehood with relative
ease. Such a case might in practice be assimilated to one in which the
parent State had specifically consented to the act of independence, or
perhaps even one in which the principle of self-determination was
operative.r?"
3.2. Self-Determination
The fact that the various Republics attained statehood following acts
of independence which recalled in no uncertain terms the principle of
self-determination"?" has prompted a number of commentators to con-
sider the applicability of self-determination to the situation of Yugosla-
via,2Ho and more generally to consider its relevance in the post-colonial
z74 Opinion No. 2, loco cit. above (n. 5), p. 1505.
Z75 Croatia was recognized by the EC Member States on 15 January 1992: Keesing's, vol. 38,
p. 38703 (1992). It was admitted to the U~ on 22 May 1992: Keesing's, vol. 38, p. 38918 (1992).
Weller suggests that recognition was accorded because the EC's insistence on constitutional
guarantees exceeded the standard adopted among many EC Member States: loc. cit. above (n. 13),
P·593·
Z76 Opinion No. 6, loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. 1511.
Z77 Keesing's, vol. 38, p. 38704 (1992). Macedonia was ultimately admitted to the U~ in April
1993 under the provisional name 'the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia': Keesing's, vol. 39,
pp. 39328, 39422 (1993). Six States of the EC established diplomatic relations with Macedonia in
December: Keesing's, vol. 39, p. 39785 (1993).
Z711 The only obvious exception on this point being the case of Macedonia. It is considered,
however, that Macedonia should be treated as having acquired independent Statehood in early 1992,
the delay in recognition being solely due to Greek intransigence on the question of its name. Above,
n.258.
Z79 Above, n. 141.
zllo See, e.g., Mullerson, International Law, Rights and Politics (1994), pp. S8-(}1; Iglar, loc. cit.
above (n. 272); Franck, 'Fairness to "Peoples" and their Right to Self-Determination', Recueil des
cours, 240 (1993-111), p. 125; Koskenniemi, 'National Self-Determination Today: Problems of
Legal Theory and Practice', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 43 (1994), p. 241.
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era.?" The Arbitration Commission did not directly consider the appli-
cability of the principle of self-determination in relation to the acts of
independence of the various Republics. Indeed, it appears to have
implicitly rejected the relevance of self-determination as a determining
factor in the acquisition of statehood. It did, however, make a number of
broad pronouncements upon the subject which were a mixture of the
cautious and the controversial.
In its first opinion, while discussing the question of the dismember-
ment of the SFRY, the Commission obliquely referred to self-determi-
nation by asserting that all successor States to the Federation would be
bound by 'the peremptory norms of general international law and, in
particular, respect for the fundamental rights of the individual and the
rights of peoples and minorities'. 2~h Leaving aside the question of
fundamental individual rights and the rights of minorities, both of which
raise specific problems with respect to their status as 'peremptory
norms', the first issue is what is meant by 'the rights of peoples'.
Although a number of rights, such as the right to peace, the right to
development and the right to a clean environment, have all been posited
in the category of 'peoples' rights', it has rarely been suggested that they
also have the status of norms of jus cogens to which the Commission
referred. One can only assume that the Arbitration Commission specifi-
cally had in mind the right to self-determination for which there is
greater, albeit somewhat equivocal, support as a norm of jus cogens. If
this is the case, however, one might wonder why the Commission was not
specific on the point.
The existence of a category of norms having the status of jus cogens,
although relatively recent, is now widely accepted.>'? Its classical state-
ment is found in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which provides:
zHI See, c.g., Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (1995); McCorquodale,
'Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 43
(1994), p. 857.
zHz Opinion No. I, loco cit. above (n. 5), p. 1496.
zH .. See generally Verdross, 'jus dispositicum and jus cogens in International Law', American
journal oj International Law, 60 (1966), p. 55; Virally, 'Reflexions sur Ie "jus cogens" " Annuaire
francais de droit international, 12 (1966), p. 5; Onuf and Birney, 'Peremptory Norms of International
Law: Their Source, Function and Future', Denver journal of International Law and Policy.s. (1974),
p. 187; Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (jus Cogens ) in International Law (1988). The International
Law Commission's commentary notes: 'The view that in the last analysis there is no rule of
international law from which states cannot at their own free will contract out has become
increasingly difficult to sustain. . . The Commission pointed out that the law of the Charter
concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in
international law having the character of jus cogens. Moreover, if some governments in their
comments have expressed doubts as to the advisability of the article ... only one questioned the
existence of rules of jus cogens in the international Jaw of today': Yearbook oj the ILC, 1966, vol. 2,
p. 247. For a sceptical view, see Schwarzenberger, 'International "Jus Cogens"?', Tulane Law
Review, 43 (19 65), p. 455·
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A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention,
a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. ZH4
Without entering into a detailed discussion of the nature of norms of jus
cogens, it is generally considered that the main difficulty attached to the
notion is that of its content and field of application. :Z~5 This is nowhere
more evident than in the debate over self-determination. :zS6 A number of
commentators have asserted the peremptory nature of self-determina-
tion, :zS7 support for which is found in the work of the International Law
Commission'?" and the separate opinion of Judge Ammoun in the
Barcelona Traction case. :zSl) However, even if it is accepted that self-
determination operates as a peremptory norm in the context of decoloni-
zation, :Zl)O it is not yet clear whether its application outside that limited
.K .. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). Article 64 also provides: 'If a new
peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with
that norm becomes void and terminates'. See Szrucki, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the
Late of Treaties (1974); Rosenne, The Law of Treaties (1970), pp. 290-3; Sinclair, The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (and edn., 1984), pp. 203-41 .
• 115 The I LC felt constrained to mention just three examples of jus cogens norms: '(a) a treaty
contemplating an unlawful use of force contrary to the principles of the Charter, (b) a treaty
contemplating the performance of any other act criminal under international law, and (c) a treaty
contemplating or conniving at the commission of acts, such as trade in slaves, piracy or genocide, in
the suppression of which every state is called upon to co-operate': Yearbook of the ILC, 1966, vol,
2, p. 248 .
a lIto The 'legal' basis of the right to self-determination is founded in a range of legal texts including:
U~ Charter, Art. I, para. I; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. I;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. I; Helsinki Final Act 1975,
Part VIII, International Legal Materials, 14 (1975), p. 59; African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights 1981, Art. 20; GA Resn, 1514, General Assembly Official Records, 15th Session, Supplement
No. 16, p. 66, U~ Doc. A/4684 (1960); GA. Resn, 2625, ibid., 25th Session, Supplement No. 28,
p. 121, U~ Doc. A/8028 (1970). The ICJ has also recognized the right to self-determination: see
advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Namibia
case),I(.J Reports, 1971, p. 16, at p. 31, and Western Sahara case, ICY Reports, 1975, p. 12, at p. 31.
See generally Cristescu, The Right of Self-Determination: Historical and Current Decelopntent on the
Basis of United Nations Instruments (1981) .
a 117 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples (1995), pp. 133-40, 169-74; Gros Espiel, 'Sclf-
Determination as]us Cogens", in Cassese (cd.), UN Law/Fundamental Rights (1979), p. 168; Dugard,
Recognition and the United Nations (1987), pp. 158-62; Hannikainen, op. cit. above (n. 283),
pp. 421-4; Salo, 'Self-Determination: An Overview of History and Present State with Emphasis on
the CSCE Process', Finnish Yearbook of International Las», 2 (1991), p. 307.
~Kll Yearbook of the ILC, 1966, vol. 2, p. 248; ibid., 1976, vol, 2, part 2, p. 95 .
• K.) IC] Reports, 1970, p. 3, at pp. 304, 312. Judge Ammoun again referred to the 'imperative
character of the right of peoples to self-determination' in the Namibia case, IC] Reports, 1971, p. 16,
at pp. 72-5.
~<)O The approach of the international community with respect to Southern Rhodesia, for example,
might be considered to provide evidence that self-determination, as a norm of jus cogens, serves to
vitiate statehood in cases where it is asserted in violation of an applicable principle of representariv-
ity: sec Dugard, op. cit. above (n. 287), pp. 123-63; Hannikainen, op. cit. above (n. 283),
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ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 383
context can be said to be peremptory in nature."'" This problem may be
addressed either by severely limiting the definition of the entitlement
holders (i.e. the 'peoples' to which the principle refers) or by accepting
that it is an umbrella principle embodying a range of subsidiary rights
and principles each of which might have differential status in inter-
national law (customary, conventional or peremptory). If the latter is the
case, it is perhaps better to start speaking of discrete forms of self-
determination, rather than using it as an all-encompassing notion.
As far as the Commission was concerned, in its first opinion it referred
to self-determination as an operative principle for all successor States to
the SFRY. As such, it was not apparently referring to self-determination
as a principle governing the creation or modification of existing States or
their borders, but rather to what has been termed the 'internal' dimen-
sion of self-determination"?" which requires the creation, and operation,
of participatory and representative mechanisms of goverrimerrt.v'?
pp. 357-424. Contra, Crawford, op. cit. above (n. 47), pp. 81-2. The principal problem in this
context is whether or not the field of application of jus cogens is wider than the specific context of
treaties: see Hannikainen, op. cit. above (n. 283), p. 9; Sztucki, op. cit. above (n. 284), pp. 67-9.
Crawford argues that self-determination is 'controversial even as jus dispositiuunt' and therefore
the suggestion that it constitutes a norm of jus cogens is 'difficult to accept': op. cit. above (n. 47),
p. 81; Sinclair, op. cit. above (n. 284), p. 217, n. 7S; Pomerance, Self-Determination in Laze and
Practice (1982), pp. 63-72. It is considered that such caution is no longer warranted. In the case
concerning East Timor, the IC] noted that the right of peoples to self-determination had an 'ergo
01111leS character' (lac. cit. above (n. 182), para. 29). While this suggests that it is more than merely
part of the jus dispositicum, it does not resolve the question of its status as jus cogens, In terms of its
scope of application, the court merely referred to self-determination 'as it evolved from the Charter
and from United Nations practice' (ihid). This may argue in favour of its being limited broadly to
the context of decolonization.
'''' Judge Dillard, e.g., in analysing the Namibia case concluded that self-determination as a norm
of international law was 'applicable to the decolonisation of those non-self-governing territories
which arc under the aegis of the United Nations': JVestem Sahara case, ICY Reports, J(}7S, p. 12. at
p. 121. Principle IV of GA Resn. 1541 (XV) defines non-self-governing territories as 'a territory
which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country
administering it'. Crawford identifies the following as units to which the principle of self-
determination applies: (a) Trust and mandated territories, and non-self-governing territories under
Chapter XI of the Charter; (h) States, excluding those parts of States which are rhcrnselves self-
determination units; (c) (possibly) other territories forming distinct political-geographical areas,
whose inhabitants do not share in government with the result that they become non-self-governing;
(d) all other territories or situations to which self-determination is applied by the parties as an
appropriate solution or criterion: op. cit. above (n. 47), p. 101.
">' See Cassese, 'Political Self-Determination-Old Concepts and :'Jew Developments', in
Cassese (cd.), UN Laze/Fundamental Rights (1979), p. 137; Higgins, Problems and Process (1994),
pp. 111-28.
2<'-' Principle VI I I of the Helsinki Final Act, 1975 provides: 'By virtue of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, all people always have a right, in full freedom, to
determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without interference,
and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development': International
Legal Materials, 14 (1975), p. 1292. The Friendly Relations Declaration (GA Resn. 262S (XXV), 24
October 1970) implicitly defines a self-determined State in a savings clause as one which is
'possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour'. There is a possible connection here between the Commis-
sion's approach to self-determination and its opinion as to the criterion of effectiveness in the context
of federal States: above, nn. 205-10. It can also be seen to have recognition in the EC guidelines on
recognition: above, n. 20S.
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Although this reflects an increasing preoccupation in the international
community with the application of democratic principles both in terms
of human rights treaty norms2 9 4 and more broadly in the practice of
international relations.v" it may be questioned whether there is, as yet,
sufficient evidence to suggest that a rule of internal self-determination is
peremptory in nature. Such a conclusion is to some extent dependent
upon the particular construction of jus cogens adopted. For example, it is
probably not too difficult to accept the proposition that States must not
derogate from a norm of internal self-determination in their conventional
relations inter se.2 9 6 The suggestion that any derogation from the
principle of internal self-determination is not only unlawful (as part of
the jus dispositivum) but also amounts to an international crime.v"?
however, appears unsubstantiated in practice.
The Arbitration Commission came to consider the question of self-
determination more directly in its second opirrion."?" There, it was asked
whether the Serbian population of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 'as
one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia', had the right to self-
deterrnination.v?? The implications of this question were significant. At
the time, Serbian populations in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
had declared their independence and had set up 'Serbian Autonomous
Republics' in Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and like the other
Republics were seeking international recognition as independent
States.>?" Although the Commission had decided that the SFRY was in
the process of dismemberment, it had not identified how the new
territorial entities were to be defined. In such circumstances, it was
clearly the position of the Serbs that the principle of national self-
determination should be the governing criterion and that it should be
applied irrespective of the existing internal boundaries of the Federation.
The Commission's response to this issue is in some respects quite
remarkable.
Although it initially declared that 'international law as it currently
stands does not spell out all the implications of the right to self-
determination' ,30 1 the Commission went on to make two broad assertions
294 e.g, Articles I and 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, UN
Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171.
29S See Crawford, 'Democracy and International Law', this Year Book, 64 (1993), p. 113.
2C)f> Such a conclusion, however, is dependent upon acceptance of 'internal self-determination' as
part of the jus dispositiuum. For the argument that this is the proper understanding of self-
determination, see Higgins, op. cit. above (n. 292), pp, 118-21.
297 It is in virtue of the distinction between 'crimes' and 'delicts' in international responsibility,
that commentators have justified the application of jus cogens beyond the confines of treaty law: see
Dugard, op. cit. above (n. 287), pp. 141-7. Cf. ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Article
19), Yearbook of the ILC, 1976, vol. 2, pp. 95-122.
2911 Opinion No, 2, loco cit. above (n. 5).
299 Ibid., p. 1498 .
•100 Keesing's, vol. 37, p. 38685 (199 1).
301 Ibid.
 at School of O
riental and A
frican Studies on February 21, 2014
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 385
applicable respectively to the external and internal dimensions of self-
determination. First, the Commission stated that 'whatever the circum-
stances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes to
existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except
where the States concerned agree otherwise'. 3 0 2 Secondly, and by
contrast, the Commission argued that in virtue of Article I of the two
International Covenants on Human Rights, the right to self-determina-
tion entailed a right of every individual 'to belong to whatever ethnic,
religious or language community he or she wishes' .303 Neither of these
assertions can be accepted in an unqualified form.
3.2. I. External self-determination and uti possidetis
As regards the first point, the Commission's line of thought is largely
unexplained. Its argument that self-determination must not involve
changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence can easily be
accepted as regards established international borders. Most recent enun-
ciations of self-determination have been accompanied by a correspond-
ing confirmation of the integrity of existing international border-s;"?" and
there is little practice to suggest that the application of self-determination
has justified the non-consensual re-drawing of such borders. In the
context of Yugoslavia, for example, it was never suggested that the
borders between Yugoslavia and Greece or Bulgaria could or should be
redrawn on the basis of self-determination claims by peoples within
Yugoslavia. One may note in that respect the considerable deference
given to the Greek complaint that the Republic of Macedonia had
irredentist designs over Northern Greece. The real question related to
what were formerly the internal borders within the SFRY that demar-
cated the various Republics for administrative purposes. This matter was
taken up by the Arbitration Commission in its third opinion (issued on
the same day), in which it specifically addressed the question whether the
internal boundaries between Croatia and Serbia and between Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia could be regarded as frontiers in terms of public
international law. 3 0 5 Expressly relying on the principles and rules of
public international law, the Commission began by declaring that all
external frontiers must be respected in line with the principle laid down
in the UN Charter, in General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) and in
.102 Ibid .
.1°.1 Ibid .
.10" Resolution 1514 (XV) provides that 'any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the U:'Il': loc. cit above (n. 286). Resolution 2625 (XXV) provides that
'[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States': loc. cit. above (n. 286) .
.lOS Opinion No. 3, loc. cit. above (n. 5).
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the Helsinki Final Act. 3 0 6 I t went on to state that the internal boundaries
that were the subject of the question 'may not be altered except by
agreement freely arrived at', and that they had become 'frontiers
protected by international law' .307 In reaching this conclusion, the
Commission invoked the principle of uti possidetis juris (which it took to
be a general principle of international law) and quoted at length from the
decision of the ICJ in the Burkina Faso and Mali Frontier Dispute case.>"
In that case the Court had stated that the principle uti possidetis juris 'is
a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of
the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is
to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endan-
gered by fratricidal struggles.'30 9 The Commission considered that this
principle applied all the more readily to the Republics since Article 5(2)
and (4) of the Constitution of the SFRY stipulated that the Republic's
territories and boundaries could not be altered without their consent.
The decision of the Arbitration Commission on this point represents a
novel extension of the uti possidetis principle outside the context of
decolonization. Uti possidetis juris has arguably undergone a number of
subtle changes in its evolution.>'" As it was originally applied in the
context of South America (a context to which some considered it to be
restricted>' I), it was a means of establishing title to territory and of fixing
boundaries in the unexplored hinterlands without having to wait for title
to accrue through prescription.>'" This was recognized in the Beagle
Channel arbitration.v '? where it was noted that uti possidetis encompassed
two broad principles: first, a presumption that all territory is deemed to
have been part of one of the former administrative divisions of colonial
rule and that therefore that no territory would have the status of res
nullius; and secondly, that the title to any given locality is deemed
automatically to rest in whatever State took over the former admin-
istrative division in which it was situated.>':' Accordingly it had a narrow
.101> Ibid., p. J500. It noted that this principle also underlies Article J J of the Vienna Convention
on the Succession of States in respect of Treaties. That article provides that 'A succession of States
does not as such affect: (a) a boundary established by a treaty ... ': American Journal of International
Law, 72 (1978), p. 971.
J 0 7 Ibid.
JoM ICY Reports, J986, p. 554.
JO<) Ibid., p. 556 .
•1'0 The principle originated in Roman Law in which it was used to denote an edict of the praetor
used to preserve an existing state of possession pending litigation: see Fisher, 'The Arbitration of the
Guatemalan-Honduran Boundary Dispute', American Journal of International Law, 27 (1933),
p. 403, at p. 4J 5. For its development in decolonization, see Frank, 'Fairness to "Peoples" and their
Right to Self-Determination', Receuil des cours, 240 (J993-III), p. 125, at pp. 129-34; Klabbers and
Lefeber, 'Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis', in Brolrnann, Lefeber and
Zieck (eds.), Peoples and Minorities in International Law (1993), p. 37 .
•111 Jessup, 'Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations", American Joumal of International
Law, 58 (J964), p. 341, at p. 347.
Jla O'Connell, OPt cit. above (n. 125), p. 426.
JIJ Beagle Channel arbitration (Argentina v. Chile), 52 ILR 121.
.1'" Ibid., p. J25.
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application in cases where the newly independent States had not in fact
fully established effective control over the totality of the area of the
former administrative division, and where the principle was used to
prevent possible future conflict by laying down title to boundaries in
advance.v'> Even within this framework, however, problems arose with
respect to the identification of the boundaries that were to be frozen. For
example, in the Guatemala/Honduras arbitration the arbitrators were
presented with two possible approaches, each advocated by one of the
parties to the dispute. One party advocated the application of uti
possidetis juris which relied upon the formal delimitation of frontiers by
the colonial administrators; the other party advocated uti possidetis de jure
which established title in virtue of actual possession as demonstrated in
administrative practice.>!" Although in that case greater emphasis was
placed upon the fact of actual possession rather than the formal devolu-
tion of title, it is clear that practice in Latin America was not consistent
on this point.>!"
In its application outside the Latin American context, the principle of
uti possidetis (or what has been regarded as such) has taken on a number
of different forms. On some occasions, it has been applied in the form of
a doctrine of State succession to boundary treaties.>'" on other occasions,
it has been interpreted as reinforcing the notion of territorial integrity.>'v
Strictly speaking, both of these forms may be distinguished from the
original notion of uti possidetis as employed in the process of decoloniza-
tion, in which the existing administrative boundaries were transformed
into boundaries protected by international law.v? That being said, it is
clear that in Africa, the former colonial administrative borders have been
largely preserved intact and have served to define the shape of sub-
sequent independent States.>"
,1'5 Cf. the defensive purpose and prevention purpose outlined by Abi-Saab (separate opinion) in
Frontier Dispute case, loc. cit. above (n. 308), p. 659.
JIb Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. 2, p. 1352. See Bloomfield, The British
Honduras-Guatemala Dispute (1955); Fisher, loc, cit. above (n. 310).
,1 " See De Laprade lie, La Frontiere (1928), who, in light of the inconsistent practice, argues for
the total abandonment of the concept. Hyde comments that 'the term uti possidetis was in reality a
description of the practice that was being roughly followed. The Latin American States of Spanish
origin did not at that time regard the phrase, despite its significance in Roman law or its place in the
law of war, as expressive of a legal principle to which they owed deference or were endeavouring to
conform in the establishment of new frontiers': International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied
by the United States (1945), p. 501.
.1
1M e.g. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation case, 77 ILR 635, where it was stated that
the 1886 boundary delimitation treaty 'remained in force between France and Portugal and became
binding between the successor states by virtue of the principle of uti possidetis': p. 657; OAU
Resolution on Border Disputes among African States,OAU Doc. AHG/Res. 16(1). Cf. Article II,
Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties (1978).
,lIQ e.g. as expressed in Article 111(3) of the Charter of the OAU, 1963, UN Treaty Series, vol. 479,
p. 39; Principle IV, Helsinki Final Act (1975).
,120 Frontier case, loc. cit. above (n. 308), p. 566.
.12' See generally Shaw, op, cit. above (n, 146).
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As far as the Arbitration Commission was concerned, in order to
justify applying the principle uti possidetis in the context of Yugoslavia, it
relied heavily upon the dictum of the ICj in the Frontier case, to the
effect that the principle was a general one 'logically connected with the
phenomenon of obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs' (emphasis
addedj.v" It should be noted, however, that however broadly-stated the
proposition, the ICj did not necessarily have in mind the application of
uti possidetis to a situation such as that in Yugoslavia. Rather, its concern
was merely to affirm that the principle was 'not a special rule which
pertains solely to one specific system of international law', and could
therefore apply to cases of decolonization other than those in Spanish
America. In fact, later in the same judgment, when the Court reiterated
the point, it specifically used the word 'decolonization' rather than the
looser terms 'independence'. 3 23 That some question remained as to
whether uti possidetis was to be conceived properly as a principle of
universal application is indicated in the separate opinion of judge
Luchaire, who warned that '[i]n legal discourse, the term "decoloniza-
tion" should be used only with great caution and must above all not be
confused with accession to independence'P":' He continued: 'the colonial
process must be regarded as finally over once the inhabitants of a colony
have been able to exercise this right of self-determination' .3 25
However the judgment of the Court in the Frontier case is viewed, it is
clear that the Arbitration Commission's determination that uti possidetis
should apply to the case of Yugoslavia is significant and tends to reinforce
a more expansive view of the principle's field of application. As a
question of policy, there is a strong case for arguing that the application
of uti possidetis to the Yugoslav situation was preferable, in the short term
at least, to the delimitation of boundaries on the basis of unstable and
shifting forces of nationalist sentiment, or on the basis of a strict
application of the principle of effectiveness. One may question, never-
theless, whether in the long term it is a legal technique which will provide
a permanent and pacific settlement to the underlying territorial dis-
putes.
As a separate question of legal coherence, uti possidetis is only
understandable when it is operated within an identifiable time-frame and
with respect to identifiable units of statehood. As the Court in the
Frontier case noted, '[i]t applies to the State as it is, ie. to the
"photograph" of the territorial situation then existing. The principle of
uti possidetis freezes the territorial title; it stops the clock, but does not
.1ZZ Frontier case, loc. cit. above (n. 308), p. 565.
3 Z3 Ibid., p. 566 .
.1Z4 Ibid., p. 65 2 .
HS Ibid.
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put back the hands. '3 2 6 In this regard, there are two particular problems
that arise from its application in the context of Yugoslavia. First, the
dismemberment of the SFRY as described by the Arbitration Commis-
sion did not, of itself, identify the units of government which were to be
the presumptive States in the new territorial settlement. That would only
be the case if the process were one of devolution or secession. Secondly,
even if the original 'photograph of the territorial situation' were to be
taken at the moment the Federation was proclaimed to be 'in the process
of dissolution', that only effectively addresses the problem of border
disputes that might arise between the various Republics. If uti possidetis
is to apply to all cases of 'independence' there is nothing to preclude its
further application within each of the Republics even after their state-
hood has been established.
Ultimately, two different processes are at work in each case. First, the
identification of presumptive units of statehood, whether that be in virtue
of the principle of effectiveness or self-determination, and secondly the
determination of boundaries within which those entities are to be
confined.>"? The principle of uti possidetis, in its original guise, only
serves to address the second question and does not provide a coherent
basis for establishing the statehood of the emergent entities. The manner
in which the Arbitration Commission addressed the issue, however, was
to use uti possidetis as a tool for establishing the presumptive statehood of
the entities to emerge from the dismemberment of the SFRY and to deny
the autonomous Serbian Republics the benefit of that presumption.
If the Commission's first opinions are taken together as a coherent
whole (which is not unreasonable given the fact that the first three were
delivered on the same day), one is left with the view that owing to a
collapse in central government the SFRY fell into a process of dis-
memberment in which, through application of the principle of uti
possidetis, the succeeding entities were presumptively deemed to be the
six Republics. This being the case, it is clear that the principle of self-
determination had little overall influence on the territorial settlement.
First, in terms of ethnicity, while Slovenia was relatively homogenous,
all of the other Republics had significant ethnic minorities within their
territorial borders which generally opposed the territorial settlement that
.HI> Ibid., p. 568. Cf. Claims of Morocco over Western Sahara, Western Sahara case, ICY
Pleadings, CR 75/8, pp. 11-16.
.lZ7 This distinction is evident in the fact that in order to acquire statehood it is not necessary for
the entity concerned to have its borders strictly determined, but rather that it should merely be in
control of territory in an abstract sense. See Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State,
Annual Digest, vol. 5, p. II, at p. 15. It is arguable, however, that territory should not be 'excessively
fragmented' as, e.g., in the case of Bophuthatswana: see UK position, Hansard, He Debs., vol. 105,
col. 100 (2 November 1986).
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emerged.v'" Secondly, in so far as the FRY and, to a lesser extent,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were unwilling partners in the
dismemberment process, it is difficult to assert that they determined
their own status; rather, their independence appears to have been thrust
upon them by the fact of dismemberment. I t is also apparent that in the
view of the Arbitration Commission the principle of effectiveness had
only a subordinate role-it being suggested that in virtue of the inter-
nationalization of their borders, each of the constituent Republics of the
former SFRY enjoyed prima facie statehood irrespective of the effective-
ness of their government. Ultimately, the principle of uti possidetis was
employed a priori, to protect the integrity of the constitutionally-defined
territorial units which were then, and only then, able or entitled to
exercise some form of self-determination, whether that be full independ-
ence, or integration into a confederation of States. In other words, a
principle of boundary delimitation was used as the primary determining
tool not only of the shape of the new territorial entities, but also for their
international personality as States.
3.2.2. Internal self-determination
The Arbitration Commission, perhaps aware of the limits of imposing
a strict territorial settlement upon an ethnically diverse population where
strong forces of nationalism were at work, sought to mitigate its effect by
developing the substance of the internal dimension of self-determination.
The first step in its argument was to assert that '[w]here there are one or
more groups within a State constituting one or more ethnic, religious or
language communities, they have the right to recognition of their identity
under international law'. 3 29 Further, the Commission argued that the
rights of the minorities so recognized had the status of peremptory norms
of international law. 33° Therefore, the Serbian population in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia 'must be afforded every right accorded to
minorities under international conventions as well as national and
international guarantees consistent with the principles of international
law and the provisions of Chapter I I of the draft Convention of 4
November 1991, which has been accepted by those Republics' .33 1
The position adopted by the Commission in this respect is quite
ambitious. Although certain individual rights, and perhaps the right of
;Ull Apart from the Serbian populations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of
:Macedonia has a significant Albanian population and Bosnia-Herzegovina has a sizeable Croatian
population. Albanians dominate Kosovo and Hungarians. Vojvodina. See generally Rusinow,
"Narionalities and the National Question'. in Ramet (ed.), Yugoslavia in the 1980'S (1985). p. 131.
329 Opinion No. 3. loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. 1498.
330 Ibid.• p. 1498. In this matter. the Commission referred back to its first opinion where it had
first posited that the rights of minorities had the status of jus cogens.
H' Ibid.
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self-determination, may have the status of jus cogens.t?" it has rarely been
suggested that the rights of minorities have that status. The I LC, for
example, has frequently discussed the possible contenders for the
category of norms of jus cogens, but has never even considered that the
rights of minorities might be included.v-? While it is commonly accepted
that rules prohibiting slavery, genocide, and perhaps racial discrimina-
tion are peremptory norms, it is not easy to extend that reasoning to the
whole corpus of human rights.">' Having said that, as a category of
human rights, minority rights have a long pedigree dating back to before
the creation of the United Nationsv'" and have recently been the subject
of considerable attention on the international plane. One may note, in
particular, the recent European Framework Convention for the Protec-
tion of National Minorities-'>" and the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, or Linguistic
Minorities.v>? Much as these developments might suggest that the rights
of minorities are developing into rules of customary international law, it
is undoubtedly too early to suggest that they are now jus cogens norms.
Two specific problems may attach to such a proposition. First, in
conceiving of minority rights as norms of jus cogens, questions might arise
as to the validity of certain individual human rights treaty norms (not
having the status of jus cogens) that preserve interests which appear to
conflict with those of minority groups. For example, the cultural
practices of minority groups may well be incompatible with the right to
non-discrimination on the grounds of sex. While much is dependent
upon how the essence of the peremptory norm is defined, the differential
status of the norms concerned will undoubtedly render more difficult the
resolution of any inherent tensions and may ultimately undermine the
very integrity of human rights in general.
A second difficulty with the Commission's approach is that although it
advised that the Serbian population should be afforded 'every right
accorded to minorities under international conventions', at the time of
speaking there was no specific human rights convention dedicated to
minority rights. The only universal human rights treaty that specifically
.1.12 Above, nn. 286-cj1 .
.1.1.1 See Yearbook of the ILC, '966, vol. 2, p. 248 .
•1.104 But see Verdross, 'Jus Dispositioum and jus cogens in International Law', American Journal of
International Law, 60 (1966), p. 55, at p. 59 .
.1.H See Capotorti, 'Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
:\'linorities', UN Doc. E/CX4/Sub.2/'9791384/Rev.,; Thornberry, International Law and the
Rights of Minorities (1991), pp. 25-54. Cf. Minority Schools in Albania, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 64,
P·4·
u f, International Human Rights Reports, 2 (1995), p. 217. This was opened for signature on I
February 1995 and therefore post-dates the Commission's opinion.
.1.17 GA Resn. 47/135,18 December 1992, International Legal Materials, 32 (1993), p. 912.
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contained an article referring to minorities was the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 27).338 However, the thrust of
that article, as with the later Convention and Declaration, is upon the
rights of individual members of minority groups rather than upon the
rights of the minority per se, the two not being co-terminous.
What is interesting about the Arbitration Commission's approach is
that it was not specifically asked to consider the question of minority
rights, but rather to spell out the implications of the right to self-
determination for the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herze-
govina. That it considered the question of minority rights to be relevant
is indicative of its view that there could be some effective assimilation of
the concepts.v?" This it proceeded to make clear later in the same
opinion. The Commission referred to common Article I of the two
International Covenants on human rights (the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights-r" and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights>") which, in its opinion, establishes
that the 'principle of the right to self-determination serves to safeguard
human rights' .34Z According to the Commission, by virtue of Article I,
'every individual may choose to belong to whatever ethnic, religious or
language community he or she wishes' .343 It continued by asserting that
one possible consequence of this principle might be that the Serbian
population of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia should have the 'right to
choose their nationality'. 344
In general terms, there might be a case for arguing for a more synthetic
approach to various categories of human rights (individual rights, group
rights and people's rights) by drawing the necessary parallels between
them and identifying their common elements. It is clear, for example,
that certain minority rights can be framed in individual terms (like
Article 27 ICCPR), and that individual rights themselves may be enjoyed
on equal terms by members of minorities. Equally, it is apparent that the
3311 Article 27 reads: 'In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to
use their own language'. See generally Thornberry, op. cit. above (n. 335), pp. 141-247.
339 Cf. Cassese, op. cit. above (n. 287), PP.348-S9.
340 UN Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171 (1966).
HI Ibid., vol. 993, p. 3 (1966).
34" Article 1(I) of each Covenant reads: 'All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.' There is no mention here of the function that self-determination has with
respect to 'safeguarding' other human rights.
343 Opinion No, 3, loco cit. above (n. 5), p. 1498. One may wonder at the language employed in
this phrase-is there, for example, a difference between the 'right to belong' to a particular
community and the 'right to choose to belong' to a particular community?
.144 Ibid., p. 1499.
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internal dimension of self-determination may be reinforced by individual
rights, such as the rights to take part in the conduct of public affairs and
to vote, and be elected, at genuine periodic elections (Article 25 ICCPR).
There are limits to the extent of assimilation, however, which are
dictated by the independence and integrity of the rights themselves: the
very existence of minority rights and people's rights assumes that the
interests they preserve extend beyond those that may be expressed in
individual terms. 345
As far as the Arbitration Commission was concerned, it went beyond
the traditional understanding of Article I of the Covenants as interpreted
by the Human Rights Committee>" and the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights.v'? in that it drew from self-determination an
individual right, namely, the right to choose to belong to whatever
ethnic, religious or language community he or she wishes. It is not clear,
however, what was intended by the Commission in this assertion. If it is
taken as meaning a right not to be arbitrarily excluded from the benefits
of membership in a particular ethnic, religious or language community,
it might be acceptable as a general principle.v'" If, on the other hand, it
entails an unqualified right on the part of an individual to join a
community irrespective of the needs or interests of the community itself,
it is deeply problematic.
In several cases pertaining to Article 27 ICCPR, the Human Rights
Committee has come to consider the problems involved in maintaining a
right of individual membership in minority communities. First in the
Lovelace case,349 and later in the Kitok case,350 complainants argued that
they had been deprived of their rights under Article 27, namely the right
to enjoy their own language or culture in community with other
members of their group. In each case, the question related to the
existence of legislation aimed at protecting the interests of a minority
group which was defined in a way that excluded the individual complain-
ant from enjoying the benefits of membership in that group. The general
principle applied by the Human Rights Committee was the same in each
case, namely, that 'a restriction upon the right of an individual member
HS Cf. Higgins, op. cit. above (n, 292), pp. 120-1.
HI> See :vIcGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee (1991), pp. 247-58; Cassese, 'The Self-
Determination of Peoples', in Henkin (ed.), The International Bill of Rights (1987), p. 92.
H7 The CESCR has made remarkably few comments in relation to self-determination. See
generally Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1995).
H!I Cf. Article 27 ICCPR, above, n. 338.
H9 Selected Decisions (1985), p. 83. See generally Bayefsky, 'The Human Rights Committee and
the Case of Sandra Lovelace', Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 20 (1982), p. 244.
HO HRC Report, General Assembly Official Records, 44th Session, Supplement No, 40, p. 221
(1989).
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of a minority must be shown to have a reasonable and objective
justification and to be necessary for the continued viability and welfare of
the minority as a whole' .35 1 In the Lovelace case, the Committee
considered the exclusion of a female member of the Maliseet Band from
the Tobique Indian Reserve on the basis that she had previously been
married to a non-Indian was neither reasonable nor 'necessary to
preserve the identity of the tribe' .35 2 On the other hand, in the Kitok
case, although the Committee did have reservations about the compati-
bility of certain provisions of the Swedish Reindeer Husbandry Act with
Article 27, it did not consider the impediment suffered by the applicant
sufficiently grave to outweigh the interests of the minority as a whole as
protected by the legislation.v"" What is clear from both of these cases is
that an unqualified right of membership in minority groups is unsustain-
able if the minority interest is to be maintained intact. Minorities, by
their nature, need to have some control over the conditions for member-
ship even if those conditions are subject to other human rights principles
such as non-discrimination on the grounds of sex. 3H Ultimately, a
balance needs to be maintained between the need for a minority to
maintain its own identity and the legitimate interests of individual
members of that group.
The second principle attributed to the right to self-determination by
the Arbitration Commission was that individual members of the minor-
ities in Yugoslavia must be afforded 'the right to choose their nation-
ality'.355 Here, the Commission was somewhat more cautious: this, it
suggested was merely 'one possible consequence' of recognizing the right
of individuals to choose to belong to whatever community they wishP>"
and was a principle that should be applied only 'where appropriate'. 357
The reason for the Commission's caution is plain: not only does it
involve the issue of whether there exists a right of expatriation in
international law, but it also concerns a prior question as to whether the
inhabitants of a territory will succeed to the nationality of the successor
State. In general, practice suggests that in cases of State succession, the
HI Ibid., p. 230, para. 9.8.
H~ Loc. cit. above (n. 349), p. 87, para. 16.
.153 It was noted that although the statute restricted reindeer breeding to members of the Sami
villages, the applicant (who was not a villager for the purposes of the Act) was nevertheless able to
graze and farm his reindeer and to hunt and fish: loco cit. above (n. 350), para. 9.8.
JH Although the HRC did not consider it necessary to go into the question of non-discrimination
in the Locelace case, it is apparent that one of the major considerations was the fact that the law
applied differentially to men and women: see, e.g., individual opinion of Vl r Bouriri, loco cit. above
(n. 349), p. 87.
JS5 Opinion No. 3, loco cit. above (n. 5), p. 1499.
H'l Ibid., p. 1498.
357 Ibid., p. 1499.
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affected population will automatically acquire the nationality of the
successor State.v'" The only substantial difference in opinion is as to
whether this occurs ipso jure under the rules of succession-"? or whether
it has merely been general practice as regards a matter which is otherwise
exclusively a question for municipal law.P?" It is considered that even if
nationality should be considered primarily a matter within the domestic
jurisdiction of the State, that does not preclude the operation of a rule of
succession that requires the granting of nationality to residents of the
territory concerned provided some genuine connection can be estab-
lished.t'" It is particularly clear in the context of Yugoslavia that the
territorial settlement would be severely undermined were the Republics
to deny nationality to sections of the population on the basis of ethnic
origin. In light of that it may be said de lege ferenda that the granting of
nationality should not be discriminatory on the basis of racial, religious,
ethnic or political grounds.>'" What is more doubtful, however, is
whether in cases of succession the affected population have a right of
option, J6 3 or perhaps a right of expatriation. J 04 Although there is a
certain amount of treaty practice in which a right of option has been
provided for,J 0 5 it is perhaps too early to suggest that international law
imposes a duty upon the successor State to permit the inhabitants of the
territory to opt for an alternative nationality.v?" Nevertheless, this
principle may well be suited to the specific context of the Yugoslav
situation in which a number of the minorities have ethnic affiliations with
one of the other Republics or neighbouring States.
.HH See generally Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (1956); Brownlie, op.
cit. above (n. 38), pp. 555-<).
'-'<> See Brownlie, who comments:
'Sovereignty denotes responsibility, and a change of sovereignty does not give the new sovereign
the right to dispose of the population concerned at the discretion of the government. The population
goes with the territory: on the one hand, it would be illegal, and a derogation from the grant, for the
transferor to try to retain the population as its own nationals, and, on the other hand, it would be
illegal for the successor to take any steps which involved attempts to avoid responsibility for
conditions on the territory, for example, by treating the population as de facto stateless or by failing
to maintain order in the area': op. cit. above (n. 38), p. 664.
."'0 In the Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco case, PCl], Series D, No. 4, p. 24 (1923), it
was stated that 'in the present state of international law, questions of nationality are ... in principle
within the reserved domain' of a State's domestic jurisdiction. See also O'Connell, op. cit. above
(n. 125), vol. 2, pp. 497-506; Wcis, op. cit. above (n. 358), p. 149; Jones, British Nationality Law
(1956), pp. 20-6; Oppenheim, op. cit. above (n. 121), p. 219.
.1'>1 Cf. Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), ICY Reports, 1955, p. 4 .
.1'" Cf. U;..J" Convention on Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, Article 9.
,,,.1 See Kaufmann, 'Rcgles generales du droit de la paix', Recueil des cours, 54 (I935-IV),
P·373·
.1"4 Article 15 UDHR provides that ':'>Jo one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality'. The ICCPR provides somewhat less directly for a right
to liberty of movement and freedom to choose one's residence, and a right to leave any country,
including one's own (Article 12) .
.1"5 e.g. Bresr-Litowsk, 1918. For practice until 1918, see Kunz, 'L'Option de Nationalite", Recueil
des cours, 31 (1930-1), p. 112 .
.l"" See generally O'Connell, op. cit. above (n. 125), pp. 529-36.
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3·3. Succession of States
The majority of the Arbitration Commission's opmions related in
some manner at least to the question of succession. As noted above, the
approach adopted by the Commission in its first opinion essentially
established the framework for all its subsequent opinions. This is
particularly true with respect to the question of succession. The Arbitra-
tion Commission initially outlined the broad principles upon which
problems of succession should be solved in its ninth opinion. Following
that, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the ICFY sub-
mitted a further six questions to the Arbitration Commission on 20 April
1993 which were addressed in Opinions 11-15.3 6 7 It is beyond the scope
of this article to address all the issues raised in the depth necessitated by
a complex and difficult area of law, and for that reason, the general
elements of the Commission's approach will be outlined and a number of
issues selected for discussion. It is notable to begin with that the
Commission was only called upon to address directly questions of
succession to State property, archives and debts. In consequence, the
issues of succession to membership in international organizations-?" and
31>7 The six questions were as follows:
'I) In light of the inventory in the report by the Chairman of the Working Group on Economic
Issues, what assets and liabilities should be divided between the successor States to the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the succession process?
2) On what date(s) did succession of States occur for the various States that have emerged from
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
3a) What legal principles apply to the division of State property, archives and debts of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in connection with the succession of States when one or
more of the parties concerned refuse(s) to cooperate?
b) In particular, what should happen to property
- not located on the territory of any of the States concerned, or
- situated on the territory of the States taking part in the negotiations?
4) Under the legal principles that apply, might any amounts owed by one or more parties in the
form of war damages affect the distribution of State property, archives and debts in connection with
the succession process?
sa) In view of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is the National
Bank of Yugoslavia entitled to take decisions affecting property, rights and interests that should be
divided between the successor States to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in connection
with the succession of States?
b) Have the central banks of the States emerging from the dissolution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia succeeded to the rights and obligations of the National Bank of Yugoslavia
deriving from international agreements concluded by the latter, in particular the 1988 Financial
Agreement with foreign commercial banks?
6a) On what conditions can States, within whose jurisdiction property formerly belonging to the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is situated, oppose the free disposal of that property or take
other protective measures?
b) On what conditions and under what circumstances would such States be required to take such
steps?' (International Legal Materials, 32 (1993), p. 1580).
3
M See generally Blum, loco cit. above (n. 244); Lloyd, loco cit. above (n. 244); Williams, 'State
Succession and the International Financial Institutions: Political Criteria v. Protection of Out-
standing Financial Obligations', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 43 (1994), p. 776.
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ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 397
succession to treaties (especially human rights treatiesj.>"? although
raising a number of interesting questions in the context, will not be
considered here.
3.3.1. The Vienna Conventions
Throughout its opinions on succession, the Commission took as its
starting point the 'principles of international law embodied in the Vienna
Conventions of 23 August 1978 and 8 April 1983' .370 The two Vienna
Conventions were drafted as a result of the perceived lack of consistency
in State practice and in particular the fear that such practice as existed
gave 'undue prominence to the interests of the major imperial powers
and not enough to those of the newer members of the international
community' .371 The initial drafts of the Conventions were compiled by
the International Law Commission in 1974372 and 1981,373 the final text
being completed at two conferences held in Vienna in 1977 and 1983. It
is clear, however, that neither Convention has acquired the 15 ratifica-
tions or accessions necessary for them to enter into force and there is no
prospect of their doing so in the near future. In that respect, one might
question the Arbitration Commission's reliance upon the principles
embodied therein.
Two factors might go to explain the position of the Commission on
this point. The first, rather weak, justification is that the SFRY was one
of the few States at that time to have ratified the two Vienna Conven-
tions. It is abundantly clear, however, that the SFRY was not strictly
bound by the terms of the Conventions before their entry into force ,374-
and that even then, their application in the present situation was
dependent either upon their having passed to the succeeding States in
virtue of the rules of succession which they embody, or by reason of their
embodying operative rules of customary international law. Secondly, and
somewhat more significantly, all the Republics had agreed that the
.1"') On this point see Shaw, 'State Succession Revisited', Finnish Yearbook of International Law,
6 (1995), p. 34; Mullerson, 'The Continuity and Succession of States by reference to the Former
USSR and Yugoslavia', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 42 (1993), p. 473; id., '::"Jew
Developments in the Former USSR and Yugoslavia', Virginia Journal of International LaU', 33
(1993), p. 299; \Villiams, 'The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the Former Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia: Do they Continue?', Demier Journal of International Late
and Policy, 23 (1994), p. I; Schachter, 'State Succession: The Once and Future Law'. Virginia
Journal of International Law, 33 (1993), p. 253; Williamson and Osborn, 'A US Perspective on
Treaty Succession and Related Issues in the \Vake of the Breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia',
ibid., p. 261; Martins, 'An Alternative Approach to the International Law of State Succession'.
Syracuse Late Review, 44 (1993), p. 1019.
.17 0 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, 1978, American journal of
International LaU', 72 (1978), p. 971; Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State
Property, Archives and Debts, 1983, International Legal Materials, 22 (1983), p. 306.
.17 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. above (n. 121), p. 236.
.172 Yearbook oj the ILC, 1974, vol. 2, part I, p. 174.
.17.1 Ibid., 1981, vol. 2, part 2, p. 20 .
.lH Cf. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, UN Treaty Series, vol.
1155, p. 331.
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Conventions should form the 'foundation for discussions between them
on the succession of states at the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia' .375
Whilst this falls considerably short of an agreement to be bound by the
terms of the Conventions, it is entirely appropriate for the Conventions
then to be used by the Arbitration Commission as the starting point for
its consideration of the issues.
I t is interesting to note that the Commission's appreciation of the
precise status of the rules embodied by the Vienna Conventions appears
to change through its opinions. In its first opinion it speaks of the
Conventions having 'drawn inspiration' from the general principles of
international Iaw.P?" Later, in its eighth and ninth opinions, it refers to
the general principles that are embodied in the Conventions, but stops
short of defining the provisions to which it refers.>?? By the time it came
to deliver its thirteenth opinion in July 1993, the Commission clearly
took a more circumspect view. There, it noted that 'there are few well-
established principles of international law that apply to State succession'
and that application of those principles 'is largely to be determined case
by case, depending on the circumstances proper to each form of
succession', In that respect, it suggested, rather lamely, that the Vienna
Conventions 'do offer some guidance' ,37!'! It is undoubtedly the case that
some provisions of the Vienna Conventions do reflect customary inter-
national law: one might suggest, inter alia, Articles 1 I, Is(a), 16,24(1) of
the 1978 Convention and Articles 12, 14(2)(a), IS(I)(a), 17(1)(a) and
18(I)(d) of the 1983 Convention.>"? On the other hand a number of
provisions, and especially those relating to 'newly independent States', 3!'!O
do not draw upon established State practice and are therefore more in the
nature of norms aimed at the progressive development of international
law.>"' What was perhaps overlooked by the Arbitration Commission in
its reliance upon the Vienna Conventions was their limited scope. There
are undoubtedly a number of questions that might arise in the context of
succession on which the Vienna Conventions have nothing to say. It is
clear, for example, that the Vienna Convention of 1983 does not deal with
State debts owed to private individuals as distinct from other States, nor
with questions or nationality, currency, or criminal, as opposed to
375 Opinion No. 8, loco cit. above (n. 5), p. 1524.
371> Opinion No. I, loco cit. above (n. 5), p. 1495 .
.177 Opinion No. 8, loco cit. above (n. 5), p. 1523; Opinion No. 9, loco cit. above (n. 5), p. 1525.
378 Opinion No, 13, loc. cit. above (n. 8), p. 1592 .
.179 These are no more than examples-there are clearly a number of other provisions abou! which
there would be little disagreement .
.180 e.g. Articles 15, 28, 38, Vienna Convention, 1983.
Jill The preambles of both Conventions refer to 'the need for the codification and progressive
deuelopment of the rules relating to succession of States' (emphasis added). It was clearly
acknowledged by members of the ILC that their role in drafting the Vienna Conventions was more
legislative than codificatory: see Ago, Yearbook of the ILC, 1973, vol. I, pp. 101-2.
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ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 399
contractual, responsibility.V" One may only assume that the Commission
considered that the broad principles it outlined would be equally
operative in these areas.
3.3.2. Broad principles
The Commission dealt with the broad principles on which the
succession of the various Republics should be based initially in its ninth
opinion.t'" There, it had been asked to outline 'on what basis and by
what means should the problems of the succession of states arising
between the different states emerging from the SFRY be settled'.
According to the Commission, '[tjhe chief concern is that the solution
adopted should lead to an equitable outcome, with the states concerned
agreeing procedures subject to compliance with the imperatives of
general international law and, more particularly, the fundamental rights
of the individual and of peoples and minorities'. 38~ From this rather brief
statement of principle, the Commission then outlined a number of more
detailed conclusions. The two main elements of its opinion were that,
first, the successor States (of whom none could claim to be the sole
successor) should settle all aspects of succession by agreernerrt.v"" Failing
agreement, they must settle all disputes peacefully, 'in line with the
principle laid down in the United Nations Charter' and in particular by
means of inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settle-
ment.v'" Secondly, the successor States should try to achieve an equitable
solution by drawing on the principles in the Vienna Conventions and
general international law, taking into account the principle of equality of
rights and duties between States.t"? It noted, in particular, that the assets
and debts of the SFRY, together with its property located in third
countries, must be divided equitably between the successor States.>'"
3.3.3. The obligation to negotiate, non-cooperation, and third States
In its twelfth op irriorr.P"? the Commission came to address an issue
which had primarily arisen from the non-participation of the FRY in the
Conference Working Group on Succession which was attempting to deal
with the complex issues of dividing assets and debts. I t was asked, in
particular, to outline what principles were to apply to the division of
State property, archives and debts in the face of a State's refusal to
.lH. The earlier title of the Vienna Convention of 1983 referred broadly to 'matters other than
treaties'; this was changed in recognition of the narrow scope of the Convention: ibid., 1981, vol. 2,
p. 21.
.,H.l Opinion No, 9, loc. cit. above (n. 5), p. 1523 .
.lH~ Ibid .
.lHS Ibid .
.,HI> Ibid., p. 1525. Cf. Article 33, U:'oJ Charter.
.lH7 Ibid .
.,HH Ibid .
.lHQ Opinion No. 12, loc. cit. above (n. 8).
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co-operate, and what protective measures could, and should, be taken by
the remaining States.P?"
In response to the questions, the Commission reiterated its broad
position that it was for the States concerned to achieve an equitable result
by negotiation and agreement inter se. If a State refused to co-operate to
that end, it would be in breach of that obligation and would be liable
internationally for any loss suffered as a result. In such a case, the
Commission considered that it would be open to those States sustaining
such a loss to take non-forcible counter-measures 'in accordance with
international law' .39 1 It added, however, that the fact of non-cooperation
does not relieve the other States of their obligation to consult with each
other to achieve a comprehensive equitable result whilst reserving the
rights of the non-cooperating State(s). Any agreement arrived at by the
remaining parties is res inter alios acta in relation to all third parties>"
(including both third States upon which property of the SFRY is located
and non-cooperating States), which are therefore not bound by its terms
unless they specifically consent to be so bound. Finally, the Commission
noted that third States may take such interim measures as may be
necessary to safeguard interests of the successor States and that they
would be under an obligation to do so if a competent international agency
had so declared.w>
It is generally appreciated that the allocation of assets and debts among
successor States should ideally be achieved by agreement among the
parties concerned, and that the rules embodied in the Vienna Convention
are generally operable only where no such agreement has been reached.
I t is less clear, however, whether it can be said that there is in fact an
obligation to negotiate. The fact that in many cases States have resorted
to negotiation to settle questions of succession-v- does not in itself
provide evidence of any necessary obligation in that regard. It might be
said, nevertheless, that such an obligation might flow from the fact that
the issues involved relate not only to the rights and duties of successor
States, but also to those of third parties, and that negotiation is a sine qua
non for the equitable resolution to the problems. It is pertinent to note,
as the Commission made clear, that even if a State should choose not to
co-operate in the division of assets and liabilities, it would not lose the
interest it had over the property concerned; it would merely be interna-
tionally liable for any loss incurred from its non-cooperation.
As regards its remarks on counter-measures, the Arbitration Commis-
sion was undoubtedly correct in asserting initially that States sustaining
390 Ibid., pp. 1589-9°.
WI Ibid., p. 1590.
.lQ' Ibid. Cf. Article 34, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties .
.1".1 Ibid.,p. 1591.
3Q4 e.g., Agreement on partition of debt of Czechoslovakia, 1939; Agreement on distribution of
debt of Yugoslavia, 1941; see O'Connell, op. cit. above (n. 125), vol. 2, pp. 389-<)0.
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ARBITRATION COMl\1I SSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 401
loss would be entitled to take non-forcible measures. In stressing that
counter-measures could be taken 'in accordance with international law',
it appears that the Commission had in mind the requirement that they be
essentially 'proportionate' to the loss suffered and should be aimed at the
restoration of equality between the parties.vv> Although there might be
some difficulty in determining the nature of the loss involved in absence
of an agreement to that effect, the States affected are entitled to take some
otherwise illegal measures to induce the non-cooperating party to return
to negotiations.>?"
The Arbitration Commission appears to state this principle in too
broad a manner, however, when it refers to the right of third States to
take interim measures of protection in order to protect the interests of the
successor States. )97 As Pellet notes, this appears to give recognition to a
form of 'collective counter-measures' that would only be conceivable in
relation to obligations erga omnes.>" In essence, it is only those States
that have suffered loss as a result of an illegal act by another State that are
competent under international law to take counter-measures. In the
circumstances, this might be the case with respect to third States which
possess a financial interest in the property that has yet to be divided
among the successor States. Third States, upon whose territory property
relating to the succession of States is located, would not by that account
suffer loss, and as such would not be entitled to take counter-measures.
But in so far as they possessed an interest in the general settlement they
might thereby be entitled to take retorsionary measures. This, however,
falls considerably short of the 'interim measures of protection' envisaged
by the Arbitration Commission.
3.3.4. The division of assets and liabilities
In its fourteenth opiri iorr;"?" the Arbitration Commission was asked to
indicate, in light of the inventory that had been drafted by the Working
Group on Economic Issues, what assets and liabilities should be divided
between the successor States to the SFRY. It is quite understandable
that, in light of the continuing negotiations and the highly complex
nature of the issues involved, the Arbitration Commission confined itself
to stating the broad principles that were to apply. It noted first that the
Working Group had divided the items on the inventory into two
sections: agreed terms and non-agreed items."?" With respect to the
.IQ5 Air Services Agreement case (1978), Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. 18, p. 416.
It might also be suggested that counter-measures are illegitimate in cases where procedures for
peaceful settlement have already been agreed: Yearbook of the ILC, 1979, vol. 2, part 2, p. 118.
.I'll> Cf. Article JO, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the ILC, 1980, vol. 2,
part 2, p, 33 .
.1'>7 See, Pellet, loco cit. above (n. 19) (1993), pp. 298-<) .
.1QH Ibid .
•1Q'l Opinion No. 14, loc. cit. above (n. 8).
~oo Ibid., p. 1593.
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former, the Commission considered that they should be divided between
the successor States. As regards the non-agreed items, the Arbitration
Commission felt that it did not have sufficient information on which to
base a decision and that in any case, it was not the type of issue it could
readily resolve in its capacity as a consultative body :~Ol It therefore
resolved to confine itself to 'determining the general principles to be
applied' .
The Commission proceeded to outline the applicable principle as
follows:
3. The Commission would nevertheless draw attention to the well-established
rule of state succession law that immovable property situated on the territory of
a successor State passes exclusively to that State. Subject to possible compensa-
tion if such property is divided very unequally between the successor States to
the SFRY, the principle of the locus in quo implies that there is no need to
determine the previous owner of the property: public property passes to the
successor State on whose territory it is situated. The origin or initial financing
of the property and any loans or contributions made in respect of it have no
bearing on the matter.
4. As regards other State property, debts and archives, a commonly agreed
principle to be found in several provisions of the Vienna Convention of 8 April
1983 on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and
Debts requires that they be divided between the successor States to the SFRY
if, at the date of succession, they belonged to the SFRY, and the question of the
origin and initial financing of the property, debts and archives, or of any loans
or contributions made in respect of them, is irrelevant.
5. To determine whether the property, debts and archives belonged to the
SFRY, reference should be had to the domestic law of the SFRY in operation at
the date of succession-notably to the 1974 Constitution.e'?
The first point to be made here is that the Commission did not explicitly
determine how the property, archives and debts should be divided, but
rather confined itself to identifying which pieces of property should be so
divided.:"? In doing so, it clearly excluded from division immovable
public property situated in the territory of the successor State. That such
property should in principle pass to the successor State upon whose
territory it is located appears an inevitable conclusion and may as such be
considered to be declaratory of customary international law.t?! Rather
40. Ibid., p. 1594.
40;0 Ibid., p. 1594.
4
0
;1 The ILC notes: 'the basic principle may be stated that in general, State property passes from
the predecessor State to the successor State. It is through the application of a material criterion,
namely, the relation which exists between the territory and the property by reason of the nature of
the property or where it is situated, that the principle of the passing of State property can be
deduced': Yearbook of the ILC, 1981, vol. 2, part 2, p. 29.
4
04 Treaty between Netherlands and Belgium, 1839, Art. IS; Agreement between Pakistan and
India, 1947. See also Articles 14, IS(I)(a), 16, 17, 18, Vienna Convention, 1983; Yearbook of the
ILC, 1981, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 33-6; O'Connell, op. cit. above (n. 125), vol. I, pp. 19<J-2oo, 204,
220.
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ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 403
more controversially, the Arbitration Commission proceeds to suggest
that the principle of the locus in quo can be applied to all public property
found on the State in question; in other words that any movable property
found on a successor State's territory would automatically pass to that
State. Here the Commission departs somewhat from the terms of the
Vienna Convention, which provides that only 'movable State property of
the predecessor State connected with the activity of the predecessor State
in respect of the territory to which the succession of States applies shall
pass to the successor State' ....°5 What appears to be the main thrust of the
Convention qualification is that property only accidentally located on the
territory of a particular State should not pass to that State, but rather
should move to the State with whose territory the property has some
connection ....0 6 In that sense, the Arbitration Commission's rule would
appear too broad. However, from a pragmatic point of view, given the
problems that might be associated with defining what property is
'connected with the activity of the predecessor State' ,"'07 the approach
adopted by the Arbitration Commission, with the qualification that
compensation may be payable if the rule results in the very unequal (or
perhaps inequitable) division of property, would appear to be a more
workable approach.
With respect to all other property (property, whether movable or
immovable, located in territory abroad), debts, and archives, the Arbitra-
tion Commission determined that they should be divided among the
successor States, but gave little indication as to the principles that should
govern their division. All that it suggested was that the division should be
broadly equitable and should not take into account the origin or initial
financing of the property, debts, archives or any loans or contributions
made in respect of them.
As regards the principle of equitable apportionrnenr.s?" which clearly
draws upon the notion of equity as employed in the context of maritime
delimitation.v'" the Commission noted that Articles 18, 3 I and 41 of the
Vienna Convention 'do not require that each category of assets or
405 See Article 17, also Articles 14(2)(b), IS(I)(d), 18(1)(c). O'Connell defines the principle in the
following manner: 'only such property as is destined specifically for local use is acquired by the
successor State': op. cit. above (n. 121), vol. I, p. 204.
4
0 h The I LC stated in its commentary that 'the mere fact that movable State property is situated
in the territory to which the succession of States relates should not automatically entitle the
successor State to claim such property': Yearbook of the ILC, 1981, vol. 2, pan 2, p. 29. Cf.
Oppenheim, op. cit. above (n. 121), p. 220, n. 7.
407 Problems would clearly arise with respect to items such as railway rolling-stock, other forms
of public transport and military supplies.
.. oK Crawford notes that this concept may owe something to the notion of 'unjust enrichment'
utilized by O'Connell: Crawford, loc. cit. above (n. 136), p. 46.
409 The I LC explicitly drew upon the notion of equity as an 'autonomous source of law'. It
referred in that context to the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 3, where it
was stated that 'it is not a question of applying equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but of
applying a rule of law which itself requires the application of equitable principles' : Yearbook of the
ILC, 1981, vol. 2, part 2, p. 20
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liabilities be divided in equitable proportions but only that the overall
outcome be an equitable division'v'!" There is some evidence from State
practice that in cases of dismemberment, public property held abroad
should be divided proportionately among the successors,4 1 1 as should the
public debt.v'" There is less evidence from practice that this should be
strictly 'equitable'. As the ILC noted: '[ejquity cannot be assigned the
main role, because there is also a material criterion concerning the
connection between the property and the activity of the predecessor State
in the territory. In fact, the principle of equity is more a balancing
element, a correlative factor designed to preserve the "reasonableness" of
the linkage between the movable State property and the territory.l'"?
With respect to State archives, for example, the position is complex in so
far as some archives will have especial relevance to a particular portion of
territory or its administration, while others will retain their historical and
cultural validity only by being maintained intact. As such, the 'equitable
apportionment' principle could only be applied in a very general
manner.f ':' Ultimately, while the 'equitable apportionment' principle
would appear to be broadly sound, there is a need to establish the
denominators that influence the application of equity in a particular
coritext.v'" In the apportionment of debt, for example, the relevant
considerations might be the proportion of territory or population taken
up by each State, the capacity to honour the debts.v'" or even the extent
to which the successor had already contributed to the debt.f '"
Nevertheless, in the division of property, debts or archives, it would
appear to be the case, as the Arbitration Commission asserts, that their
origin and financing are broadly irrelevant.v'" The one exception pro-
..,0 Opinion No, 13, loc. cit. above (n. 8), p. 1592. Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICY
Reports, 1969, p. 3, where it was stated that '[e]quity does not necessarily imply equality'.
4" e.g., division of diplomatic property abroad on dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, 1963: O'Connell, op. cit. above (n. 12), vol, I, p. 231; Yearbook of the ILC, 1981, vol. 2,
part 2, pp. 46-7.
412 e.g., dissolution of Union of Colombia, 1829; dismemberment of Yugoslavia, 1941; dissolution
of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1963: O'Connell, op. cit. above, (n. 121), vol. I,
pp. 388-<)4. Also dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, Treaty of St Germain, Art. 203. The key to
apportionment is unclear and appears to have varied in each case. See generally Feilchenfeld, op. cit.
above (n. 133), pp. 205-7, 21<)-599; Yearbook of the ILC, 1981, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 72-113.
4'.1 Yearbook of the ILC, 1981, vol. 2, part 2, p. 19.
4'4 Cf. State practice in Yearbook of the ILC, 1981, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 68-71.
4'5 Cf. dissenting opinion of Judge Gross in the Gulf of Maine case, ICY Reports, p. 246, at
P·386.
4
lb This was considered to be a particularly important factor in debt apportionment, but was
excluded from the text of the draft Convention for fear that it might be considered the only relevant
consideration: Yearbook of the ILC, 1981, vol. 2, part 2, p. 113.
417 Cf. Article 14(1)(1), Vienna Convention.
4.11 Some State practice does point to the relevance of financing, however: see Agreement between
Norway and Sweden, 1906, Article 6, cited in Yearbook of the ILC, 1981, vol. 2, part 2, p. 46. Cf.
dispute over the application of principles of locus in quo or financial contribution in case concerning
Cession of Vessels and Tugs for Navigation on the Danube (1921), Reports of International Arbitral
Awards, vol, I, pp. 97-212.
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ARBITRATION COMMISSION ON YUGOSLAVIA 405
vided by the Vienna Convention of 1983 is that in the case of 'Newly
Independent States' both movable and immovable property situated
outside the territory of the State 'shall pass to the successor State in
proportion to the contribution of the dependent territory'. 419 It is clear,
however, that this is a controversial provision and that in any case the
former Yugoslav Republics do not fall within the category of 'Newly
Independent States' as defined by the Convention.v'"
The Arbitration Commission was faced with two problems in this
context that related to the particular characteristics of the SFRY. The
first, arising from the federal structure of the Yugoslav State, was that the
1974 Constitution transferred to the constituent Republics ownership of
many items of property. These items of property, according to the
Arbitration Commission, cannot be held to have belonged to the SFRY
'whatever their origin or initial financing'. 421 What is confusing about the
Arbitration Commission's position on this point is that it either appears
to distinguish between public property held by the Federation and public
property held by the various Republics; or it assumes that once property
is handed over to the Republics it becomes private property for the
purposes of succession.v'" Neither position appears particularly sat-
isfactory: the first option assumes that despite the dismemberment of the
SFRY, there was some de jure continuity of sovereignty at a regional
level; the second option distorts reality by suggesting that the various
Republics were essentially non-governmental or private entities during
the life of the Federation. What the Arbitration Commission clearly had
in mind was the fact that if property could be clearly attributed to a
particular piece of territory, it should presumptively pass to the State
which assumes responsibility for that territory. As such, it might have
been better for the Commission to suggest that such property would pass
to the successors by virtue of the locus in quo principle, rather than to
exclude it a priori.
The second problem confronting the Arbitration Commission was that
the SFRY had possessed a 'particularly highly developed' concept of
'social ownership' in which certain items of what might be considered
'public' property, debts and archives were held by 'associated labour
organizations'-bodies with their own legal personality. With respect to
those organizations that operated exclusively within the jurisdiction of
one Republic, the Commission took a territorial approach in asserting
that 'their property, debts and archives are not to be divided for the
·.. 9 Article 15 .
...0 Article 2( 1 )(e) defines 'newly independent States' as successor States 'the territory of which
immediately before the date of the succession of States was a dependent territory for the
international relations of which the predecessor State was responsible '. See Yearbook of the ILC,
1974, vol. 2, pp. 175-6·
"'" Opinion :.'-Jo. 14, loc. cit. above (n. 8), p. 1594.
.... Cf. the distinction between State debt, local debt, and localized debt: see Yearbook of the ILC,
1981, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 74-5; O'Connell, op. cit. above (n. 121), vol. I, pp. 416 fl.
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purposes of state succession: each successor state exercises its sovereign
powers in respect of them' :~23 In relation to those organizations that
operated 'social ownership' at a federal level, or in two or more republics,
the position was a little more complex. The Commission determined that
where the organizations 'exercised public prerogatives on behalf of the
SFRY or of individual republics' their property, debts and archives
should be divided between the successors.~2~ On the other hand,
'organizations operating at a federal level or in two or more republics but
not exercising such prerogatives should be considered private-sector
enterprises to which state succession does not apply'. ~25
Essentially, this was a classic example in which resort to the municipal
law of the predecessor State failed to clarify for the purposes of
succession whether the property in question was either public or
private.~26 The Arbitration Commission resorted therefore to a func-
tional division in which the test was whether or not the organization
concerned exercised 'public prerogatives' on behalf of the SFRY or
individual republics. This test appears to be an appropriate and prag-
matic response to a question which cannot easily be resolved by resort to
rules of universal application. ~27
The Arbitration Commission came to address a similar problem in its
fifteenth opinion in which it was asked to consider, first, whether the
National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY) was entitled to take decisions
relating to property, rights and interests that should be divided among
the successor States; and secondly, whether the central banks of the
successor States succeeded to the rights and obligations of the NBY
deriving from international agreements with the latter.v'" The Commis-
sion began by noting that '[a]lthough municipal laws are merely facts in
international law (Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926
PClj, Ser. A, NO.7, 12), account must nevertheless be taken of the
structure and responsibilities of the NBY as set out in the SFRY
Constitution of 21 February 1974 and in the NBY Statute of November
1989'.~29 It then confirmed that '[a]s the bank of issue of the SFRY, the
NBY participated in the exercise of the prerogatives of sovereignty' and
was responsible for carrying out common currency issue, credit and
foreign exchange policy as a 'composite of banking institutions'. As the
NBY 'partook of the State power of the SFRY', and as its collective
4
2
.1 Opinion No. 14, loe. cit. above (n. 8), p. 1594.
4 24 Ibid.
4 25 Ibid., p. 1595.
42" Cf. Article 8, Vienna Convention, 1983.
427 Cf. Peter Pazmany University case, PC IJ, Series A/B, No. 61, p. 237. It should be noted that
many treaties specifically provide definitions of State property, e.g. Annexes to Treaty of 1960
establishing the Republic of Cyprus. Cf. also GA Resn. 388(V), 15 December 1950 (in respect of
Libya); GA Resn. 530 (VI), 29 January 1952 (in respect of Eritrea).
4
2
1'1 Opinion No. 15, loe. cit. above (n. 8), pp. 1595-6.
429 Ibid., p. 1596.
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structure subsequently disintegrated with the SFRY, none of its organs
'can take legitimate decisions in respect of property, rights and interests
that should be divided between the successor States of SFRY'. The
Arbitration Commission added that the only legitimate role for the NBY
in such circumstances would be as a 'coordinating agency' acting on
behalf of the central banks of the successor States for the purposes of
'jurisdictio inter volens to effect-rather than obstruct-the division of the
property, rights and interests of the former SFRY'.
As regards the second question, the Arbitration Commission distin-
guished between those rights and obligations that attach to the NBY as
an organ of the SFRY, and those which it has assumed 'acting as a bank
with its own legal personality'. The former are subject to State succes-
sion but 'do not pass automatically to the central banks of the States
emerging from the dissolution of the SFRY' in that 'it is for each of the
successor States to determine, by virtue of its sovereign constitutional
powers, how these rights are to be exercised and these obligations
discharged'. On this point, the Arbitration Commission clearly had in
mind the doctrine of 'acquired rights' that underlies the notion of
succession in the Vienna Convention.s-? namely that rights and obliga-
tions are not 'inherited' as in municipal law, but rather that the interests
they embody are 'acquired' in virtue of the succession. As the Vienna
Convention points out, '[tjhe passing of State debts entails the extinction
of the obligations of the predecessor State and the arising of the
obligations of the successor State in respect of the State debts which pass
to the successor State'. -1-31 Accordingly, debts, property, and archives, are
'transferred' to, or 'assumed' by, the successor State, which merely
inherits a state of fact over which it, or another party, has an equitable
interest.r-" As the ILC explained:
Succession of States in respect of State debts can create a relationship between
the predecessor State and the successor State with regard to debts which linked
the former to the third State, but ... it cannot, in itself, establish any direct legal
relationship between the creditor third State and the successor State, should the
latter 'assume' the debt of the predecessor.e-?
It follows that although the third parties retain their legal interest in the
property formerly held by the NBY, they cannot enforce that interest vis-
a-vis the successor States in virtue of the original agreement. -I-H By the
same token the successor States, while not 'inheriting' any rights and
obligations under the original agreement, are obliged under international
4.l° The question of 'acquired rights' was particularly controversial in the work of the I LC: see
Yearbook of the ILC, 1969, vol. 2, p. 69.
4.l ' Vienna Convention, 1983, Article 34. Cf. also Articles 9 and 21.
4.'2 O'Connell, op. cit. above (n. 121), vol. I, pp. 237-<).
Hl Yearbook of the ILC, 1981, vol. 2, part 2, p. 81.
4.H Ibid., p. 83.
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law to discharge any obligations owed to third parties to which they have
succeeded.
As regards the ordinary commitments undertaken by the NBY 'acting
as a bank with its own legal personality', the Arbitration Commission
offered no direct opinion-it merely asserted that any such rights and
obligations do not pass to the successor State. The matter is also left open
by the Vienna Convention of 1983, which specifically provides that
nothing in the Convention should be considered 'as prejudging in any
respect any questions relating to the rights and obligations of natural or
juridical persons'.~35 The position adopted by the Arbitration Commis-
sion may be interpreted in two ways: either that private rights and
obligations became bona vacantia with the extinction of the SFRY, or
that they remained intact, entirely unaffected by the change in sover-
eignty. It has to be assumed, given the palpable need for stability and
certainty in legal relations, that the Arbitration Commission considered
the second interpretation to be the case.
3.3.5. War damages
In one of the more straightforward questions, the Commission was
asked whether any amounts owed by one or more parties in the form of
war damages should affect the distribution of State property, archives
and debts in connection with the succession process.s>" The Commission
began by pointing out that the rules applicable to State succession were
distinct from those relating to State responsibility. ~37 Accordingly, the
division of assets and liabilities of the SFRY must be effected without the
question of war damages being allowed to interfere in the matter of State
succession. However, it admitted that 'the possibility cannot be
excluded ... of setting off assets and liabilities to be transferred under
the rules of State succession on the one hand against war damages on the
other' .~3H
In essence the Commission was probably correct in suggesting that in
the equitable apportionment of the assets and liabilities of the SFRY, it
would not be appropriate to bring into account the question of responsi-
bility of one Republic vis-a-vis another. It might well be asked, however,
whether it is correct to distinguish categorically between the principles
relating to State succession and those of State responsibility. In that
respect one might recall the definition adopted by the Arbitration
Commission in its first opinion, namely that succession entails the
'replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the inter-
national relations of territory' (emphasis added).">" On one view at least,
+.15 Vienna Convention, 1983, Article 6.
+.11> Opinion No. 13, loc. cit. above (n. 8).
+.17 Ibid., p. 159 2 •
+.111 Ibid.
+.19 Opinion No. I, loc. cit. above (n. 5).
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questions of State succession can be seen to be merely a specific species
of problems that lie within the genus of issues of State responsibility.
The point of distinction to which the Arbitration Commission appeared
to refer is that whereas State responsibility primarily concerns the
existence and consequence of illegal acts in international law, State
succession is concerned with the 'transfer' of that responsibility or its
'assumption' by a successor State. When looked at from the point of view
of successor States, however, one might question whether there is a great
difference between the attribution of responsibility following a rule of
succession and its attribution directly in virtue of the principle of pacta
sunt servanda or other principles of customary international law.
The obvious point in the context of war damages was whether, and to
what extent, the various Republics were responsible for the damage
caused in the months of conflict that started in mid- I 99 1 and continued
thereafter. Although it was clearly preferable, from a pragmatic point of
view, to separate the question of war damages from that of the more
general question of succession, in so far as the identity of the various
parties in that period was unclear the question would clearly arise as to
whether anyone of the Republics could be held responsible for the
tortious acts committed in the name of the SFRY. That this is not merely
a remote possibility is highlighted by the fact that the SFRY was not, in
the opinion of the Arbitration Commission at least, defunct until July
1992, by which time a considerable amount of fighting had already taken
place. A point that the Arbitration Commission might have made,
however, is that it is a general principle in the law of succession that a
successor State is not liable for the delicts of its predecessor.v'" Accord-
ingly, if the claims for war damages in question were of a strictly
unliquidated nature, even if they were attributable to an act of the SFRY
itself, they would not pass to the successor State and would therefore not
be relevant as regards the division of assets and liabilities. In essence, this
would render the same conclusion as that offered by the Arbitration
Commission, but would achieve it by a more consistent line of reason-
mg.
4. CONCLUSIONS
It is undoubtedly the case that the opinions of the Arbitration
Commission, taken as a body, represent a unique and important exam-
ination of the legal issues that attach to the dismemberment of a State. It
has rarely been the case that an independent body of legal experts has
been asked to consider the whole range of issues relating to statehood,
HO Robert E. Brow" case, Annual Digest, "01. 2, No, 35. There is some doubt whether the principle
can be strictly applied: see Lighthouses arbitration, 2] I LR 81; O'Connell, op. cit. above (n. 121), \'01.
I, pp. 482-6.
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recognition, self-determination, territorial integrity, and succession, in
relation to the break-up of a single State, and to map their development
as events unfold. It is equally rare for a quasi-judicial body to play such
an active part in the process of dismemberment itself. As has been noted,
even if the opinions of the Arbitration Commission were delivered in a
consultative capacity (a point which was not entirely clear in the early
stages) and for that reason are not to be regarded as res judicata, they
nevertheless played an influential part in creating the necessary frame-
work within which subsequent State practice developed. It is particularly
clear, for example, that the Arbitration Commission's first opinion, in
which it found the SFRY to be 'in the process of dissolution', not only set
the scene for the subsequent recognition of the emergent Republics, but
also provided the impetus for the subsequent exclusion of the FRY from
automatic membership in international organizations.
The precise role and terms of reference of the Arbitration Commission
was particularly unclear in the early stages of its work. It was created
pursuant to an agreed statement adopted at the opening session of the
International Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, at which it was
determined that an arbitral procedure should be established to which the
relevant authorities would be competent to submit their differences.
Thereafter, however, it did not undertake a normal process of arbitra-
tion: no compromis was agreed for the submission of disputes to the
Commission, and no awards were delivered. Instead, the Commission
delivered a series of 'opinions' as an advisory, or consultative, body to the
Chairman (or later the Steering Committee) of the Conference. It also
delivered a number of opinions relating to questions of recognition that
had been submitted to it by the Council of Ministers of the EC.
Although its terms of reference were later revised and made more
explicit, the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Commission was still chal-
lenged on two occasions by the FRY. On each occasion, the Arbitration
Commission dismissed the challenge and continued to deliver the
opinions as requested. In doing so, it drew heavily upon the case law of
the IC] in respect of its advisory jurisdiction. It has been argued that
there are cogent reasons for distinguishing between the advisory jurisdic-
tion of the IC] and that of the Arbitration Commission or other bodies
similarly positioned. With respect to all permanent tribunals which
operate an advisory jurisdiction as part of their participation in the
activities of the Organization to which they are responsible, it is clear that
that jurisdiction is materially related to the object and purpose of the
Organization as a whole. If, as in the case of the IC], there is a close,
'organic', relationship between the Court and the Organization, it is
acceptable to presume that member States have consented to the
jurisdiction of the Court to the extent to which the role of the Court is
concerned with the purposes of the Organization. If, however, there is no
clear organic relationship (as in the case of the PCI]), or the object and
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purpose of the organization (or indeed the tribunal itself) are obscure, the
chain of consent cannot lightly be presumed. In other words, it would be
highly inappropriate for an institutional tribunal to offer an opinion on a
question that related to the substance of a dispute between States without
their explicit consent, unless it was apparent that consent could be
imputed through the existence of a clear institutional interest. Whether
or not that is the case is dependent both upon the terms of the constituent
instrument and the extent to which the organization has international
personality in its own right in which its interest may be developed. In the
case of the Arbitration Commission, it is doubtful whether the independ-
ent interest of the Conference could be materially demonstrated as
regards questions relating to the statehood of the FRY, particularly in so
far as the distinct identity of the Conference could scarcely be dis-
cerned.
Notwithstanding the possible doubts regarding its jurisdiction, the
Arbitration Commission produced a series of opinions which have
important implications for the development of public international law.
Some of the main points that can be drawn from an analysis (and in some
instances a development) of its conclusions are as follows:
I) When a State loses the majority of its population and territory
through the involuntary disassociation of one or more territorial units, so
that the remaining entity is forced to reconstitute itself constitutionally,
it may be presumed to have suffered dismemberment. Despite the
suggestions of the Arbitration Commission, it is considered that the
determinants of this process do not (and should not) change according to
the type of government that is exercised over the territory, whether that
be unitary or federal. Equally, it is considered that whether or not the
material facts point towards the dismemberment or continuation of the
State may ultimately be confirmed or denied by the individual apprecia-
tion of the States concerned, and that of other members of the inter-
national community. It cannot be sustained, particularly in light of the
case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that the legal function of diplomatic recog-
nition is 'purely' declaratory.
2) If a State is identified as being in the process of dismemberment
(i.e. that a majority of the constituent territorial units, which embody the
majority of the population, have undertaken to disassociate themselves
from the parent State), no presumption will be operated in favour of the
continued effectiveness of the parent State. Accordingly, the entities that
emerge therefrom will be able to establish their sovereignty and state-
hood with greater ease than would be the case if they had merely seceded.
Whilst this does not mean that the parent State has technically trans-
ferred its sovereignty over the territory concerned to the emergent
entities, it may otherwise be assimilated to a case of devolution, at least
as far as the emergent States are concerned.
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3) Whereas in cases of secession, the identity of the nascent State will
be relatively clear, that is not necessarily the case with respect to
dismemberment which, as a process, does not identify per se the
presumptive units for future statehood. That, however, is to be deter-
mined not by resort to the principle of self-determination, nor by a strict
application of the principle of effectiveness, but rather in virtue of the
principle of uti possidetis juris. In this context, uti possidetis operates not
merely to seal the boundaries of the emergent entities, but also serves to
distinguish between those entities that have a right to territorial sover-
eignty and those that do not. In other words, independent territorial
units that exist within the borders of a former administrative unit have to
establish their statehood as against the presumptive effectiveness of the
unit as a whole. This rule is not affected by the application of the
principle of self-determination.
4) All successor States are bound by peremptory norms of inter-
national law relating to the rights of peoples, individuals and (possibly)
minorities, and the principle of self-determination requires all successor
States to allow every individual a right to choose to belong to the ethnic,
religious or language community of his or her choice (subject to the
necessary interests of the community). More doubtfully, it may also
entail a right of individual members of minorities to choose their
nationality.
5) All States emerging from a process of dismemberment are equal
successors in title, and a fortiori, none of them can be considered to be the
continuation of the former parent State. All successor States are under an
obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to achieving an equitable
distribution of the assets and liabilities of the parent State. Failure to
co-operate to that end may invoke the international responsibility of the
State concerned, and any State suffering loss is entitled to take non-
forcible counter-measures in accordance with international law.
6) In the distribution of assets and liabilities, immovable property on
the territory of the successor States is subject to the principle of the locus
in quo. This is also, but more doubtfully, the case in respect of movable
property. As regards other State property, archives and debts, including
that on the territory of third States, they should be distributed among the
successor States according to the principle of equitable apportionment.
That principle itself does not require division according to equal
proportions, but merely that the division should be broadly equitable.
These broad principles, which form the heart of the Arbitration
Commission's opinions, are by no means without their problems and in
places are obscured by some of the Commission's own reasoning. The
approach of the Commission, on occasion, tended to be excessively rigid
and deterministic, particularly as regards its findings in respect to
statehood. On other occasions it adopted an over-ambitious approach, as
for example in its views in respect of the content of jus cogens. In many
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instances, however, the Commission was attempting to deal with the very
difficult and specific problems that arose in relation to the events in
Yugoslavia, and for that reason, even if its views cannot always be
accepted as general, and universal, propositions, they may nevertheless
provide an indication as to the direction in which the various aspects of
international law are developing.
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